

Chapter – III

Nature of Consciousness

3.1 Introduction:

Consciousness is regarded as a mental state or process in psychology. The word consciousness is derived from the Latin word, 'Conscire' which means to know things together. Men are aware of their mental and motor activities. This meaning was made popular by Vives, the Spanish psychologist. Thus consciousness is the distinctive character of mental life. It is very difficult to give a definition of consciousness. According to Badwin, 'consciousness is the point of division between mind and not-mind.' Unconsciousness is attributed to a chair or a log of wood. Mc Dougall says that the word consciousness should be used to mean the act of knowing or thinking of thing. But it is seen that consciousness has a wider sense than this definition. The ninetieth century psychologist G.T. Ladd gives this meaning of consciousness, 'whatever we are when we are awake, as contrasted with what we are when we sink into a profound and dreamless sleep, that it is to be conscious. What we are less and less, as we sink gradually down into dream less sleep, or as we swoon slowly away and what we are more and more, as the noise of the crowd outside tardily arouses us from our after-dinner nap; or as we come out of the midnight of the typhoid fever crisis that is consciousness. ¹

According to International Dictionary of Psychology, consciousness is having of perceptions, thoughts, feelings and awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. The concept of consciousness is different from self-consciousness. To be conscious is to be conscious of something. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon.

It is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written about it.’

Rene Descartes was the first philosopher to hold that consciousness is the essence of mind. According to Descartes, all mental states and processes are conscious. He held that every event in the mind is a content of experience. He assimilated volitions, intentions and every type of thought to this class. For Descartes, the notion of an unconscious mental state was a contradiction. In philosophical knowledge, in search of certainty Descartes found that ‘cogito-ergo-sum’ is the single certain truth. After having made it clear that he exists (cogito-ergo-sum). Through this method Descartes tries to find out what he is. At last he found that he is nothing but a thinking thing. Thinking or consciousness is his essence. The essence of a thing contains only what is necessary for the existence of the thing. In this context Prof. Norman Malcolm writes –

*..... if there is an existing thing O, and if there is something E, such that if one perceives E necessarily one perceives O, and if one perceives O, necessarily one perceives E, the E is the essence of O. Descartes proves that this essence is thinking.*²

According to Descartes, thinking or consciousness is his essence. And he states that the subject of consciousness is the mind and that the mind is a thing or entity separate and distinct from the body. The body is a thing or entity whose essence is occupying space, i.e., having shape, size and location in space, and it is not conscious. On the other hand, the mind is completely different in its nature. It is utterly non-spatial, having neither shape, size nor location. Mind’s essence is having consciousness, thoughts, feelings, memories, perceptions, desires, emotion etc. In this

way, Descartes is aware of himself when and only when he is aware of thinking. Descartes states that thinking is nothing other than ‘consciousness’. In his meditation Descartes maintained that a thinking thing is that which is having conscious activities like doubting understanding, willing sensing etc., that is consciousness. Descartes writes –

What then is it that I am? A thinking thing, what is a thinking thing? It is a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, sustains from willing that also can be aware of images and sensations. ³

Through the principle ‘cogito-ergo-sum’, Descartes wants to rebuild the edifice of knowledge about self consciousness. Here the ‘I’ (or self consciousness) that has been proved to exist and it has been inferred from the fact that ‘I think, therefore I exist.’ If ‘I’ ceased to think, there would be no evidence of my existence. I am a thing that thinks, a substance of which the whole nature or essence consists in thinking and which needs no place for its existence. Therefore the soul is distinct and separate from the body. Descartes states that the mind is essentially active and its activity is to ‘think’. According to Descartes, there is no thinking apart from something which thinks. He admits that there is a permanent self or ego, since there is its unchangeable attributes of thinking. In this way, Descartes concludes that the soul or mind is a permanent substance because we have found its essence called thinking or consciousness which even the worst of doubt cannot demolish. Descartes recognizes two kinds of substances – finite and infinite. According to him, God is the only perfect and infinite substance. Mind and body are finite substances. Thus Descartes holds that the essential nature of soul or self is thinking, since to be aware

of thinking, to be aware of myself and to be aware of oneself is to be thinking or consciousness.

It can be held that Freudian concept of mind goes against Descartes claim that consciousness is the essence of mind. According to Freud, mind has three mental states, such as conscious, sub-conscious and unconscious. If so, question arises, how consciousness can be regarded as the essence of mind? According to Freud, unconscious has no access to consciousness except through the pre-conscious. Pre-conscious is the unconscious states which are easily accessible to memory. The unconscious must be accepted as the general basis of the psychic life. In this regard, Freud analyses what Descartes has pointed out. Everybody would agree that an unconscious state cannot prove its existence. Mind can be proved to be having existence only through consciousness. However if unconscious is accessible to consciousness through preconscious state then unconsciousness does not remain opposite to consciousness.

3.2 Wittgenstein on Consciousness:

Wittgenstein rejects the concept of consciousness given by Descartes. There are many important aspects of Cartesian dualism and among them the epistemological perspective, which is that there is a faculty of introspection by which a human being as a conscious being can know the contents of his/her own conscious states. According to Descartes, consciousness is the essence of mind. Mental states and process are conscious states and processes. To be in a particular state is to be conscious of it. Wittgenstein in his philosophy and in this part of it as well, did not formulate a thesis in the strict sense, nor did he formulate strict objection and arguments. Rather he displayed philosophical puzzlement about the mind by the

identification of misleading images and superficial similarities. He saw that there is an important problem closely connected with the Cartesian picture of consciousness.

A picture of Cartesian concept of consciousness particularly to the Cartesian introspection is given by Wittgenstein through his view– *“Though the ether is filled with vibration the world is in dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light.”*⁴ It helps us to understand the Cartesian nature of consciousness. Consciousness is conceived as the ray of life which illuminates our private mental episode. Each conscious mind is store house in which events take place and the events can be observed only by the person whose mind it is. In his later work, Wittgenstein raised numerous objections to this picture, or “world of consciousness” especially in *Philosophical Investigations*.

According to Wittgenstein, there is a relation between one’s being conscious and one’s ability to speak a language. Wittgenstein holds that “if after an accident, I say to my doctor I am conscious, I do not report the result of introspection of my mind but simply try to convince him that I am conscious.” However Wittgenstein states the fact that I have regained consciousness will equally be proved if I say “hello” to my doctor. Thus Wittgenstein tries to show that there is nothing mysterious about consciousness. The fact that one is conscious is obvious from the fact that one is playing a language game involving mind. To be conscious is to be able to play different language game. Thus one can always know whether the other beings are conscious or not simply by finding out what role do they play in a language game. In this way Wittgenstein tries to show that there is a relation between consciousness and language.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that the concept of consciousness such as the experience of pain is essentially private in the sense that only the subject of that states can know whether he is in that state. To accept this conception is to accept the first person /third person distinction in the use of psychological words. First person use of psychological words in singular present indicative is not based on observation of bodily behavior whereas third person use of them is based on observation of bodily behavior. So there is an asymmetry between them. This sort of thinking supports the claim that nature of states of consciousness guarantees not only essential privacy but also guarantees that a subject has an immediate infallible awareness of what his present states of consciousness is. Thus a person's consciousness is thought of as essentially private and his assertion about his state of consciousness is infallible and it cannot be checked by another person about which he himself cannot be mistaken.

Wittgenstein rejects this on numbers of grounds. First, it is false that one person cannot know, in ordinary sense of the expression that another person is in pain. One person often does know that another person is in pain. Second, in virtue of the nature of pain the subject of pain knows with certainty that he is in pain is a miss conception. According to Wittgenstein, one cannot say, "I know I am in pain" because one cannot say that "I believe I am in pain" or "I doubt I am in pain." But one can logically say "I know he is in pain"

Thirdly, if pain were essentially private then in the first place each person would know only what he calls 'pain' not what anyone else does. But what each of us calls 'pain' would be irrelevant to the use of the word 'pain' in our language. Thus there would be no public criteria to determine whether one is using the word 'pain'

correctly. In this context Wittgenstein gives the example of 'beetle in a box' as follows –

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! – Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle." No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. –Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. – But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? – If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. -No, one can: "divide through" by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.⁵

Wittgenstein asks the reader to imagine that each person has a box, inside of which is something that everyone intends to refer to with the word "beetle". Further, suppose that no one can look inside another's box, and each claims to know what a "beetle" is only by examining their own box. Wittgenstein suggests that, in such a situation, the word "beetle" could not be the name of a thing, because supposing that each person has something completely different in their boxes (or nothing at all) does not change the meaning of the word; the beetle as a private object "drops out of consideration as irrelevant". Thus, Wittgenstein argues, if we can talk about something, then it is not *private*, in the sense considered. And, contra positively, if we consider something to be indeed private, it follows that we cannot talk about it.

According to Wittgenstein, “consciousness” does not refer to a phenomenon inside us and the alleged ontological gap between the physical world and the world of consciousness is merely a categorical difference between non-sentient and sentient beings that we commonly apply. In *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein tries to show that there is no such thing as a “metaphysical” mystery of consciousness. This is Wittgenstein’s treatment of the Cartesian picture of consciousness is a part of his more general criticism of the inner/outer distinction. This is also closely connected to the problem of other minds. It is believed that “the mental states of others are hidden to me as well as my mental states are hidden for others.” But Wittgenstein criticized by saying that “Nothing is hidden.”

The Cartesian solution is “res-cogitans” as immaterial substances which are bearer of psychological properties. Cartesian and empiricist conceptions imply that the mental is an inner realm of subjective experience contingently connected to the body. For Wittgenstein, the mental is essentially manifested in the form of behavior which gives expression to the inner. Wittgenstein’s final criticism of Cartesian and the empiricist “world of consciousness” is a simple statement that human being have consciousness, and tree and stones do not have it.⁶

As a linguistic philosopher, Wittgenstein gives importance in proper use of language. Philosophical problems relating to mind/soul, consciousness/sensation and others arise due to misuse of language. In order to understand Wittgenstein’s concept of mind, it is necessary to know what Wittgenstein has got to say so far consciousness is concerned. Wittgenstein tries to dissolve the problem of mind and body and attempted to show that these problems arise out of conceptual confusions, and that proper attention to the way in which we use mental and physical terms in ordinary

language will relieve us from the vexation problem. According to Wittgenstein, mind is a part of the world where language-games take place. It is observed that the question of consciousness arises only in the case of human beings who speak language. According to Wittgenstein, it is because of this, that, mind, thought and other mental states are ascribed to the human beings. It is the human beings who have the capacity to relate themselves to the world by virtue of their cognitive and other interest in the world. It is suggested by Wittgenstein that human mind cannot rest idly without speculation by simply dissolving the philosophical problems. A philosopher has to enquire the mental concepts until the mystery of the mind is disclosed. Wittgenstein maintains that language serves as the best medium of relating our mind to the world and mind does not stand apart as a transcendent entity but directly enters the world as a function of the linguistic activities. According to Wittgenstein, thinking and representing the world are the same and the activity of representing the world means we have already thought about the world. Thus Wittgenstein's mind represents the universe with language which represents rational mental activity and consciousness.

Wittgenstein is an ordinary linguistic philosopher. As a linguistic philosopher, he gives importance in proper use of language. Philosophical problems such as mind/soul, consciousness/sensation and others arise due to misuse of language. Wittgenstein tries to dissolve the problem of mind and body and attempted to show that this problem arises out of conceptual confusions, and that proper attention to the way in which we use mental and physical terms in ordinary language will relieve us from the vexation problems. For Wittgenstein, there is nothing inside who has mental processes and beetle in the box has nothing to do with the language game because the

box may be empty. Wittgenstein attacks the Cartesian concept of inner world. So he liberates the concept of mind from the Cartesian conception of the inner world of the linguistic and other activities. So, according to Wittgenstein, mind is a part of the world where language games take place. The world is not a set of dead material objects and the objects are various sorts, such as plants, animals, humans etc. It is observed that the question of consciousness arises only in the case of human beings who speak language. According to Wittgenstein, it is because of this, that, mind, thought and other mental states are ascribed to the human beings. It is the human beings who have the capacity to relate themselves to the world by virtue of their cognitive and other interests in the world. It is suggested by Wittgenstein that human mind cannot rest idly without speculation by simply dissolving the philosophical problems. Philosophers always search the actual truth of any mastery. Therefore a philosopher has to enquire the mental concepts until the mystery of the mind is disclosed. Wittgenstein maintains that language serves as the best medium of relating our mind to the world and mind does not stand apart from the world as a transcendent entity but directly enters the world as a function of the linguistic activities that are about the world. According to Wittgenstein, thinking and representing the world are the same and the activity of representing the world means we have already thought about the world. Thus Wittgenstein's mind represents the universe with language which represents rational mental activity and consciousness.

Wittgenstein says that philosophers concept of consciousness is not covered by any one of them. He says, the philosophers notion of consciousness invariably use in the sense of an essence of the mental as opposed to the physical. For the philosophers, mental by nature of consciousness is self-imitating. He asserts that anything appearing on the mental state makes itself felt or known by the person

concerned. 'Conscious' in the sense of 'sensitive' of a particular part of the body means awareness of that part of the body.

Wittgenstein does not believe that awareness or consciousness exists privately. According to him, consciousness is observable in physical behavior. He writes –

Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man's behavior for fact that he does not understand a word: that it means nothing to him, that he can do nothing with it. And criteria for his 'thinking he understands', attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one. And, lastly, criteria for his understanding the word right. In the second case one might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but which I "appear to understand" might be called a "private language."⁷

But it is argued that consciousness cannot be identified with behavior. For example a paralyzed man may be completely incapable of any behavior, but a robot may behave as perfectly as a human being but it is not conscious. The mistake of identifying consciousness with behavior of course a correlation or a bond does not mean identity. By denying consciousness as essence of mind Wittgenstein has strengthened the belief that dispute about the traditional philosophical problems. Therefore it can be said that the phenomenon of consciousness is so fundamental that it cannot be either defined or properly described.


According to Descartes, consciousness is the essence of mind. But Wittgenstein asserts that consciousness is not the essential nature of our mind. Materialism is the view that the universe is entirely made up of physical particles that

exist and it says that these are no ontologically irreducible mental phenomena. Dualism tries to say that there are irreducible mental phenomena. But they state that the mental phenomena is apart from the ordinary physical world we all live in. On the other hand the materialist says, "Consciousness is just a brain process". Materialist holds that consciousness as an irreducible part of the body does not exist. But dualist says that consciousness is irreducible to third person neurobiological processes. According to dualist consciousness is not part of the ordinary physical world but is something over and above it. Consciousness is causally reducible but not ontologically reducible. It is part of the ordinary physical world and is not something over and above it. On the dualist's conception, consciousness is definitely something over and above its material substance, consciousness differs from solidity, liquidity etc.

It is stated by Wittgenstein that conscious experiences do not come to us as a disorganized mess, rather they typically come to us with well defined and sometimes even precise, structures. In this connection he mentions the famous duck-rabbit example in *Philosophical Investigations*. In the duck-rabbit picture Wittgenstein shows that our brain can organize the same picture as a duck or as a rabbit. It is a function of consciousness.

Our mind has the capability to organize any structure or substance into a well defined way and give its shape and predict the substance in its own way. Our mind identifies anything in its own way. Whatever we see, mind recognizes it and informs us about the particular objects. Thus we come to know what does substance is or what it is call. The brain has the capacity to take degenerate stimuli and organize them into coherent wholes.

There is a famous example of duck-rabbit picture (Picture No. I) which gives us an idea about the perception of mind.



Picture =I



Picture= II

In the first picture there is a duck as well as a rabbit in the same picture. Both the structures are hidden from each other and both the structures are equally highlighted. But, if our vision tells our mind that it is a duck, our mind shapes it as a duck and if our vision tells it as rabbit; our mind shapes it as a rabbit. Hence, our vision power is strong enough to convince our mind about a particular object and our mind agrees to it and informs us whatever it thinks,

The picture –II is just a diagram constructed by placing some lines here and there but whenever we look at this, our mind relates it with a human face and we recognize it as human face.

Mysterious think that consciousness is a mystery that cannot be solved by our existing scientific methods and some mysterious think we will think that never be able to understand how consciousness could be explained by brain processes. Thomas Nagel thinks that it might be possible one day to understand how brain causes consciousness but it would require a total revolution in our way of thinking about reality and in our conception of scientific explanation, because given our present

apparatus we cannot conceive how subjective, qualitative, inner experiences could arise from third person neuronal phenomena. Another extreme mysterian Colin Mc Guinn thinks that it is impossible in principle that human beings should ever come to be able to understand how the brain causes consciousness.⁸

These mysterious concepts of consciousness are refuted by Wittgenstein because these concepts are too pessimistic. And they have no scientific value. According to Wittgenstein, consciousness is such a stunning and mysterious phenomenon that one always feels that the very effort to describe it in ordinary words somehow is not only bound to fail, but also the very effort reveals a failure of sensibility. Consciousness is caused by micro level processes in the brain and realized in the brain as higher – level or system feature. According to him, consciousness is the very essence of our meaningful existence. He rejects Descartes view that the essence of mind is consciousness. Consciousness is itself the condition of anything having importance.

It is observed that Wittgenstein has not advocated any theory about consciousness. He has carefully examined the use of words for describing mental phenomena. He declares that consciousness is not the essence of mind or mental phenomena. It is found that there is nothing in common underlying mental phenomena. In this connection his concept of ‘family resemblance’ can be applied to it. In case of mental phenomena, without having any one essence in common, we have a vast range of phenomena overlapping in various ways. Here we may say that we have a family of items in which the members bear a ‘family resemblance’. It is just like the member of a family who may resemble one another, even though they have no one feature (e.g. the shape of the nose) in common. Like family resemblance, all

conscious processes resemble to one another but nothing in common which is to be called conscious.

Descartes accepted the 1st person account of consciousness. But Wittgenstein rejects the 1st person consciousness which leads to give a private ostensive definition of consciousness. Wittgenstein states that if one holds that the initial application of expressions involving consciousness is to one self, if one learns the meaning of these expressions by a private ostensive definition, then insoluble difficulties arise concerning the application of such expressions to others. This Cartesian theory of consciousness is criticized by Wittgenstein, which regards conscious to be a private inner essence. For him, the paradox of Cartesian theory of consciousness is that by giving pre-eminence to the private sensation, the theory eliminates sensations. Wittgenstein's beetle in the box passage displays this self-defeating character of the Cartesian position. He denies the truth of a 'private' inner account of consciousness. But Wittgenstein does not want to say the obvious truth that people have a private mental life. Wittgenstein did not try to analyze this truth in a neo-behaviorist fashion. He wanted to deny the possibility of private sense, e.g. of giving sense to the word 'pain' by just attending to one's own pain experiences, a performance that would be private and unshakable. Wittgenstein also rejects the view that such relations as that between a pain and its symptoms or a thought and the words expressing it have nothing to do with our concept of pain or thought and are just established inductively.

Like David Hume, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that the self or subject is an entity, which is the subject of consciousness. He also denies that our relation to our mental states is one of possession or ownership. Wittgenstein attacks the idea of the

self as an entity. In his reputed early work *Tractatus*, he says that there is no such thing as the thinking, presenting subject. He writes-

*If I wrote a book "The World as I found it." I should also have there in to report on my body and say which members obey my will and which do not etc. This then would be a method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject: that is to say of it alone in this book mention could not be made.*⁹

From the general point of view there are two parts of human being that is mental part and physical part. But Wittgenstein attacks against the idea that life consists of two parts. He asserts that these two parts are not separate. Then question arises that - was Wittgenstein a behaviorist or materialist? It is seen that Wittgenstein did not even accept behaviorism or materialism directly. He never says that only matter is real. He is not denying mental phenomena. For Wittgenstein here is a significant asymmetry between first and third personal relations to the mental. When one attributes mental states to other people, he does it on the basis of behavioral criteria. But he does not discover his own mental states by considering evidence or applying criteria. He neither observes the contents of his mind, nor infers what they are. Therefore we cannot have proper knowledge of our own mental states.

In Wittgenstein's concept of consciousness and mental process he accepts the logical behaviorism. Wittgenstein seems to say that mental processes are one of the sensory kind like sense impressions, sensation of pain etc. Wittgenstein denies the non-sensory intellectual kind of mental processes. For him, many so-called psychological statements assert not only the occurrence of mental processes, but also

something about overt behaviors. In this point Wittgenstein maintains that there must be observable, behaviouristic criteria for the application of psychological concept. Mental phenomena is nothing but outward expression. If we remove the physical behavior from our action we find that nothing remains to be called mental or intentional. In this context Wittgenstein views–

*And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arms?*¹⁰

Wittgenstein guarantees metaphysical certainty to the existence of the world and also to that of the mind in the sense that both thought and language are a part of the world. It is seen that Wittgenstein does not accept Descartes concept of consciousness that it seems to be the first person account which led to give a private definition of consciousness.

Wittgenstein asserts that mind is not the seat of mental process and consciousness is not the innate nature of mind. In his view it is wrong to think that an inner process is the invisible and distinguished from the body. Mind is expressed in physical behavior. His approach to the problems of consciousness is logical and metaphysical. Mind is not knower, the subject of consciousness or activities. The mind, the subject 'I' is only the logical agent involved in the language-game.

According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems are arisen due to misuse of language. Both in *Tractatus* and *philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein gives importance in the meaning and understanding of language.

From the above discussion Wittgenstein's concept of consciousness which is related with his concept of language can be expressed as follows:

a. Thinking and language both belong to the natural history of human beings:

Wittgenstein writes in the section-466 of *Philosophical Investigations*, –‘*what does a man think for? We are not interested in causes –we shall say: Human beings do in fact think.*’ Again in the section-25 of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein says: ‘*Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, and playing*’. Human being can command, question, recount, chatting as they walk, eat, drink, etc. All these are natural to man. Since they can speak language and they can perform activities like commanding, recounting, chatting, questioning. All these activities are performed by human being regularly and therefore it logically follows that they are minded beings and they are conscious beings.

In this connection the theory of evolution of Charles Darwin in the nineteenth century asserts on the identity of human being as rational beings and on the basis of this theory it can be said that the history of thinking and language is as old as their existence. Thus consciousness is deeply ingrained into human thoughts transforming all those into language.

b. Certain forms of thinking and consciousness presuppose the existence of language:

Wittgenstein has considered the acts of thinking and transformation of consciousness into language in multiple levels. He has illustrated that thinking, consciousness, and language are essential description of ‘natural history’ of human beings. In the *Philosophical Investigations* (Part-II) Wittgenstein writes: ‘*One can imagine animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled but hopeful? And why not? A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe that his master*

will come the day after tomorrow? –And what can he not do here? ... Can only those who can talk? One those who have mastered the use of a language. That is say; the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life’.

Our thinking and consciousness are expressed in language. Therefore language is the first tool to express mental state or other related affairs. So according to Wittgenstein, thinking and consciousness pre-suppose the existence of language. However thinking, consciousness etc. are not only connected with language but they are connected with human mode of behaviour or form of life. This behaviour may be natural or learn behaviour.

The term ‘natural history’ itself suggests the existence of tribes, kinds, varieties, or, at the very least, of pluralities of some sort of other. In this part of Wittgenstein account, thinking, via reference to request is designated as one of the natural activities of an existing plurality, viz. human race.

To regard thinking, consciousness and language as part of our natural history of the human race makes it difficult to pose the problem of solipsism: but it cannot make it actually impossible, unless thinking, language etc. are to be regarded as essentially the activities of a plurality of beings.

c. A living human being is a kind of paradigm of a conscious being:

According to Wittgenstein, only human beings have the sensation and consciousness. On the section -281 of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein views: ‘*only of a living human being and what resembles (believes like) one do we say that it has sensations: it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is consciousness or unconsciousness*’. Again at section-360 there is a very similar remark: ‘*We only say of a human being and what is like one that it thinks*’.

d. We cannot attribute consciousness to anything we like:

According to Wittgenstein, human beings feel the emotions only because of their consciousness. Thus human beings may be seen as ‘a living paradigm’ of ‘a conscious being’. He attributes ‘consciousness’ to an individual/special entity as he believes that consciousness cannot be associated with something such as rocks, books, automobiles etc.

Indeed, there are not many things at all to which we can attribute consciousness. Furthermore, what can be imagined in this context turns out to be not there to be logically possible. In *Philosophical investigations* on the section-284 he writes: ‘*Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations..... How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? One might as well ascribe it to a number! –and now look at a wriggling fly, and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here when before everything was, so to speak, too smooth for it.*’

Wittgenstein finds that what we call mental phenomena are found in the human beings. It is because only human beings and those which are closer to human beings can be said to have minds. We can ascribe to them only the predicate of thinking, feeling, willing etc. Only those beings who use language or capable of learning language are said to be minded beings. That is not only biologically true but also true in a deeper logical sense. We cannot say that a dog hopes or a fish hopes or thinks.

Therefore it is clear that we can attribute consciousness to human beings who possess the mind. The predicates ‘hope’, ‘think’, ‘argue’, and that like to human beings and to hope, to think, to argue is to be conscious.

David Hume asserts that we know nothing of an immaterial, indivisible, imperishable soul substance. He claims that the idea of substance is meaningless whether applied to matter or to mind. The doctrine of simplicity and indivisibility of thinking substance can neither be affirmed nor refuted by empirical evidence. Hume's – substance as well as consciousness can be understood by the following –

“The mind is a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement. The mind is a kind of theaters where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, re-pass, glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is no simplicity in it at a time, nor identical in difference (times).”¹¹

Again Hume admitted that he did not find self by his introspection. Of course Hume's claim seems to be untenable because as a subject of consciousness something must exist whether it is mind or physical body. In this context Mc. Taggart says that our knowledge of our own identity implies that self is not a mere bundle of impressions as Hume contended. It implies that there is in fact an unanalysable ego of which we have direct knowledge of introspection.

There are objections against the view that ‘consciousness is the essence of mind’.

1. There are a number of activities of which we are conscious in the beginning and which on being performed for a number of times become automatic. As they become automatic, they do not need attention. This is the nature of our habitual actions. Therefore it can be said that in habitual actions, there is no need of consciousness.

2. The 'unconscious' is regarded as an important part of the mind and its study is very much within the province of psychology.
3. There is a view that consciousness can be studied only with the help of 'introspection.' Every individual's introspection is a private affair, its study can only be subjective or speculative. We have immediate knowledge of our own consciousness only. Other's consciousness can only be inferred of course this method is analogical and therefore not scientific.
4. The use of introspection can obtain a complete description of the consciousness of an individual. But it does not explain why any particular consciousness takes the form it does, and how it can be controlled or utilized to the best advantage of human being.

Moreover, there are objections against introspection itself.

In the famous paper 'Does consciousness exist?' William James denies the existence of consciousness. But we should notice the first point that William James puts the word consciousness in inverted commas. James is not referring to consciousness as ordinary understood, but to a specific philosophical doctrine of 'consciousness.' From the following passage it is clear about William James' denial of consciousness.

"To deny plumply that 'consciousness' exists seems so absurd on the face of it – for undeniably 'thoughts' do exist that – I feel some readers will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts are made, but there is a

function in experience which thoughts perform and for the performance of which this quality of being is involved, and that is the function of knowing”.¹²

It is observed that what James is denying is not infact the existence of consciousness but the correctness of certain types of description of consciousness, viz. those that entail its being an ‘entity’ or ‘aboriginal stuff’. So, it is said that James is disputing the truth of certain philosopher’s descriptions of consciousness. This is a fearless radical challenge than the unqualified statement that consciousness does not exist. Thus James believed that consciousness is the name of the non-entity, and has no right to place among first principles. James denies that the word ‘consciousness’ stands for an entity, but he insists that it stands for a function. For him it is the stream of thought or consciousness or of subjective life.

Hamilton gives a sort of objection to James’ claims that consciousness is not an ‘entity’ or ‘aboriginal stuff’. According to Hamilton, ‘consciousness may be compared to an internal light, by means of which, and which alone, what passes in the mind is rendered visible. Consciousness in simple –is not composed of parts, either similar or dissimilar. It always resembles itself, differing only in the degree of its intensity. Thus there are not various kind of consciousness, although there are various kinds of mental modes or states of which we are conscious.”¹³

In the sixth chapter of ‘Concept of Mind’ Ryle discusses about consciousness. Here Ryle’s concern is two-fold. The first is to dismiss the traditional notion of consciousness and introspection and the second is to establish the identical nature of knowledge of one’s own self and the knowledge of others. Ryle maintains that our knowledge of our own selves cannot be based on the doubtful means. Ryle believes that the traditionalist’s theory of ‘privileged access’ to our own mental states and

processes rests on an imaginary assumption that there is an internal faculty of reflection or intuition or introspection or consciousness which supplies the data about our internal life. Ryle has sought a number of arguments to dismiss the age long notions of consciousness and introspection. Therefore it can be said that both Wittgenstein and Ryle are agreed that consciousness is not private.

3.3 Consciousness and “Meaning and Understanding”:

Wittgenstein shows that meaning and understanding are related to consciousness. According to Wittgenstein, understanding is mastery of a technique or practice. In *Philosophical Investigations* he talks about meaning and understanding. Understanding is not an inner mental state or process but “mastery of a technique” and that the technique in question consists in following the rules for the use of expression, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that one’s understanding something by an expression consists in one’s going through an inner mental process. He rejects his earlier view of *Tractatus* that words are pictures of facts. Here Wittgenstein rejecting the empiricist view that meaning is grounded in sensory experience, one does not teach the meaning of words by setting up an association in the learner’s mind between the word and an experience of some object or situation. And secondly that our attaching meaning to an expression on different occasions of using it does not consist in having the same experience or going through the same mental process each time. According to Paul Horwich, “Our discourse with the words “meaning” and “understanding” is similar, in a variety of striking respects, to the way we speak of mental phenomena such as pain, color sensation, and moods; and so we are inclined to suppose that someone’s understanding a word in a certain way, his meaning a certain thing by it, is a matter of its occurrence (his hearing and saying it) being correlated

with a characteristic conscious state of his mind –perhaps a certain mental image, or an interpretation, or a body of discussion about how the word is to be deployed. In which case, that associated mental state would be what is meant by the word, its meaning.”¹⁵

Several reasons are given by Wittgenstein for rejecting the inner state or process view of understanding. One is that the logic (the ‘grammar, as he puts it) of the concepts of meaning and understanding differs from that of experiential concepts. First, ‘pain’ is an experience, and we can talk of pain lasting for a long or a short time, of being in one’s toe or in one’s head, of being intense or dull. We cannot say any of these things about understanding an expression for a long time, or in our toes, or intensely. Secondly different people associate different images with, or have different reactions to, the same expression, accordingly the meaning of the expression cannot consist in these mental accompaniments, nor can one’s understanding of the expression do so. Thirdly, the most important reason is that it is not enough for an understanding of an expression that a particular inner mental process should be going on. To illustrate what he means by this Wittgenstein gives the example of one’s using the word ‘cube’, and says that it is a mistake to think that having a mental picture of a cube before one’s mind is what one’s understanding the word consist in, because the mental picture does not and cannot by itself tell one what the word ‘cube’ means. The mental image of a cube could indeed be associated with any number of expressions – ‘box’, ‘sugar’, geometry etc. – and therefore it does not dictate how the word ‘cube’ is to be correctly understood, we cannot, that is to say, read off from any of the associable images what the words meaning is. The main target of Wittgenstein’s attack on the inner state or process conception is the view that understanding is something hidden, is not just ‘inner’ (in the mind) but deep in the mind. ¹⁶

*But isn't it our meaning is that gives sense to the sentences? (And here of course, belongs the fact that one cannot mean a senseless sense of words). And 'meaning it' is something in the sphere of the mind. But it is also something private! It is the insensible something; only comparable to consciousness itself.*¹⁷

Man can think which is not seen in other material objects. Though consciousness is not the essence of mind yet according to Wittgenstein, there is a relation between mind and consciousness. In this context Wittgenstein writes:

*Could a machine think? –could it be in pain? Well, is the human body to be called such a machine? It surely comes as close as possible to being such a machine.*¹⁸

From the above version it is clear that a machine cannot think because it has no any conscious. So he writes –

*But a machine surely cannot think? –Is that an empirical statement? We only say of a human being and what is like one that it thinks. We also say it of dulle and no doubt of spirits too. Look at the word 'to think' as a tool.*¹⁹

Wittgenstein states that the sensation word 'pain' cannot be private. If it is private then nobody can understand what is the meaning of pain. So Wittgenstein writes:

Could someone understand the word "pain" who had never felt pain? –Is experience to teach me whether this is so or not? –And if we say "A man could not imagine pain without having some

time felt it” –how do we know? How can it be decided whether it is true? ²⁰

It is observed that Wittgenstein gives his account of consciousness in different writings. Wittgenstein doesn't provide any theory regarding the concept of mind or consciousness. In this context Phil Hutchinson writes:

Wittgenstein is offering us neither a theory of mind or consciousness proto computational or behaviorist –nor is he stipulating or mapping for us the grammar of “thinking” or “thought”, from which we might infer that he committed to logical behaviorism. ²¹

Wittgenstein gives a positive account of what meaning and understanding are. Here the concept of understanding is central. He says that to understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique. This says that ‘understanding’ is knowing how to do something, in the case of language, understanding language means knowing how to use it. Thus the connection between understanding, meaning and use is an intimate one. Two immediate implications are these – *(i)* using is itself an activity and *(ii)* understanding as a practical capacity, is something that is recognized and measured by outward criteria.

Wittgenstein discusses philosophical question by reference to the meanings of words, as shown in their use. What does it mean to say that human beings are conscious? He writes-

Now, expressions like “I see”, “I here”, “I am conscious”, really have their usages. I tell a doctor “Now I am hearing with this ear

again”, or I tell someone who believes I am in a faint, “I am conscious again”, and so on. ²²

3.4 Consciousness and ‘Understanding and Rule following’:

Wittgenstein’s account of understanding turns on the notion of following a rule which is related to consciousness or mind. The practice in which understanding the meaning of expressions consists is that of observing the rules for their use in the different language games they belong to. In sections 143-242 of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein discusses about rule following.

In the *Tractatus* and Augustinian’s view of language, generally, the idea is that the rule for the correct use of a word is in some way determined by the nature of the object denoted by that word. In this sense, meaning of the word can govern that word’s use. But Wittgenstein rejects this view. The model of the rules of logic is in Wittgenstein’s view particularly harmful as applied to language because there is an enormous diversity of rules governing the use of expressions in language, whereas in logic there is a single all-embracing and rigid set of rules constituting the ‘language’ in which logic consists.

There is a problem with the notion of rule-following that is on the one hand the feeling of being guided by a rule does not guarantee that the rule is being followed. For someone might think he is following a rule but in fact be applying it incorrectly, while on the other hand someone’s acting in accordance with a rule may be a merely coincidental matter – that person might not be following the rule at all. For example he might even be ignorant of its existence. Yet both the guiding function of rules and the fact that observance of them constitutes doing things correctly in

whatever activity is at issue, appear to be essential to the very notion of rules and rule following.

Wittgenstein wants to say that rule following is a general practice established by agreement, custom and training. Therefore, although rules indeed guide us and afford us with our measures of correctness, they are independent of us and hence do not constitute a coercive standard imposed from outside our rule following practices themselves. In this context Wittgenstein gives us an example as follows:

*Consider a signpost such as one might find at a crossroads or on a footpath. The signpost tells one what direction to take but not because it coerces one to go there, its guiding function rests upon the fact that is a custom, a practice, which establishes the use we make of signposts in general and our understanding of what that function is. And this is just what we are to understand by 'rule' in the case of language – A rule stands there like a signpost.*²³

The key notion here is that of a 'custom' Wittgenstein says, *a person goes by a signpost only in so far as there exists a regular use of signposts, a custom.*²⁴ The application of the concept 'following a rule' presupposes a custom. By employing the notion of a custom Wittgenstein intends to make a number of points, two of which are especially important. One is that rule following is not an inner mental activity, something hidden, but is a public matter when someone sees a signpost and goes in the direction it indicates, he is not internally obeying a rule. Secondly his taking the direction indicated by the signpost just is his following the relevant rule. Therefore rule-following is not a mysterious activity at all. It shows itself in our practice, it is manifest. To understand rules and rule following we have only to remind ourselves of

what is familiar in all our many different kinds of normative behavior. The another point is that rule following is essentially a social practice, that is, something which exists in a community and that it is the existence of agreement in the community which establishes the rules we follow. Wittgenstein asserts that the word agreement and the word 'rule' are related to one another, they are cousins. *If I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it.*²⁵ He wants to mean by it that rule following is essentially a community based activity entails that nothing can count as a 'private' observance of a rule. Whether someone is following a rule or not depends upon the availability of public criteria for his doing. In this context opines-

*And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately'. Otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.*²⁶

Wittgenstein says 'the application of the concept 'following a rule' presupposes a custom. Hence it would be nonsense to say just once in the history of the world someone followed a rule. Wittgenstein's view in that rule following is a habitual practices, one in which we are trained as 'Juvenile' members of our linguistic community. Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so. Wittgenstein puts this point more explicitly in *Blue and Brown Books*. According to him, we can understand and obey the rules due to presence of consciousness.

From the above discussion we have come to the conclusion that the meaning of an expression is what we understand and when we understand that expression. Understanding consists in knowing the expression's use across the variety of language games in which it occurs. Knowing its use is having an ability; the ability of follow

the rules for its use in those different language games. Rule following is not a mysterious inner process. It is a practice embedded in the customs and agreements of a community and as such is essentially public. To follow a rule correctly is to conform to the established practices of the community. We acquire the ability to use expressions, to follow the rules for their use, by our training as members of that community. To understand any given sentence is to understand the language-games of which it is part, correlatively to follow a rule is to have mastery of the practice of rule-following itself.

3.5 The Role of Consciousness in Knowledge:

Wittgenstein asserts that consciousness plays a vital role in the process of knowledge. With it man acquires knowledge, appraises events and phenomena, appreciates the beauty of nature and reality, performs intellectual activities assimilates ideas and concepts, understands in thinks.

There is an important notion in Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind that mind takes the central role in acquiring knowledge. In the *Tractatus* he rejects experience and knowledge as not the part of philosophy but of science. In the later part it is seen that these take the major part with the discussion of meaning. According to him, understanding the meaning of expressions in language does not consist in private mental states or processes. For his view implies that there is something wrong not just with this way of thinking about understanding but with the very idea of 'private mental states' in general. Accordingly, starting with the *Blue Book* but chiefly in the *Investigations*, *Zettle*, and elsewhere among the later writings, Wittgenstein attacks the idea that the concepts of experience, thought, feeling, intention, expectation and

the rest are concepts of what is inner and private, accessible only to the individual who possesses them.

What Wittgenstein means by ‘expression’ is set out in his *Investigations* of first person talk of “pain”. In the section- 244 Wittgenstein says, how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? Of the word ‘pain’ for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural expressions and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior. Wittgenstein’s claim is that someone’s saying ‘I am in pain’ is a manifestation of his pain. It is not an outer sign of something else which is occurring internally, but is itself part of his pain behavior. It is an expression of pain, but it is a learned, substitute for those more primitive expressions. In this context Wittgenstein writes: –

By nature and a particular training, a particular education, we are disposed to give spontaneous expression to wishes in certain circumstances. (A wish is, of course, not such a ‘circumstance’.) In this game the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied.²⁷

The statement ‘I am expecting a bank at any moment’ is an expression of expectation. According to Wittgenstein, a command of language introduces levels of richness and subtlety unavailable to non-language-using creatures. He writes –

A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after tomorrow? ²⁸

But the difference between verbal behavior and the other behavior is one of degree, not of kind, verbal behavior is an extension of the natural expressions, pain and so on, which take the form of pacing or wincing as the case may be.

According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of words like 'pain', 'expectation, and the rest cannot be fixed by private inner ostention. Rather, like all words, their meaning is their use and their use is settled by the publicly agreed rules for their use in the shared form of life upon which the possibility of that agreement rests. Wittgenstein asserts that there are no separate sets of rules for 1st person and another for 3rd person's application. In just the way therefore that first person ascriptions of psychological terms turn on their being expressions of pain, expectation, or whatever, and therefore parts of pain etc., behavior itself. So, third person's ascriptions of them are expressions of our behavior towards others. Our language-game is an extension of the primitive behavior.²⁹ In Wittgenstein's view it means that there is no skeptical problem about 'other minds' of the kind which has dogged philosophy since Descartes. Wittgenstein's rejection of Cartesian picture of mind has consciousness for how we think of other minds then our own. We can never really know what is going on in someone else's mind because those going on are private. Solipsism and the problems of other mind depend crucially on Cartesian picture of the self. According to Wittgenstein, there is no any problem of other mind because mental event is always public.

With regard to knowledge Wittgenstein criticizes Descartes method of doubts. He responds to certain thesis advanced by G. E. Moore on the subject of knowledge

and certainty. In a well known paper entitled “Proof of An External World” Moore argues that there are a number of propositions which he can know with utter certainty to be true. One is that he has two hands, the ‘proof’ is he says, that he can hold his hands aloft and display them. Therefore it can be said that there are many other such propositions which can be known with equal certainty. Here Moore critically argues to Descartes’ claim in the ‘Meditations’ that whereas one can be certain, whenever one thinks of it, of one’s own existence as a ‘thinking thing’ (a mind). It can legitimately be doubted whether one has ‘hands and a body’ (meditations). In Moore’s common sense philosophy’ such doubts are refutable with the greatest ease, that ‘there are hands’ is as simple a matter as displaying them. Here, though Wittgenstein supports Moore’s view of knowledge, he argues that both Moore and Descartes are mistaken in their thinking about these concepts. Wittgenstein reason is that it is senseless to lay claim to knowledge where doubt itself is senseless, since in all but rare and unfortunate circumstances the question whether one has hands simply does not and cannot sensibly arise, Wittgenstein therefore says that the assertion ‘I know that I have hands’ therefore involves a misuse of ‘know’.

Wittgenstein views that doubt is itself possible only in the context of a language-game. A language-game, is a form of life. It is a practice or a set of practices involving agreement about the rules for the use of words. Wittgenstein points out that a child who is learning, say, history has to accept the language-game before he can question whether something is true or whether something exists.³⁰ Wittgenstein says that doubt comes after belief. If the pupil continually doubted whether the world has existed for longer than a few hours or years, the business of learning history would be impossible. Wittgenstein says that such doubt are ‘hollow’. For in effect they try to make the entire language-game itself impossible. But if the language-game were

impossible then the doubt itself would fail to make sense: *A doubt that doubted everything would not be doubted.*³¹ Wittgenstein investigates ‘doubt’ and ‘certainty’ holds that: where there is no doubt there is no knowledge either, and this is intended to undermine the Cartesian view that first-person knowledge is knowledge. Wittgenstein is correct in attacking the Cartesian view that private mental states are not source of knowledge. Although the account just given of Wittgenstein’s reflections on knowledge is drawn from ‘on certainty’, the fundamental of his view of knowledge is present in his later work *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein’s concern is to show that psychological concepts do not apply to something essentially private. This is shown by a dialogue with himself which he sets out in the *Investigations* –

*In what sense are my sensations private? –Well only I can know whether I am really in pain, another person can only surmise it. – In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word ‘to know’ as it is normally use (and how else are we use it), then other people very often know when I am in pain –yes but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself –it cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a job) that I know I am in pain. What is it suppose to mean –except perhaps that I in pain?*³²

Wittgenstein’s concept of consciousness is found in his great in his discussion on the topic of the possibility of a private language. Such a private language is not to be confused with the evident fact that language users can speak to themselves. Wittgenstein writes –

*A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself, he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even imagine human being who spoke only in monologue, who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. –An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people’s action correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.*³³

According to Wittgenstein, the above mentioned language i.e. a language use to talk to oneself like speaking to oneself in monologue is not the private language. It is a language used by a person to talk about his immediate private sensation, because the object of that language has to be necessarily private. He writes –

*But could then we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experience –his feelings, moods, and the rest –for his private use? –Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? –But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking to his immediate private sensation. So, another person cannot understand the language.*³⁴

In this version, Wittgenstein is concerned with what may be loosely termed the ‘Cartesian’ conception of subjectivity and self-knowledge. According to this view, one has determinate concepts of one’s own inner experiences independently of having learned to speak a public language like English or Urdu. His consciousness is like an inner theatre in which various objects and events are analyzed and in which he is the

soul audience member. No one else can experience the inner workings of his consciousness because it is after all his consciousness, shut up and locked away from other consciousness. So only he can know what his experiences are like, and no public language can capture all there is to be captured about his sensations.

Wittgenstein seeks to reject this Cartesian picture as a philosophical illusion. He states that consciousness is not private. If the meaning of sensation terms really were fixed by some mysterious procedure of inner ostensive definition then they could have no use in the public language that we share with each other. Meaning of consciousness are not fixed by inner ostensive definition. The success of ostensive definitions would depend on the possibility of others' being able to learn the use of sensation terms by acquaintance with other people's sensation but it is unclear what it would mean to acquaint someone else with one's pain, for example, unless it were to express it to her in some way. But such expressions are part of our public language, not examples of inner ostention. The ostensive definition would be playing no role in bringing the term into the language.

The traditional inner/outer picture of the mind is rejected by Wittgenstein. According to him, psychological expressions are not names of entities which are directly observable only by the subject. Wittgenstein's private language argument denies the ostensive theory. There can be no inner, private, analogue of public ostensive definition. Sensations cannot fulfill the role of samples. So a pain cannot serve as a defining sample for the application of the word 'pain'. Concentrating one's attention upon one's pain is not a kind of pointing. Remembering a sensation is presuppose and so cannot explain the meaning of a sensation, name, and the memory of sensation word by reference to a sensation, conceived of as private and intended to

function as a defining sample in an ostensive definition would be such a pseudo-rule-
for which there could be no criterion of correct application. Thus Wittgenstein
expresses his concept of knowledge and shows how consciousness is related with
knowledge.

The problem of sensation with which Wittgenstein struggled in *Philosophical Investigations* is a dilemma. There are two solutions viz. Cartesianism and behaviorism about this puzzle. According to Cartesianism, each man has in Rylean phrase, 'privileged access' to his own sensation. Only the person directly knows that he has them. Other person can infer that he has a given sensations but he and only he knows whether he has it or not. This raises a problem about how a word can name a sensation. Since nobody can display his sensations to anybody else, sensations cannot be given names by public ostensive definition. Therefore, Cartesian are tempted to infer that in order to name a sensation of a given kind, for example toothache, each man must wait until he has a sensation of that kind, 'toothache' on it.

But the Cartesian view on sensation that nobody can directly know whether another has a given sensation say a pain, is now widely dismissed by behaviorism. According to behaviorism, another is in pain can be observed in innumerable cases. For example when one sees a child spill boiling water on himself, and hears his uncontrollable cry, it seems to follow that to say of somebody, 'he is in pain', asserts nothing except what can be observed: that is, nothing that does not have to do with his behavior and circumstances.

According to the Cartesian position, knowledge of the sensations of other is impossible. But according to behaviorist, a man can know what his own sensations are only in the way by which others do, namely, by observing his behavior and

circumstances. The dilemma is that, while both positions are repugnant, it appears that one or the other must be true. Behaviorists assert that there is no problem of other mind, because mind is not private entity.

Wittgenstein tries to give a solution to the problem of sensation. In a series of lectures delivered in 1932-33 of which G. E. Moore has left a detailed record. According to him, the sentences 'I have toothache' and 'He has toothache' do not, he declared, both express values of the propositional function 'X' has toothache. It can be said that if he is right, the problem of sensation does not arise at all. Yet he gives a solution in the Blue Book. Wittgenstein remarks 'To say, I have a pain, is no more a statement about a particular person than moaning is'³⁵

In the part II of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein made it clear that a man may use the sentence 'I am in pain', to describe his state. He writes –

*I say "I am afraid", someone else asks me: 'What was that? A cry of fear; or do you want to tell me how you feel; or is it a reflection on your present state?'" –Could I always give him a clear answer? Could I never give him one?'*³⁶

Wittgenstein has interwoven remarks about fear and grief with remarks about pain and visual sensation; he evidently intended what he said about fear to be applied to sensation also. According to George Pitcher, 'Wittgenstein's work on sensation in *Philosophical Investigations* is a sustained criticism of a Cartesian theory, which he labels V that can be stated in three propositions'.³⁷

John Wisdom tried to determine the fundamental sense of consciousness by the following points –

1. Conscious implies either feels or awareness.
2. Consider the change which comes over a man as he comes round from chloroform or from dreamless sleep that kind of change he calls becoming conscious.
3. Conscious does not mean alive. A tree is alive but not conscious. An amoeba is certainly alive yet quite likely not conscious.
4. Conscious does not mean living and sensitive. A man in a dreamless sleep is a living and sensitive being. But he is not at that time conscious in the sense of course such a man is conscious compared with a tree or a dead body.
5. It is conscious implies neither *(a)* that is conscious of his environment nor *(b)* that is conscious of himself.
6. Conscious is the fundamental sense of 'conscious' – that is the sense in terms of which all other senses are defined.

Recently John R. Searle gives an analysis about consciousness in his book "Mind". According to him, there is a theory that universe is material yet nobody can give up minds exist. In the problem of mind and body the concept of consciousness takes a vital role. According to Searle, all forms of consciousness are caused by the behavior of neurons and are realized in the brain system which is itself composed of neurons. All conscious states are caused by lower level neuronal processes in the brain. According to psychologist, we have conscious thoughts and feelings; they are caused by neurobiological processes in the brain and they exist as biological features of the brain system. John R. Searle states the biological naturalism about consciousness as a set of four theses:

1. Consciousness states, with their subjective, first person ontology are real phenomena in the real World. We cannot do an eliminative reduction of consciousness. Showing that it is just an illusion. Nor can we reduce consciousness to its neurobiological basis, because such a third-person reduction would leave out the first person ontology of consciousness.
2. Conscious states are entirely caused by lower level neurobiological processes in the brain conscious states are thus causally reducible to neurobiological processes. They have absolutely no life of their own, independent of the neurobiology. Causally speaking they are not something 'over and above' neurobiological processes.
3. Conscious states are realized in the brain as features of the brain system, Individual neurons are not conscious, but portions of the brain system composed of neurons are conscious.
4. Because conscious states are real features of the real world, they function causally. For example John's conscious thirst causes him to drink water.

From these, it can be said that we know for a fact that all of our mental processes are caused by neurobiological processes and we also know that they are going on in the brain and perhaps in the rest of the central nervous system. We know that they function causally, though they have no causal powers in addition to those of the underlying neurobiology, and we know that they are not ontology, first person ontology. John's conscious feelings of thirst really do exist and function causally in his behavior. We know for a fact that they are caused by neuronal processes and the feeling themselves are processes going on inside the brain. We have found the following features in Searle's analysis of consciousness.

a. Qualitativeness:

Every conscious state has a qualitative feel to it. In that sense conscious states are always qualitative. Some philosophers introduce the word 'qualia' to describe this feature, but the term misleading because its usage suggests that some conscious states are not qualitative. Apparently the idea is that some conscious states such as feeling a pain or tasting ice cream, are qualitative but some others, such as thinking about arithmetic problems, have no special qualitative feel.

b. Subjectivity:

Because of the qualitative character of consciousness, conscious states exist only when they are experienced by a human or animal subject. They have a type of subjectivity that is called ontological subjectivity. Another way to make this same point is to say that consciousness has a first person ontology. It exists only as experienced by a human or animal subject and in that sense it exists only from a first person point of view. For example when one knows about his consciousness, he has knowledge that is quite different from the kind of knowledge he has of his own consciousness.

c. Unity:

Consciousness of the normal, non pathological kind, comes to us with a unified structure. Kant called this unity of the conscious field the 'transcendental unity of apperception', and he made a great deal out of it. Consciousness is by its very essence qualitative, subjective, and unified. Consciousness is not divisible in the way that physical objects typically are, rather consciousness always comes in discrete units of unified conscious fields.

d. Intentionality:

If consciousness and intentionality are independent phenomena, of course, many conscious states are intrinsically intentional. Not all consciousness is intentional, and not all intentionality is conscious but there is a very serious and important overlap between consciousness and intentionality, in fact, there are logical connections between the two: mental states that are in fact unconscious have to be the kind of thing that could in principle become conscious.

e. Mood:

All conscious state comes to the person in some sort of mood or other. When someone suddenly receives some very bad news, he will find that his mood changes. If someone receive good news, it will change in the opposite direction mood is not the same as emotion because, for one thing, emotions are always intentional. They always have some intentional content, whereas mood need not have an intentional content. But moods predispose us to emotions. For example, if someone is in an irritable mood, he will be more likely to experience the emotion of anger. Moods seem to be more susceptible to artificial pharmacological control than most other aspects of consciousness. Like pains, which one can control through aesthetic and analgesics, he can effect moods such as depression with drugs such as prose and lithium. It seems likely that pharmacological advances will enable us to get even greater therapeutic control of debilitating moods, as we did of pains.

f. Pleasure/Unpleasure:

Mood is the phenomenon that for any conscious state there is some degree of pleasure or unpleasures. The questions, did your enjoy it, was it fun? Did you have a

good time, bad time, boring time, amusing time? Was it disgusting, delightful, or depressing? etc. are related with consciousness.

g. Situatedness:

All of our conscious experiences come to us with a sense of what one might call the background situation in which one experiences the conscious field. One has the consciousness such as he is on the surface of the earth, what time of day it is, what time of year it is, whether or not he has had lunch, what country he is a citizen of. One becomes aware of the sense of situatedness when it is lost or disrupted.

h. Active and passive consciousness:

To anyone who reflects on his conscious experiences, there is an obvious distinction between the experience of voluntary intentional activity on the one hand and the experience of passive perception on the other. It is not a sharp distinction, because there is a voluntaristic element of perception and there are passive components of voluntary action. But there is clearly a difference, for example, between voluntarily raising one's arm as part of a conscious act, and having one's arm raised by someone who triggers once nerve connections. This distinction is well illustrated by the researcher of the Canadian neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield (quoted from Searle's 'mind'). The basic distinction is this: in the case of perception (seeing the glass in front of me, feeling the shirt against my neck) one has the feeling that 'I am perceiving this, and in that sense, this is happening to me'. In the case of action one has the feeling, 'I am doing this, and in that sense, I am making this happen.'

i. The Gestalt Structure:

Our conscious experiences do not just come to us as a disorganized mess, rather they typically come to us with well, defined, and sometimes even precise, structures. The Gestalt psychologists investigated these structures and found certain interesting facts. One is the brain has a capacity to take degenerate stimuli and organize them into coherent wholes. It is able to take a constant stimulus and treat it now as one perception, now as another. So in the famous duck-rabbit example there is a constant perceptual input but one perceives it now as a duck, now as a rabbit.

This is the famous Gestalt theory of consciousness which is discussed by Wittgenstein in the part –II of his *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wittgenstein's concept of consciousness is realized in his concept of private language argument. Wittgenstein's, private language argument aims to show that there can be no inner, private, analogy of public ostensive definition. He asserts that sensation cannot fulfill the rule of samples. So a pain cannot serve as a definition sample for the application of the word 'pain' concentrating one's attention upon one's pain is not a kind of pointing. Remembering a sensation presupposes and so cannot explain the meaning of a sensation. It cannot serve as an object of comparison for the application of a sensation word. According to Wittgenstein, there is no such thing which is incommunicable with a rule to anyone else. But the idea of defining a sensation word by reference to a sensation conceived of as private and intended to function as a defining sample. An ostensive definition would be such a pseudo rule for which there could be no criterion of correct application. Thus it is observed that the nature of consciousness is controversial.

3.6 Conclusion:

It is observed that the problem of consciousness is also controversial as other problems in philosophy such as mind or soul. Philosophers and psychologist are not agreed in one certain definition or nature of his problem. Though it is believed that consciousness is the essence of mind (like Descartes), according to modern analytic philosophers, consciousness cannot be the essence of mind. Behaviorism denies the privacy of consciousness. Though the problem of consciousness is a controversial, it is clear that the concept of consciousness is an undeniable fact. It occupies a very important place in neurology as a neurophysiological phenomena and trying to identify it with high level brain activity. But neurophysiology is yet to develop itself to prove mantel phenomena to be neuronal phenomena. In this regard David J Chalmars, in his essay “On the Search for the Neuronal Co-relate of Consciousness”, says –

“And I hope to have made a case that philosophy and neuroscience can come together to make clarify some of the deep problems involved in the study of consciousness.”³⁸

From the above discussions it may stated that Wittgenstein philosophy of mind and consciousness have enriched the human study. His liberal views on this difficult subject have illuminated dark areas of human mind which was not properly considered/ studied earlier. Of course many new ideas or studies are entering in to the study of philosophy.

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