

Chapter –V

Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mind

5.1 Introduction:

Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind occupies a significant place in modern analytic philosophy. Modern philosophy of mind begins with the French philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes. It is almost exclusively concerned with the mind/body problem. Wittgenstein as a modern analytical philosopher is against the views regarding Descartes philosophy of mind.¹ The recent history of the philosophy of mind can be seen as one tide of Descartes philosophy attempting to swallow up the other, counteracting his immaterialism by prevailing the other side of his mental-physical divide.² The philosophy of mind studied by Wittgenstein opens up a new horizon in the field of analytic philosophy.

5.2 Descartes' Concept of Mind:

The 17th century French philosopher and mathematician, Rene Descartes broadly discussed in his two Meditations, (Meditation No. II and Meditation No.-VI), the nature of human mind and its relation to the body.

According to Descartes, mind is a substance with no extension, whose essential nature is to think. By 'thinking' Descartes means all of these activities which we commonly associate with the mental, namely desiring, feeling, judging willing and so on. The mind is unique, dynamic inter teleological rather than mechanical and non-spatial. It is simple, indivisible substance. In this way Descartes holds that there is no thinking apart from something which thinks. So, the mind is that thing which thinks and that thing is a substance vastly different from land independent of the great space time mechanical works of physics.

In his great work, *Meditation*, Descartes elaborates that both mind and body are two distinct separate and independent substances. Body, Descartes concludes is extensive, inter-subject to mechanical laws, having no desire, purpose or power of spontaneous motion. Motion is the action by which a body passes from one place to another. Motion is the transporting of one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with to the vicinity of other bodies. Body conceived as mere extension and passive and cannot move itself; therefore Descartes takes recourse to God as the first cause of motion in the world. God originally created matter along with motion and rest and alone God has given the world a certain amount of motion and it is constant. Bodies cannot produce motion of themselves, consequently they can neither increase nor decrease it, and hence the quantity of motion and rest must remain the same. All changes in the world of bodies must follow according to constant rules or laws of nature. Laws of nature are laws of motion. All differences in bodies are explained as different relation of the parts.

Descartes holds that the mind is a thing or entity, separate and distinct from the body and it is the subject of consciousness. The body is a thing or entity whose essence consists of occupying space like having shape, size and location in space and it is in no sense conscious. The mind on the other hand, is completely different from body. It is utterly non-spatial, having neither shape, size, nor location. Mind's essential characteristic is consciousness that is thoughts, feelings, memories, perceptions, desires, emotion etc. The mind and the body are separate entities, each can exist without their other. Descartes himself believed that animals (other than man) were also examples of bodies without mind. Descartes believed that minds are immortal, they continue to exist as disembodied minds after the body has perished.

Thus Descartes shows that there are two independent substances called mind and body.

Descartes never holds that particular physical objects are substance. When he comes to understand the physical universe he draws a distinction between the whole and the part. By whole he, however, does not mean aggregate but opposes to it and it is prior to, and of a higher degree of reality than, the parts. He maintains that infinite matter is the whole thing and particular physical objects are parts. This infinite matter is the ground of particular physical objects and as such more real than the parts. But he does not make any such distinction when comes to understand the nature of the self. He says that self is an absolutely isolated individual and as such he abstracts it from the physical world as well as from society and doing so he subscribes to an individualistic doctrine of the relation between the individual and the individual society. Thus, his concept of morality is purely individualistic.

According to Descartes, self is created by God and so it is free. He makes a distinction of two kinds of freedom. He says that the individual self being creation of the free will of God, is not the result of any mechanical process. Hence the self is itself free and there is nothing to interfere in his freedom, because he is originally endowed with freedom. But Descartes maintains that matter is not free like self because the physical universe is subject to the principle of mechanical laws.

Descartes maintains the human mind is in contact with objects and their qualities. It is also in contact with external truths. He divided objects into two classes. These are thinking things and extended or physical objects. When he attributes any kind of qualities or affections to object, these are nothing but the result of the interaction between mind and body. He says that the essence of the body is simply to be extended.

Descartes seems to have explained away the mechanical pressure of the body on the mind by the mediating services of the animal spirits terminating in the pineal gland. Similarly he shows that the mind acts on the body by moving the animal spirits in the pineal gland which coursing through muscles leads to bodily movement. The mind only excites the bodily movements without imparting its own energy into the material series. Descartes tried to show the absolute dualism of mind and body by pointing out at least one place of pineal gland as their meeting ground. The soul being a spirit does not need a seal like any material body but it can occupy space in the pineal gland and there seems to be no reason why it should not occupy the whole body.

Descartes' 'Dualism' has a human personality and it declares that they act upon each other. We know that the total amount of physical energy in the universe is constant and one kind of physical energy can be transformed into another without any loss of quantity, but no physical energy can be transformed into mental energy. The dualism of Descartes contradicts the law of conservation of energy. Therefore the dualism is not scientific. Reality as a whole cannot be the objects of any one's observation and it remains supersensible. Naturally God cannot be known in scientific way. To say that interaction taking place at the brain does not solve the problem of the relation between immaterial soul and material body. According to J. R. Searle, "Descartes views have led to endless debates and it is fair to say that he left us with more problem than solution."³

This Dualistic theory of Descartes faces various problems like – how can an immaterial spirit influence the workings of a material body? If mental states are completely private then how can we know that we are justified in ascribing them to other people at all? How can one know that the correlations between mental states and

physical states are the same in other as in him since it is not possible for him to know at least once the correlation going on in other person. With reference to the above we can write the observation of Wittgenstein.

5.3 Wittgenstein on Mind:

It is seen that Wittgenstein has not directly spoken about mind, but from various sources of his philosophical thoughts his assumptions on mind have been considered in this study. Wittgenstein criticizes Descartes' theory from different perspectives. According to Wittgenstein, mental predicate does not refer to anything private. The meaning of the mind predicates must be explained in terms of overt behavior. In his conception mind is nothing but some activities or function such as thinking, feeling, willing etc which are related to person's behaviour. For Wittgenstein the attribution of intention, desire, intelligence, excitement and so on are to be understood as attribution of a disposition to behave in a characteristic manner in suitable circumstances. Mental states are names of particular patterns of behavior, they cannot cause the behavior in question. Wittgenstein holds that mind does not refer to any separate substance or entity. The thesis that there is a logical connection between inner process and overt behavior seems to be implied by Wittgenstein's claim that behavior provides the criterion for ascribing mental predicates. Wittgenstein says that, *an inner process stand in need of outer criteria.*⁴ The thoughts of human being are expressed in their behavior. If someone suffers from toothache then either there is natural behavior of pain or commotional behavior of pain, and it cannot be kept hidden. For example pain behavior only related to pain. Inner always needs the outer. Outward behavior is logical necessary. It is necessary of condition of pain but not the sufficient condition of pain. In this context Wittgenstein writes-

*A wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is no part of the mechanism.*⁵

In this version, Wittgenstein means that just as for a wheel of a machine to be regarded as a part of the machine, it is necessary that when the wheel moves, some other parts of the machine also must move with it, similarly, he argues that external behavior is not meaningful to us if there is nothing internal. Here, we can say that Wittgenstein does not reject the innerness of mind all together.

Wittgenstein feels that we cannot reject the mental state altogether in explaining certain mental concepts. He maintains that in remembering there is a mental process. In this context he writes –

*Why should I deny that there is a mental process? But there mental process of remembering.....' means nothing more than I have just remembered ...' to deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering, to deny that anyone ever remembers anything.*⁶

Memory is the mental process. In our everyday life we take the help of memory, to deny the mental process would mean to deny remembering, deny that anyone ever remembers anything. For example, whenever one tries to remember something or whenever one tries to remember what he did in the last evening, he just goes on correlating one action with another and in this way, he finally remembers what he did. This sort of correlation is completely a process of thinking. He does not behave in a particular way to do this sort of thinking and this is completely a mental process. Therefore it can be said that Wittgenstein does not deny the mental process.

Wittgenstein tries to clear the philosophical confusion concerning our talk about the mental. When we ascribe a pain, a thought, an intention, etc to ourselves it

seems that we cannot be mistaken in these ascriptions. Things seem very different with the ascription of mental predicates to others. Wittgenstein's observation- *I can only believe that someone else is in pain, but I know it if I am*⁷ makes us to think to suppose that we attribute mental predicates to others using some form of analogical reasoning. Unfortunately, under scrutiny, such analogical arguments appear too weak to give us good reason to suppose that another person has undergone the same pain as I am. This concept about the sensation of pain leads us to skepticism. To avoid skepticism Wittgenstein adopts a behaviouristic analysis of ascription of mental predicates to others. We can assume mental qualities in others with their dispositions to behave in certain ways. So Wittgenstein Views-

“But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behavior accompanied by pain and pain-behavior without any pain?” –admit it? What greater difference could there be? –“And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing” – Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here.

*The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always function in one way always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts – which may be about houses pains good and evil, or anything else you please.*⁸

The clear implication of this passage is that philosophical problems about the mental have arisen through treating mental ascriptions on the model of talk

concerning chairs, houses, and the like. It is not a nothing. It is something about which nothing could be said. In this context Wittgenstein writes –

“But you surely cannot deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place.” –What gives the impression that we want to deny anything? When one says, “Still, an inner process does take place here” – one wants to go on: “After all, you see it.” And it is this inner process that one means by the word “remembering” – The impression that we wanted to deny something arise from our setting our faces against the picture of the ‘inner process’. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word “to remember”. We say that this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is.”⁹

According to Wittgenstein, problems about the mental arise because of the uncritical assumption that mental terms get their meanings through referring to ‘hidden’ mental processes. On that assumption, problems about the mental are intractable. Wittgenstein comparison of statements about the mental with natural expressions of feelings is an attempt to break the spell of one way of viewing such discourse through nothing similarities to certain non referential uses of language.¹⁰

Wittgenstein’s reflection on the nature of mind is expressed in his later work, the *Philosophical Investigations*. According to Wittgenstein, meaning and understanding is neither to name nor to describe mental occurrences. In this treatment of meaning and understanding it is found that he is originally motivated by the relationship between language and the mind. Wittgenstein asserts that language is the essential

part of our life, there is a relation between language and mind. In this respect Wittgenstein writes –

It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: “they do not think, and that is why they do not talk.” But – they simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use language – if we accept the most primitive forms of language. – Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, and playing. ¹¹

In this version, Wittgenstein tries to show that only minded being can speak the language. Other animals of this universe do not talk because they have no mind. From the history of human civilization, it is seen that there are various types of languages such as commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting etc. which can be compared with the natural and essential functions of human being such as walking, eating, drinking, playing etc. Like these human’s functions, language is essential part of our life and it is related with our mind. Therefore, the new frame work aims at making mind available in the space occupied by language. That is, it makes mind as transparent as the world in language itself. This result is making language the home of mind and the world.

Wittgenstein liberates the concept of mind from the Cartesian conception of the inner world and puts it back in the outer world of the linguistic and other activities. He realizes that language is like a game which is played by every human being in their life through performing different physical expressions. According to Wittgenstein, mind is a part of the world where the language games take place. He asserts that the world is not a set of dead material objects. There are various sorts of

objects such as plants, animals, human beings etc. Among of them, it is found that the question of consciousness arises only in case of human being who speaks language. In this context, Christoffer Geftwert remarks that, “speaking language is a complicated process and it is possible due to our mind.”¹² It is because of this that mind thought and other mental states are ascribed to human beings. It is the human beings who have the capacity to relate themselves to the world by virtue of their cognitive and other interests in the world. In this context Wittgenstein views –

*Can one think without speaking? - And what is thinking? -Well, don't you ever think? Can't you observe yourself and see what is going on? I should be quite simple. You do not have to wait for it as for an astronomical event and then perhaps make your observation in a hurry.*¹³

According to Wittgenstein, speaking language is another name of thinking. Thinking is the function of the mind; Therefore, Wittgenstein admits that there is a relation between languages and mind. As a function of mind ‘thinking’ is expressed through language. There is a deep bond between language and mind. The rationality of thinking is the outcome of mind and it results in languages. Thus it can be maintained that mind and language are interrelated.

Wittgenstein states that language serves as the best medium of relating our mind to the world and mind does not stand apart from the world as a transcendental entity, but directly enters the world as a function of the linguistic activities. Thinking and representing the world are the same and the activity of representing the world means we have already thought about the world. Thus the mind in Wittgenstein’s conception represents universe without standing apart from the world because ultimately it is language which does the representing rational mental activity.

Language reflects the world as it is and thus there is a representational relation between the world and human mind. That is why mind is not a cogito type relation of Descartes and it is also not a substance according to Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein wants to establish the mind in behavioral expression. Our sensations are not inner and private. Mental states are reflected in outer expression. In this context Wittgenstein writes-

“What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word ‘tooth-ache’.” – Well, let’s assume the child is genius and itself invents a name for the sensation! - But then, of course, he couldn’t make himself understood when he used the word. – So does he understand the name, without being able to explain its meaning to anyone? –But what does it mean to say that he has ‘named his pain’? – How has he done this naming of pain?! And whatever he did, what was its purpose? –When one says “He gave a name to his sensation” one forgets that a great deal of stage setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And when we speak of someone’s has given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word ‘pain’; it shews the post where the new word is stationed.¹⁴

Therefore Wittgenstein’s concept of mind is assimilated into the linguistic function of representing the world. According to him, sensation and sensation words are use in language publicly. Sensation words are learned by others because it is already practised in language game. Wittgenstein finds the mind world certainty

logically available is metaphysical certainty which involves the certainty about our language game. He writes –

*When philosophers use a word – “Knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name”-and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language- game which is its original home? – What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.*¹⁵

The certainty occurring to our language and forms of life is the certainty needed so far as our beliefs about the world are concerned. Wittgenstein wants to emphasize on the certainty of the existence of the world as its existence is a part of the framework of our thinking and using language and so there could be no place for the universal doubt about the existence of the world. The use of language itself presupposes that the world exists and that the world being as it is, it makes language use possible. In this way Wittgenstein guarantees metaphysical certainty to the existence of the world and also to that of the mind in the sense that both thought and language are part of the world. Wittgenstein also argues for the mind in the world rather than for the mind that is outside the world. The mind is intimately connected with the world since without the world we cannot think of what mind is.

It is obvious that man is the minded being. Those beings who use language or at least are capable of learning language are said to be minded beings. The unique fact about man as the minded being is that he is capable of speaking and learning language. Having a language and having a thought are one and the same thing because those who speak a language are capable of showing the signs of having thoughts, hopes and expectations etc. According to Wittgenstein, there is a natural

history of the human species that determines why human beings alone are minded beings. The world and the minded beings constitute the reality and so there could not be a gap between the world on the one hand, and the human mind on the other side. The world has a history of the minded beings themselves. Wittgenstein clearly indicates that though mind is irreducible, it is yet the co-partner of the body. Therefore Wittgenstein says,

The human body is the best picture of the human soul. ¹⁶

Wittgenstein deeply believes that mind reflects the body that is why the body is a picture of mind. The activities of the soul are reflected in the body. So mind and body are not separate entities, but two sides of a coin. Indirectly body implies the existence of mind. Since body and mind are not separate from each other, therefore body stands as a picture of mind. That is why Wittgenstein says that body is like a picture of the human mind.

The mind is still autonomous for Wittgenstein because the language in which we talk of mind is itself not reducible to a language of things. In the later work, the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein looks upon language game as a form of life. In the other words, he gives up the meaning reference dichotomy. The entire communicative system is treated by Wittgenstein as a game and apart from meaning and referring Wittgenstein says that the various ways in which language is used are specific language games, for example giving orders, reporting an event, play acting, asking, greeting etc. We are misled, when instead of looking at multifarious use of language, we come forward with some unique explanation that claims to reveal the essence of language. In fact a language game is an use of language for some purpose. Language is not something artificially constructed for the use of philosophers but it is rather an instrument. That is to say –

Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, picture, of the world. These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each. (But what are these words to be used for now? The language-game in which they are to be applied is missing).¹⁷

Speaking a language and understanding it is a matter of being 'able to do a variety of things.' Therefore it can be said that the speaking a language is engaging in certain modes of human behavior. It is to engage in 'form of life' and 'to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life'.¹⁸ Words are pieces used in various language games and also word is determined by its role in the various language games in which it occurs, the kind of behavior in which its use is embedded. So, Wittgenstein believes that language is almost inseparably connected with life. But it does not mean that some sort of non-linguistic activity is always essential for the use of a word.

In concept of language rule following is necessary which is related to mind. Wittgenstein goes to maintain that in the more strict sense rules do not determine what a game (or use) is. Wittgenstein shows that 'following a rule' is as much dependent on 'practice as playing a game. He views –

And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.¹⁹

From this quotation it is proved that rules are not private things. Rules are obeyed by public or common masses. Wittgenstein asserts that rule is not an individual process.

Wittgenstein examines misleading features of the traditional doctrines of meaning, namely, meaning and understanding as mental activity. It is believed that the speaker intends his words to mean something and meaning is thus a mental activity. In order to say something definitely, the speaker must not only utter or write a sentence, he must also mean something by mental activity. Wittgenstein describes this 'tendency to search the life of meaning in the mental activity as disease'²⁰ According to Wittgenstein, words are lifeless in themselves, there must be something, in addition, to give them meaning. But it is wrong to assume that it is a mental activity or process that gives meaning to a word. It is rather the use of a word in language which makes it meaningful. Wittgenstein states that meaning and understanding are not determined by what goes on in the speaker's and hearer's mind. Meaning is the stream of life that makes an expression significant. The meaning is the mental activity and it is embedded in the circumstances where we seem to say something and mean something else. Wittgenstein maintains that the mental words 'thinking' and 'meaning' do not designate any inner process. If there were inner processes running along concurrently with the physical processes of speaking, we should be able to recognize and identify these alleged processes by introspection. Certainly it is possible to say something and to mean something else, but usually it is gestures, tone of voice, facial expressions and a variety of actions and experiences of different kinds before and after which distinguish meaning what we say from not meaning. In this context Wittgenstein argues-

*If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of.*²¹

Wittgenstein tries to ponder into the primary activity of mind as he believes that mind is not a concrete object. It can be seen/felt in human language. Since mind

is abstract its elusive or mysterious quality cannot be understood even by God. In this version Wittgenstein tries to show that generally there is no mental content designated by mental words even in the situation where a mental content seems to be present. The meaning of a word is not determined by its occurrence. The word meaning is used in a variety of situation and it is not positive to maintain that in all these situations it is the occurrence of a mysterious act in the mind which justifies the use of this mental content. Wittgenstein writes –

It would be quite misleading, in this last case, for instance, to call the words a “description of a mental state.” – One might rather call them a ‘signal’; and we judge whether it was rightly employed by what he goes on to do. ²²

Wittgenstein says that the use is the existence of mental preparation of both the speaker and the hearer. Here we see that the hearer must not only listen to what a speaker says, he must be attentive and try to grasp it carefully. It suggests us that when a speaker understands the sense of language something occurs in his mind, which justifies us to say that he has now understood it. In this context Wittgenstein writes –

Is what we call “obey a rule” something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to only once in his life? – This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression “to obey a rule.” It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. – To obey a rule, to

*make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).*²³

Wittgenstein does admit that it is a natural way to regard understanding as a mental activity. A picture or a formula may come before our mind. It may be correct to say that someone solved a problem because he understood the formula. But these admissions do not establish the thesis that the essence of understanding an expression consists in the mental content. Wittgenstein analysis is to examine the notion of knowing how to go on the grammar of the word to understand. We may take the example, suppose, A writes the series 1, 5, 11, 19, 29, at this point B says that he knows how to go on. Now various things may have happened to B. It is wrong to think that 'B knows how to go on' must be something that went in his mind. Wittgenstein says that B might have engaged in no mental activities yet he may be justified in his claim. Therefore Wittgenstein shows that 'know how to go on' means different things in different situations like as the statement 'they can walk now'. It means different things in different situations. Wittgenstein says that 'He knows how to go on' or 'I know how to go on' can consist in the sudden occurrence of our mental process. The expression 'now I can go on' is not a description of a mental state, it is a claim, which is correct mental action in the appropriate circumstances proceed in the right way. In this sense Wittgenstein opines that understanding and meaning are not names of mental occurrences yet there is a sense of name in which they may be said to name mental processes.

Wittgenstein's strategy is to demystify mind and thought and to make a fresh attempt to make mind as transparent as language itself. In the Cartesian frame work mind was the central concept that inherited the task of making thought, the inner state of all human activities. This led to two important consequences, first it perpetuated

the myth that thought belongs to the inner world and second, thought is pre-linguistic and so can exist in the autonomous realm of the mind that is independent of language. Wittgenstein struggles against both these ideas.

In Cartesian thought, the idea of inner is the idea of making thought as inner process in the invisible and subjective realm of the mind as distinguished from the body of man. According to this view, the inner mental processes as distinguished from the bodily actions constitute the mind. Thus mind is taken as a storehouse of ideas or the mental processes. Mind is the seat of these activities and so consciousness becomes the innate nature of the mind. It is realized that mind cannot be the seat of conscious acts unless it is of the nature of a spiritual or immaterial substance. So, Descartes accepts that mind is a spiritual substance. But Wittgenstein does not support this view. According to him, mind is not something spiritual substance. He asserts that conscious is not the essence of mind. In real sense we never find such type of mind which exists separately from the body. Mind is not a spiritual or mysterious substance. It is realized in different activities of human beings.

Wittgenstein's effort is to dissolve the myth of inner as, according to him, it presents a misleading picture of mind. Mind is not turned into something inner and subjective. He attempts to show that the idea of the inner arise because of a grammatical mistake of the misunderstanding of the language in which we talk about the mental activities. He writes-

Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand? How do I use words to stand for my sensations? – As we ordinarily do? Then are my words for sensations tied up with my natural expressions of sensations? In that case my language is not a

*'private' one. Someone else might understand it as well as I. –
But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the
sensation, but only had the sensations? And now I simply
associate names with sensations and use these names in
descriptions.*²⁴

By saying this Wittgenstein states that the language in which we have such words like 'thinking' 'willing' etc. has a logic of its own which cannot be confused with that of words like walking, sneezing etc. The statements expressing mental activities like I am in pain are distinct from such statements as 'I have a hand'. The statements about the mental activities like the above in the first person present tense are not descriptive statements at all. They are expressions of the mental states and are not descriptive of what is happening in the mind. The mind does not contain mental states, which can be described in the way that we can describe the contents of a room. Therefore Wittgenstein characterizes 'the first person' present tense statements about mental activities as avowals which cannot be assimilated to 'the third person' statements about the mental contents.

According to Wittgenstein, mind stands for a set of activities rather than for a mental entity. This conception of mind rejects mental phenomena as entities of a mysterious sort. But the whole exercise of understanding mind comes down to our continuous understanding of the logic of the language in which we express the mental states. Thus Wittgenstein's strategy for dissolving the Cartesian conception of the inner is twofold, the first is he shows that the conception of the inner is based on grammatical mistake and second is he admits that mind is real though not as a mental entity. Mind is not a spiritual substance. We never find it as an entity which is separate from the body.

In different sections of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein uses the word 'pain' to explain the mental states. The word 'pain' is not inner mental states. The grammar of the word 'pain' shows that pain is not the name of an entity in the mind. It demonstrates that it stands for a form of life. According to Wittgenstein, *you learned the concept 'pain' when you learned language.*²⁵ The word which is not used in language game, we cannot understand the meaning of the word. The word 'pain' is understood because it is practised on language game. So pain is not private sensation.

In Wittgenstein's conception one can learn or understand the name of sensation because sensation words are already existed in language games. According to him, pain is pain behavior in the sense that the word 'pain' is to act in a certain way. It is ultimately the language game. Wittgenstein shows that the mind is not a mysterious entity. If it is mysterious, then we would not able to talk anything about mind. In this sense Wittgenstein's language games are rich with the mental words. There are innumerable forms of life with concerning mental life. In this context Wittgenstein writes –

*A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. – An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)*²⁶

Therefore Wittgenstein claims that there are several types of form of life and form of life is related with mental states. Our life is interrelated with language and

language is the function of our mind. Through the various types of languages one plays the language game which is our form of life.

According to Wittgenstein, meaning and understanding are not mental activities and they are not private or inner process. He has tried to show with extraordinary brilliance that actually there is no mental content which can be designated by mental words. Even in the situation where a mental content seems to be present, the meaning of a word is not determined by its occurrence. Therefore what gives meaning to the words and sentences is their use in language and life. In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein writes -

A process accompanying our words which one might call the "process of meaning them" is the modulation of the voice in which we speak the words, or one of the processes similar to this, like the play of facial expression. These accompany the spoken words not in the way a German sentence might accompany an English sentence, or writing a sentence, but in the sense in which the tune of a song accompanies its words. This tune corresponds to the feeling with which we say the sentence. And I wish to point out that this feeling is the expression with which the sentence is said, or something similar to this expression.²⁷

Mind is realized through different activities. Mind or mental states are not private process. The words like pain, itch, ache, mood, anger and others are used to do not private experience. Wittgenstein accepted the view that sensation words describe primary experience. In *philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein realized that the proposition "*I have headache*" is not equivalent with the proposition "he has headache" It is argued that *if pain is the name of a sensation which I experience only*

*in the privacy of my own consciousness, then I cannot even understand what it means to say that another person has a pain.*²⁸ And he says, *if the word “pain” only signifies for me as an item in my consciousness, then “pain” can exist only when I am aware of it.*²⁹ By such type of argument Wittgenstein tries to prove that sensations are not private. He believes that mind is real and mental states are logically connected with the behavior of the human beings. Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of private language. It is the great attack to the Cartesian view that sensation words are private. The meaning of sensation words like “pain” is necessarily tied up with our private sensations. Therefore the meaning of the sensation word “pain” is determined by pain behavior or through observation of the situation in which pain is used. Wittgenstein denies the possibility of such type of private sensation. In this context, Wittgenstein makes two observations.

According to Wittgenstein, we use the model of the naming objects by pointing out the language of mental phenomena. He opines that when we cannot perceive anything outside ourselves in the world we assume that these mental activities exist inwardly. In this point of view Wittgenstein holds that the problems of mind are arisen because of accepting the mental activities to be analogous to physical phenomena. Gilbert Ryle in his book ‘The Concept of Mind’ remarks the above mistake of language as category mistake.³⁰ Ryle argues that the dualistic confuse the category of mind with the category of body. In dualism, mind and body are two distinct categories.

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind can be seen in the light of his conception of the nature of philosophical problems and what is necessary to resolve them. For him, philosophical problems are puzzles induced by misinterpretations of the use of words in our language and they are solved by paying attention to the ways in which the

problematic words are really used. Wittgenstein's work in the philosophy of mind does not issue in philosophical thesis about the mind but is directed towards dissipating philosophical puzzlement about the mind by the identification of misleading images and superficial similarities and by a description of the actual use of those words, that lie at the heart of the problem. Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind can be understood by paying attention to what Wittgenstein has got to say regarding the –

(1) The diversity of heterogeneity of mental concepts:

According to Wittgenstein's, later philosophy, the superficial linguistic uniformity conceals grammatical diversity, so that the variety of reality is hidden from our reflective understanding by similarities in our means of representation of that reality in language. There are two ways of application of this insight –

Firstly the grammars of words for sensation, emotions, thoughts, images, intentions and so on, are very different from one another, though there may be superficial resemblance. Wittgenstein finds out a clear cut difference between the occurrences of one kind of mental states to another kind. (for example, the feeling of how your arm is moving to the feeling of how you experience in your arm when it is so moving).

Secondly, an even apparently uniform mental category can exhibit considerable diversity in the kinds of state that falls within it. So that the failure to recognize this diversity results in a mistaken assimilation of mental states. Wittgenstein's illustration of this is to emphasis more on the variety of visual experience. The nature provide us platform to see colour, shape and lightness between one face and another, a person's melancholy expression or sometimes jolly mood, a sign as the mirror image of an F , and various other sorts of thing. All of these

experiences fall under the concept of seeing or we can say that it is based on our perception. But Wittgenstein puts up the difference between the concept of our kind of visual experience and the concept of another. Let us consider the experience of suddenly seeing melancholy in some one's face –a face that remains still at the moment we see the melancholy. This is one example what Wittgenstein calls seeing an aspect. Here Wittgenstein rejects two opposed positions as false alternatives. One insists that this visual experience is a typical example of a genuine visual experience, as discussed earlier (experience of seeing colour, shape etc.). The other insists that it is not really a case of seeing, but it is just an interpretation of what is seen based on visual experience. But according to Wittgenstein, both these positions are mistaken for the experience of seeing Melancholy shares some grammatical features with the illegal paradigm and also shares some features with the suggested alternatives. While Wittgenstein reveals some similarities between the two positions, yet at the same time he points out some interesting differences too. Seeing an aspect resembles seeing a colour with respect to 'genuine duration' whereas seeing an aspect, unlike seeing a colour, is subject to the will. This truly means the experience of seeing melancholy is not at all problematic, but the concept of that kind of experience is not reducible to either of the proposed kinds. To adapt the well-known remark –Bishop Butler that impressed Wittgenstein: the concept of seeing something as we interpret it 'is what it is and not another thing.'³¹ This is the moral that Wittgenstein emphasises time and time again in his examination of mental concept.

(2) The illusion of the essential privacy of the states of consciousness:

Wittgenstein targets in his investigations of the concept of a state of consciousness. It was believed that consciousness is private. Such as the experience of pain, is the seductive idea that a state of consciousness is essentially private. In the

sense that in virtue of the nature of a state of consciousness, it is such that only the subject of that state can know whether he is in that state. This conception is often thought to underlie the notable first person/third person asymmetry in the use of psychological words: whereas the third person use is based on observation, the first person singular present indicative is not based on observation. This way of thinking is usually supplemented by the claim that the nature of a state of consciousness guarantees not only essential privacy but also the subject's immediate and infallible awareness of what his present state of consciousness is. But according to Wittgenstein, consciousness cannot be essentially private realm. If it is private then it cannot be checked against the reality by any other person.

According to Wittgenstein, consciousness is not private and he argues on a number of grounds that this is a misrepresentation of the concept of pain. The concept of essential privacy is best understood with the help of an example; suppose someone is suffering from stomach pain. Now the pain he experiences is private for him because it is only he that is suffering it at that very moment. Many a time people thought that this suffering is private i.e. only the sufferer understands the pain. But Wittgenstein opposes this concept. According to Wittgenstein, the magnitude of pain that the person is experiencing already known to us as more or less in our lifetime also we all may have suffered from the same pain. From the sufferer's expression or complain we can come to know his pain as we also put forward the same expression when we went under the same pain. So this pain is no more private and it is just as illusion which is no more secret.

(3) The nature and basis of mental representation of intentionality.

Psychological predicates are neither predicable of the body nor of its parts. It is senseless to ascribe to the brain predicates applicable only to the whole creature,

e.g. thinking, believing, wanting, or intending. For the criteria for the third-person ascription of such predicates are distinctive forms of behaviour of the creature in the stream of life, and there is no such thing as a brain manifesting thought or thoughtlessness, belief or incredulity, desire or aversion, intention or inadvertence in what it does. Hence too, it makes no sense to ascribe thought or thoughtlessness, understanding, misunderstanding or failure of understanding to machines. Thought is essentially bound up with the sentient, affective, and conative functions of a being that has a welfare, is capable of desiring and suffering, can set itself goals and pursue them, and can hope to succeed or fear to fail in its projects.

Human behaviour that constitutes criteria for the ascription of psychological predicates is not “bare bodily movement,” from which we infer analogically or hypothetically their inner state or which we interpret as action. On the contrary, we see the pain in the face of the sufferer, hear the joy in the voice of a joyful person, perceive the affection in the looks of lovers. Pain, pace behaviorists, is not pain-behaviour, any more than joy is the same as joyous behaviour or love the same as a loving look. But the “inner” is not hidden behind the “outer”; it may sometimes be concealed or suppressed (or it may just not be manifested). But if it is manifested, then it infuses the “outer,” which is not bare bodily movement, but the actions and affective reactions of living sentient beings in the stream of life. These are not typically describable save in the rich vocabulary of the ‘inner.’”

Referring to the above themes Wittgenstein tries to focus on the central point in his study of philosophy of mind, where he asserts that mind is not a substance. It is not identical with the brain. It is not a private space in which mental objects are paraded, disclosed to introspective vision. There is to be sure, such a thing to be introspection, but it is not inner perception. Rather it is a form of reflection on one’s

past, one's reasons and motives, affection and attitudes. It is expressed that the third person pronoun refers neither to the mind nor to the body but to the person, the living human being.³²

The concept of sensation language is interrelated with the concept of mind in Wittgenstein's philosophy. According to Cartesian, dualism each person, in effect, has two sensation languages: a purely private language based on introspection, for talking about her own sensations, and a shared public language, based on behavior, for talking about other people's sensations. Wittgenstein rejects both the view.

The celebrated private language argument is the critique of the 'Cartesian' view of the sensations, on the Cartesian view; the identity conditions of sensations are purely introspective. Sensations are individuated in a way that is entirely independent of any links of the external circumstances of the behavior. Sensation words get their meaning by introspective attachment to one's own sensations; so each person knows what 'pain' means only from his own case. And while each of us knows the character of our own sensations, no one can know the character of anyone else. Against the Cartesian view, Wittgenstein argues that it is impossible to give meaning to a sensation word by pure introspection without relying in any way on links to external circumstances or behavior. He thinks that private language cannot establish genuine standard applications. Standards of correctness are not laid by reality; they are dependent on human practices of classification. And the private linguist lacks the resources to establish a genuine practice of classifying his private sensations.

Against the Cartesian claim, Wittgenstein argues that our understanding of ascriptions of sensations to other people involves an extrapolation from a purely introspective, first personal conception of sensation. Wittgenstein rejects the Cartesian view that no one can know the nature of anyone else's sensations.

The starting point of Wittgenstein's positive account of sensation language is the idea that one's use of sensation words is a development and extension of our natural, pre-linguistic behavior. That explains the meaning of sensation words in a way that does not make them dependent on inner ostensive definitions and that sees the third person use of sensation words as being just as fundamental as their first person use. The same general principles can be applied in Wittgenstein's account of our concepts of belief, intention and so on.

Generally, people talk of mind or soul as inner to be irresistible. However, there are problems with the picture that what inner is, because it is inner, essentially hidden from view. People think that our minds are inside our bodies, like a marble is inside a box. The body hides the mind from view by functioning as an opaque screen. This is the general picture about mind and Wittgenstein struggles with it. He tries to show why we find it hard to shake it off, and also what is wrong with it. In this context Alessandra Tanesini opines that, "Wittgenstein's later philosophy involved a sustained struggle with a very common picture of the human mind or soul. It is the picture that the inner is essentially or logically hidden. The idea that the soul or mind is inner has a long pedigree (although it is by no means universal)." ³³

The view that our thoughts and feelings are logically hidden is the view that the inner is logically independent of the outer. According to Wittgenstein, the view that the inner is logically hidden is a misconceived attempt to give a philosophical voice to this sense of acute loneliness. Wittgenstein's discussion of the inner is in part, an attempt to show that this picture cannot be coherently stated. It may be said that in real sense Wittgenstein does not reject the notion of the inner. Rather, he writes –

If I ask someone on the street for direction then I prefer a friendly answer to an unfriendly one. I react immediately to someone

*else's behavior. I presuppose the inner so far as I presuppose a human being.*³⁴

According to Cartesianism, 'pain' is private because only one person could have them. Wittgenstein finds mistakes in the view. He expresses his philosophical position with the following words.

*"Another person cannot have my pains" – which are my pains? What counts as a criterion for identity here? Consider what makes it possible in the case of physical objects to speak of 'two exactly the same', for example, to say "This chain is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it."*³⁵

In this remark, Wittgenstein points out that, it makes sense to say of two objects or particulars, for example, two chairs – that they are exactly alike, although they are not the same thing or identical in the sense of being one and the same person. They are identical only in the sense that they are exactly alike. There are nevertheless, two of them. The twins are not numerically identical, because they are not one and the same person. They are qualitatively identical because exactly alike. In case of sensations, this example can be applied. In the Blue and Brown Books, Wittgenstein points out that there are cases in which the distinction between being one and the same and being exactly alike makes no sense. The sensation 'pain' is said to be private because one's headache is different from others' headache. Wittgenstein's objection to this claims that pains are private. He points out that words used by the philosophers cannot be taken as having their ordinary meaning. Wittgenstein points out that we often know whether others are in pain. He views –

*If I see someone writing in pain with evident cause, I do not think: all the same, his feeling is hidden from me.*³⁶

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein remarks that psychological concepts about perception, thoughts and sensations are applicable only to living beings. In this context he writes –

*“But doesn’t what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?” –It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.*³⁷

Therefore it can be said that a computer or automation could also behave alike a human being but they cannot be the kind of being of which it can be said that they are in ‘pain’ or have thoughts. He suggests that psychological concepts apply to living beings only because their behavior at least minimally resembles that of human beings.

Wittgenstein’s resistance to mind-body dualism takes a different route. He begins with the idea of a human being identified with a soul who is best pictured as a living human body. For him, the mistakes common to Descartes and his opponents is a certain reductionist view of the human body. According to this view, the body is an object that can be understood in terms of the interactions among its parts. Descartes elaborates this view and adds that what makes us human must be something distinct from the body. His opponent accepts the essence of Descartes conception of body and also asserts that there is no more to us than this complex material thing. On the other hand, Wittgenstein rejects this picture of the human body.

It may be claimed that Wittgenstein rejects the Cartesian view of human body and prefers to talk about the human soul of which the human body is the best picture. Wittgenstein employs the concept of human soul to capture what is characteristic of human being in other word; the human being is for Wittgenstein, a being with a

human soul. However, one should not think of human soul as a substance or even a feature of human beings. When Wittgenstein talks about beings with a human soul, he is talking of beings who have a life and whose life includes the exercise of many of these abilities. To say that the human body is the best picture of the human soul is to say that if one wants to understand what makes us human, it is best to think about living human bodies and all the things that they can do. If, instead we picture our humanity as a matter of possessing a mind, we are likely to misunderstand who we truly are.

After coming back to '*Philosophical Investigations*' from the '*Tractatus*', Wittgenstein argues that metaphysics leads the philosophers into complete darkness. Turning his attention back to language, he concluded that almost everything he had said about it in the *Tractatus* had been an error. There were, in fact, many different structures which could serve quite different needs. Language was not a unified structure, but consisted of a multipurpose aims. Wittgenstein's new philosophical analysis brings a revolution to analytic philosophy.

The views of David Hume are identical with the views of Wittgenstein in the study of the philosophy of mind. Hume starts with a metaphysical inquiry about the nature of self. Hume tries to find out some entity a spiritual substance, a soul, self or ego. But he fails to catch hold of any such entity after an 'unprejudiced' enquiry in to 'himself'. Instead, he 'stumbles on' some particular perception or other. So he gives a psychological account of the self, a 'bundle' of perception, although his initial enquiry was metaphysical. Like Hume, Russell gives a psychological explanation of the mind and mental phenomena in his famous Book, "The Analysis of Mind." Russell begins his book with a criticism of the concept of consciousness.

In the celebrated book, *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein also gives the similar views with Russell regarding the concept of self or mind. Their views are similar with Hume's concept of self. Wittgenstein tries to clear his view with linguistic analysis. For him, the limits of the language are the limits of thought. He comes to the problem while discussing the concept of solipsism. "Solipsism may be defined as the view that only one's own self and what one experiences exist, what is not experienced by one self, including other selves does not exist. There is sense in which Wittgenstein agrees with solipsism. One natural way of expressing the view of solipsism is to say 'The world is my world', and this statement, according to Wittgenstein is quite true."

However, according to Wittgenstein, solipsism is not to be understood in the dualistic way. It should not involve the experiencing self and the object of experience. In proper sense, solipsism is the view that only what one experiences exists. The outer side, viz. the thinking, knowing, experiencing metaphysical self must be rejected. In the *Tractatus* he writes –

There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas. ³⁸

According to Wittgenstein, the word 'I' in the sentences, I see ..., I think and so on, is not the name of an object. It is only the accidental grammatical form that misleads us to suppose that there is a metaphysical 'I' that designate the word in the sentence. Like Russell, he opines that this grammatical form should be given up.

The 'I' is not an observable entity. 'Eye' is an observable entity which can be experienced by senses but 'I' is not to be experienced by any of the senses. George Pitcher observes - "This idea had been expressed much earlier in the history of

philosophy by Hume and Kant, but Wittgenstein doubtless got it from his reading of Schopenhauer.”³⁹

It is seen that, Wittgenstein does not believe ‘mind’ as an entity or as a reality. Just as in the field of vision there is no visual subject, so in the field of reality’ there are various experienced situations, but no experiencing subject or mind. Against the existence of mind, Wittgenstein argues that if the mind exists it would have to be a simple object and must enter to the states of affairs which in turn would have to be observable by the very same mind which is alleged to be one of their constituents. But in his view, it is absurd. So, *the mind is the limit of the world, not a part of it.*⁴⁰

The view that ‘all that I see exists’ is essentially the view of common sense realism. Wittgenstein admits it in *Tractatus*. Here it can be seen that solipsism, ‘when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-orientated with it’.⁴¹

While denying the metaphysical self (mind), Wittgenstein does not deny the subject matter of psychology, which he calls the ‘soul’. The psychological soul, as opposed to the metaphysical self which does not exist, is nothing more than the series of thoughts, pains, and desires and so on.

In real sense Wittgenstein was not influenced by Hume. But in concept of self or mind it is found that both have great similarities. Wittgenstein’s denial of metaphysical self is same as Hume’s denial of self. Therefore one cannot distinguish Wittgenstein from Hume’s concept of mind.

G. E. Moore, in his essay, *Wittgenstein’s lectures in 1930-1933* observes that Wittgenstein sometimes uses the word ‘person’ to mean the same as ‘physical body’. When he says that the idea of a person does not enter in to the description ‘I have

toothache', he certainly means to deny that the idea of a physical body enters necessarily into the description.⁴² According to Moore, in 'I have toothache' does not 'denote a possessor'. If there is an ownership such that 'I possess a body', that is not verified by reference to a body', i.e. 'this is my body' cannot possibly mean 'this body belongs to this body' he said that, where 'I' and 'he' are 'on the same grammatical level'. Wittgenstein of course speaks of two uses of 'I' one is on a level with other people and the other is not. He illustrates the first of these uses with examples as 'I have got a match-box' and 'I have got bad tooth' where 'I' can be replaced without losing its status. They are values of the same propositional function. But 'I have toothache' or 'I see a red patch' cannot be translated.⁴³ Thus we find Moore's concept of self which is similar with Wittgenstein's account of mind. Both of them are agreed that mind is not a private or inner entity.

It is observed that, Gilbert Ryle's account of mind is similar to Wittgenstein's view on mind. In his celebrated book 'The concept of mind' he starts with a criticism of Cartesian mind-body dualism. Here Ryle maintains that the Cartesian dualism is metaphorical and it involves a special kind of fallacy which he names category mistake. Ryle states that there are two aspect of person, one is external which includes things and events of the physical work and his body and the other is internal, i.e. the workings of his own mind. Ryle here points out that these expressions of external and internal are metaphorical, because mind as a non-spatial entity, cannot conceivably be said to enter into anything in order to be called internal.

The Cartesian dualism is called by Ryle as an 'official theory'. This treatment of the mind and the body as two completely different things and yet the attempt to relate them somehow very closely is, according to Ryle, fallacious. He calls it 'with

deliberate abusiveness', as 'the dogma of the ghost in the machine'. This theory is 'false in principle' and involves a 'category mistake'.

Ryle points out that the view about a person as a ghost mysteriously entered in to a machine (the body) gives rise to many philosophical problems. The supporters of the view think that as the human body is a complex organized unit, so the human mind must be another complex organized unit. They are parallel and similar but not identical laws for governing both the realms.

In illustrating what he calls a category-mistake Ryle says that it is committed when a thing belonging to one logical type or category is taken to be belonging to another. According to him, two things can be conjoined or disjoined in a statement when both belong to the same category.

Ryle maintains that idealism and materialism are both illegitimate philosophies. The reduction of the mental states and processes to the physical ones is improper attempts. They believe that either mind or matter exists, but not both. In Ryle's view this is tantamount to saying 'either she bought a left-hand or a right-hand glove or she bought a pair of gloves (but not both).'44 For Ryle the mind and the body belong to two separate logical categories so that their conjunction or disjunction results only in non sense.

The Cartesian Ghost-theory, that is, the concept of a non-material, un-extended, metaphysical mind in a body is thus refuted by Ryle. Like Ryle, it is found that Wittgenstein also rejects the principles that mind and body are two separate entities but they may be conjoined. Both of them supports that the word 'I' and 'You' are not proper names or names at all. Ryle calls them 'index words' like 'today', 'how', 'this page' etc. 'I' and 'You' are direct index words, while 'he' and 'they' and in some uses 'we' are indirect index words'. Like Wittgenstein Ryle says that in some

uses the word denoting a first personal pronoun can be replaced by 'my body' while in some other uses it cannot be done.

In Ryle's writings, it is found that Ryle has not worked out the theory of self or mind very clearly. He seems to hold that the self exists, but one cannot know anything about it. So he remains silent. Wittgenstein too holds this view that the mind is not known. Wittgenstein seems to be easier to understand while Ryle's position appears to be somewhat mystical. Wittgenstein's concept of mind can be understood because his concept is not mysterious. Through analytical method, he wants to give an idea about mind or self. In his writings Wittgenstein tries to say that mind is expressing different activities.

The problem of other mind is discussed by Wittgenstein through his different writings Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* accounts for a good deal of the problem. He holds that such a view is based on some misconception about the function in of our language. In this context Wittgenstein however doesn't intend to formulate a new philosophical theory to disprove the skeptics challenge. Rather, he approaches to alter the total prospect of the skeptic to the problem. In this respect Wittgenstein shows a different way to meet all the challenges of the skeptics. This way consists in a thorough understanding of our language and its variety of function. The issue of other mind of the skeptics is often typified from the stand point of the privacy of linguistic usages. To the formulation of the private language that Wittgenstein comes up with his characteristic way of linguistic analysis to disprove the same. In this regard he shows the grammatical inaccuracy of projecting language as private. It is seen that Wittgenstein gives several reasons against private language.

All the observations of Wittgenstein withdraw the privacy of sensation in order to avoid a grammatical mistake. The mistake lies in the faulty use of the word

‘sensation’ in the private domain which is rather publicly understandable and does not refer to the name of my private state. In fact, words stating sensation like “pain”, receive their meaning from their publicly observable behavior or criterion. Hence there is no concept of any meaningful ‘private’ sensation. If there is no private sensation it implies that there is no problems of other minds. Nothing is hidden as private in minds. All are publicly observable. Wittgenstein refuses Descartes and other skeptic’s notion of the problem of other mind. It is seen that Wittgenstein’s account of mind is like the view of behaviorism. For clear this concept we should discuss about behaviorism here.

5.4 Behaviourism

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein accepted only mental entities in his ontology. And in the *philosophical Investigations* he reversed his position; in this point, Wittgenstein may be regarded as a behaviorist. Behaviorism is a most important theory which belong to materialism. Materialism denies that the world includes both mental and material substance and materialist argue that every substance is material substance. According to materialism, mind is fashioned somehow from the same materials from which rocks, trees and stars are made. The mind is not a separate, non-material entity, but mind is only matter, suitably organized. Materialism is the view that the only reality that exist is material or physical reality, and consequently if there is mental entity it is nothing but physical states of some kind of materialism, argues that matter is only real and they have not consciousness as intentionality. According to John R Searle, “the history of materialism is fascinated, because though the materialism is convinced, with a quasi – religious faith, that their view must be right, they never seem to be able to formulate a version of it that they are completely satisfied with and that can be generally accepted by other philosophers, even by other

materialist,”⁴⁵ Materialism denies Cartesian dualism. The mind is not a separate entity; it is the behavior of the body. There is nothing over and above the behavior of the body that is constitutive of the mental. Behaviorism is a form of materialism. There are two types of behaviorism, viz.– methodological behaviorism and logical behaviorism.

Methodological behavior is the movement in psychology. Along with other natural sciences it wants to discuss mental states from scientifically. It is known as stimulus response theory in psychology. In this sense psychology is not the science of mind but it is science of human behavior. This view is called “methodological behaviorism because it proposed a method in psychology rather than the existence or non- existence of the mind. J.B Watson, B.F. Skinner etc are the Pioneers of psychological behaviorism. They do not believe the existence of any inner qualitative mental phenomena. According to B.F. Skinner, the purpose of Psychology is to study human behavior. Psychology does not study any mysterious inner, spiritual and mental entities. In this context, Searle opines that Methodological behaviorism was a research project in psychology and was surprisingly influential for decades.⁴⁶

Another types of behaviorism is logical behaviorism which is known as analytical behaviorism. It is a primarily movement in philosophy and it makes claim than methodological behaviorism. According to methodological behaviorist, Descartes was wrong as a matter of logic. In the contemporary analytical philosophy, Gilbert Ryle is famous for logical behaviorist. His great work “The Concept of Mind” is a turning point in philosophy of mind which makes him as a behaviorist. According to logical behaviorism, a statement of a person's feeling can be translated in to a set of statements about the person's actual and possible behavior. In this regard John Searle mentions a good example as follows - “John believes that it is going to rain just means

the same as saying an indefinite number of statements such as: if the windows in John's house are open, he will close them, if the garden tools are left outside, he will put them indoors, if he goes for a walk he will carry an umbrella or wear a raincoat or both, and so forth.”⁴⁷ These statements of this example are the logical form of “if such and such condition obtains then such and such behavior will ensure” Logical or Philosophical behaviorism is associated with this formula about the nature of mind and the meaning of mental terms. Logical behaviorism claims that mind is not entities and mental episode are not private or individual.

Behaviorism dominated philosophy of mind for much of the 20th century, especially the first half of this century. According to behaviorism mind is the sum total of behavioral responses of the physical body so, Prof. Gilbert Ryle, in his celebrated book, “The Concept of Mind” says that, *Descartes’ dualism as a myth of the Ghost (soul) in the machine.*⁴⁸ Descartes holds that body and soul are polar opposite. Gilbert Ryle says that Descartes theory is not defective in details, but it is a wholesale mistake, a fundamental error. In Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* it is seen that, he rejects the Cartesian view of mind body problem. In different sections of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein expresses his concept of mind due to which he may be considered as a logical behaviorist. He does not believe the mind as an entity. The existence of mind can be realized in behavior. Wittgenstein asserts that mental states are expressed through outer behavior. Here Wittgenstein’s view that, *an inner process stands in need of outward criteria,*⁴⁹ may be applied.

By outward criteria Wittgenstein means that for identified mental states its need outward expressions. The above phrase indicates that without outer criteria one cannot understand the inner states. Man can determine one's mental states by looking

the physical behavior. From the interest in physical behavior, Wittgenstein goes to support behaviorism. Wittgenstein does not deny the existence of mind, but simply wants to give an account of the mind in terms of behaviorism. In regards to Ryle and Wittgenstein D. M. Armstrong remarks that, "I think these philosophers wrongly persuaded themselves that they were not behaviorist. However whether this piece of interpretation is right or not does not really matter. The account of mental processes given by these philosophers was certainly very close to behaviorism and it is useful to consider them as behaviorists. If they are not behaviorist we may legitimate them or their followers to tell us in what way their view differs from behaviorism."

It is observed that Wittgenstein never says that he is a behaviorist. In his remarks behaviorism can be treated in psychology. In the part-II of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein writes the followings-

Then psychology treats of behavior, not of the mind?

What do psychologists record? What do they observe? Is not it the behavior of human beings, in particular their utterances? But these are not about behavior. I noticed that he was out of humour. 'Is this a report about his behavior or his state of mind? (The sky looks treating' is this about the present or the future?) Both, not side by side, however, but about the one via the other. ⁵⁰

For establishing the validity of his opinion that mental concepts are equivalent to a collection of behavior, Wittgenstein uses the arguments against the possibility of private language argument. In this context he opines-

If there has to be anything 'behind the utterance of the formula' it is particular circumstances, which justify me in saying I can go on –when the formula occurs to me.

Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all. – For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say "Now I know how to go on," when that is, the formula has occurred to me?

In the sense in which there are processes (including mental process) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process.

*(A pain's growing more and less; the hearing of a tune or a sentence: these are mental processes.)*⁵¹

From the above discussion it may be said that Wittgenstein's account of mind leads behaviorism. According to Wittgenstein, mental phenomena are recordable in physiological reactions. Wittgenstein's account of behaviorism is not psychological but analytical behaviorism. According to psychological behaviorism, there is no such entity called mind, we get only behavior, and on the other hand analytical behaviorism does not reject the existence of mind. According to analytical behaviourism, mental concepts can be explained in terms of behavioural concept. To talk about mental phenomena is to talk about behaviour. The aim of analytical behaviorism is to explain mind and the mental states in terms of dispositions. Analytical behaviorist assumes that mind is not an entity and mental states are not private. Wittgenstein also advocates that the mind is not a substance, but it can be assumed from behavioral expressions. His writings in *Philosophical Investigations* are the evidence of it. This assumption is proved by the following writings in *Philosophical Investigations-*

“But does not what you say come to this: that there is pain, for example, without pain behavior?” – It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) living human beings can one say: it has sensation, it seems, is blind, hears, is deaf, is conscious or unconscious. ⁵²

From this version it appears as if Wittgenstein is a behaviourist only human beings and to those who behaves like human beings cannot say that it feels pain or have a sensation. Human body or bodily behaviour is the best expression of human mind. Wittgenstein stresses in the physical behavior and he remarks- *human body is the best picture of the human soul.*⁵³

Psychological predicates applied to other people are logically connected with behavior. However that connection is not one of logical equivalence between propositions (namely psychological and behavioral one). It takes two forms. First, it makes sense to ascribed mental phenomena only to creatures who can manifest them in their behavior. Second, our mental “terms” would not mean what they do if they were not bound up with some behavioral criteria.

In other words, not all signs of the presence of pain can be mere symptoms; some must be criteria in the semantic sense, otherwise we should have no basis for the application of the concept ‘pain’. This is one of the points of the private language argument. This concept makes Wittgenstein as a behaviorist which he explicitly rejected in many places.

Hanjo Glock suggests that the behaviorism is still sticking too closely to the Cartesian picture by construing the mental after the image of the physical. According to him, Wittgenstein’s attack on the inner/outer dichotomy is often accused of reducing the inner to the outer, and thereby ignoring the most important aspects of

human existence, Ironically, Wittgenstein in turn accuses the inner/outer conception of mistakenly assimilating the mental to the physical. It construes the relationship between mental phenomena and mental terms on the model of material object and designation, and thereby turns the mind in to a realm of mental entities, states, processes and events, which are just like their physical counterparts only hidden and more ethereal (This tendency is fuelled by the Augustinian picture, of language, which suggests that all sentences describe something – if not physical entities, then entities of a different kind. ⁵⁴

Wittgenstein's account of mind leads inevitably to behaviorism, though his behaviorism is not psychological behaviorism. Wittgenstein does not reduce mental phenomena to behavior in the sense the psychological behaviorist do. So he suggests that outward criteria is the basic need for inner states. He indicates that there are grammatical criteria of calling something pain. Pain states are mental states and these are distinguishable from other states. The criteria is located in the behavior in the sense that we make various linguistic moves when we have pain. In this way Wittgenstein shows mental states are logically connected with the behavior of the human agent. He writes –

*“But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behavior?” – It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.*⁵⁵

According to Wittgenstein, pain behavior is pain language game. That is to express pain is to use language in a certain way. This involves a total mental activity of things including language such that to have pain is to be able to identify their

emotion and also to express it. In real sense a person is living in a community of language users. He has learnt from others how to express pain. Thus having it is a kind of form of life such that there are definite ways of embedding it in a certain language game. Wittgenstein views –

Could someone understand the word ‘pain’, who had never felt pain? – Is experience to teach me whether this is so or not? – And if we say “A man could not imagine pain without having sometime felt it” – how do we know? How can it be decided whether it is true? ⁵⁶

From this version Wittgenstein has moved from the individual having pain to the community of language users who also have pain in certain characteristic manner. ‘Pain’ is not one’s sensation or individual sensation. It is common or public, sensation word. Feeling of pain is expressed in outer behavior such as crying etc. Here behavior does not mean physical behavior but the forms of life that are associated with the concerned language-games. So, Wittgenstein need not demand behavioral criteria for the mental states. All that he needs is grammatical criteria which evolve from the language games themselves. There he says that the mental states are logically connected with the linguistic expressions such that whenever a particular mental state is talked about we have to see the language-game that is associated with it. In this way the mental phenomena can always be identified with the forms of life. Thus there is no room for so called behaviorism in Wittgenstein’s account of mind. His account of mind or mental concept involves logical behaviorism. In this context Wittgenstein writes –

“Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a

*fiction?” – If I do speak of fiction, then it is of a grammatical
fiction.* ⁵⁷

Wittgenstein tries to show that the philosophical understanding of the nature of mind does not require either the denial or affirmation of the existence of mind. According to him, mind is real in the sense that we are already playing the language-games involving mind. It is not that the language-game brings the mind into existence. Language and mind is in common bond. That is why those who deny mind are as much at fault as those who affirm the existence of mind. So, in this case both mind and the world go together in that language pre-supposes both as a real. Wittgenstein is not like a spiritualist. He does not believe in the spiritualistic nature: Descartes said the mind is spiritual and it differs from the body. In fact, if mind and body are different then there can be no relation between the two. According to Wittgenstein, the mind belongs to the world as much as the body and so the mind is not something which is less related to the world than the body. Wittgenstein's remark that the human body is the best picture of the human soul seems to be relevant.

5.5 Conclusion:

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that in the twentieth century, Wittgenstein brings up a new evolution in the "Philosophy of Mind." Wittgenstein stands against the ideas of previous philosophers related to mind and he believes that mind is not a mysterious entity. According to Wittgenstein, mind and body are not two separate entities which was against Rene Descartes' idea of mind. Our mind is generally expressed by our different behaviours. Also, Wittgenstein states that the body is a picture of mind, the existence of mind is hence expressed through our physical activities. Our mind is not even a mystery as told by different mysterious philosophers. They believed that mind is such an entity which comprises mysteries

and cannot be understood so clearly. But Wittgenstein opposes this thought and says that mind can be easily understood through our activities. Descartes believes that the body and mind are different from each other by their nature. But according to Wittgenstein, both mind and body work together.

Wittgenstein believes that inner state can be expressed by outer activities of our body. Wittgenstein puts more emphasis/importance on outer behaviour than the inner, hence, he can also be called a behaviourist.

The ideas about mind which are brought into focus by Wittgenstein added new and innovative ideas in the philosophy of mind. It becomes more worthy to use Wittgenstein's ideas rejecting Descartes' ideas as it let us know about the real facts of mind.

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