CHAPTER – II

Wittgenstein's Concept of Language

2.1 Introduction:

Language is a distinctive human achievement and it performs a variety of important function in the human society. Among human beings language is the primary instrument of communication that distinguishes man from the rest of the animal world. Language, spoken or written, is the only tool that serves the means of expression and communication. Among the contemporary western philosophers, Ludwig Wittgenstein analyses language from a new perspective. In his early life he wrote *"Tractatus Logico Philosophicus"* which is regarded as masterpiece of linguistic philosophy and in his later life, he wrote another masterpiece known as *"Philosophical Investigations."* In some fundamental points Wittgenstein made reverse opinions concerning the same matter in these two books i.e. whatever is in *Tractatus* is not found in the *Philosophical Investigations*. In these two books Wittgenstein expressed his concept of language very clearly from his own perspective.

Wittgenstein's concept of language has a great significance in philosophy of mind. There is a close relationship between language and thoughts which is noticed in Wittgenstein's concept of mind. It is believed that language is the vehicle which signifies human thoughts. Thought is a function of mind. Therefore human mind and language are closely associated with one another. **2.2 Concept of Language** *(Tractatus):*


Tractatus Logico Philosophicus was first published in German in 1921 and translated by C.K. Ogden with F.P. Ramsey's help and published in English in 1922. Clearly, the book addresses the central problem of philosophy which deals with the

world, thought and language and presents a solution of this problem which is grounded in logic and in nature of representation. The world is represented by thought, which is a proposition with sense; thought and proposition share in the same logical form. Hence the thought and proposition can be pictures of the facts.

Wittgenstein's objective in the *Tractatus* was to present a comprehensive philosophical picture of the world. He wanted to show how propositions succeed in presenting real states of affairs in the world and in this sense he was part of an ancient tradition which conceived 'language' as 'reference', as our way of referring to things in the world. According to A.C. Grayling, "The task Wittgenstein sets himself in the Tractatus is therefore to explain, with a view to establishing the foregoing points, how language works."¹ The comments of A.C. Grayling shows Wittgenstein's task is to reveal the nature of language and its relation to the world, which in effect amounts to explaining how meaning attaches to the propositions we assert. A proposition is something asserted or proposed for acceptance as true. For example the table is brown, this book is about Russell, it is raining etc. But propositions are not to be confused with the sentences used to express them. A sentence is a grammatically well formed string of words in any language, written or spoken by someone at a certain time and place. A sentence has only to obey the grammatical rules of the language to which it belongs in order to be a sentence; on the other hand a proposition is what is asserted when a sentence is meaningful and non-idly used. Therefore, propositions and sentences are quite different from one another regarding their structure.

Wittgenstein says that both language and the world have a structure. Language consists in propositions, and these are compounds made up of what he calls 'elementary propositions', which in turn are combinations of names. Names are the ultimate constituents of language. Correspondingly, the world consists in the totality

of facts and facts are compounded out of 'state of affairs', which in turn are compounded out of objects. Each level of structure in language matches a level of structure in the world. The objects, which are the ultimate constituents of the world, are denoted by the ultimate constituents of language. The names combine to form elementary propositions, which correspond to states of affairs and each of these further combine to form, respectively, propositions and the facts which, in a sense to be explained, those propositions picture'. A.C. Grayling puts the following structures of these relations as follows –



Wittgenstein wanted to show how propositions succeeded in presenting real states of affairs in the world. He argued in the *Tractatus* that the world is represented to us, by language which is a picture of reality. If language is a picture of reality he reasoned, there must be a similarity of structure between that which pictured and which is pictured. That is, the form of language must be the same as that of reality. In this context A.C. Grayling says, "What is fundamental to the *Tractatus* is the thought that language has an underlying logical structure, and understanding of which shows the limits of what can clearly and meaningfully be said. The importance of this, in Wittgenstein's view, is that what can be said is the same as what can be thought." ²

In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein begins with the proposition- *The world is everything that is the case*, ³ what is intended here is the following, if we ask someone what the world composed of, from what it is built up?, we might get this type of

answer that the world is composed of objects such as trees, people, animals, automobiles, books, tables etc. All objects, considered together, make up the world. This answer, according to the Tractatus is wrong. While the world can be reconstituted from such objects, the more collection of these objects is not sufficient. What is necessary is knowledge of the combinations in which objects are related to one another. For example, in reality, a book or a table is not a fact, for a fact can occur only in combination, as in the proposition 'The book is lying on the table.' Here, the book is a thing and the table is a thing, whereas it is a fact that the book is lying on the table. It is neither the book nor the table, but the book is lying on the table, which is one of the elements constituting the world. Such an element is a fact. Thus the second proposition of Wittgenstein in Tractatus -The world is the totality of facts not of things, ⁴ is the existence of states of affairs. According to Wittgenstein, a state of affairs is a fact that in itself does not consist of facts; it is a constellation of objects. It is a combination of things, and a thing is a simple, an irreducible entity. And a state of affairs that actually obtains is a fact. Facts; then may be positive or negative: a positive fact is the existence of a state of affairs; a negative fact is the non-existence of a state of affairs.

The elementary propositions are logically independent of each other. So, we need to say which of them are true and which of them are false in order to give a complete account of reality. In other words, reality consists of all possible state of affairs, whether existing or non existing. Propositions are formed out of elementary propositions by the truth functional connectives. They are therefore truth – functions of elementary propositions. Because they depend for their own truth value on the truth values of the elementary propositions which constitute them, propositions will be truth or false according to the distribution of the truth values among the elementary

propositions. But there are two important cases where this is not so, one in which a proposition is true no matter what its constituents, truth values and the other in which a proposition is false no matter what its constituents truth values. In the first case the proposition is a tautology, always true, in the second it is a contradiction, always false.

In the *Tractatus*, we have seen that the world consists of state of affairs – and not of objects. Objects are the constituents, that changes in the combination of objects yield changes in the states of affairs. The correspondence between elementary propositions and state of affairs is constituted by the fact that the names out of which elementary propositions are built denote the objects out of which their corresponded states of affairs are built. The arrangement of the names logically mirrors or pictures the arrangement of the objects in states of affairs. It is in virtue of this picturing relation that the propositions compounded out of elementary propositions have sense. This is the picture theory of meaning. Which lies at the heart of the *Tractatus*, constituting the explanation of how language and the world are connected and therefore of how meaning attaches to what we say when we use language correctly.

a. The Picture Theory:

Picture or model is another important concept which is related with language in *Tractatus*. Language is manifested as a picture or model of the fact about which Wittgenstein writes, *A picture is a model of reality* ⁵ Just as states of affairs are the elements of the world, so propositions are the elements of language. Language is the totality of propositions of that which they refer to. Complex propositions can be analyzed in to the basic units of language and elementary propositions. Wittgenstein stressed on the statement that language pictures reality. Language is formed by proposition. Propositions are not other than combination of names which are used to represent facts. Wittgenstein refers proposition as a logical form of proposition and the logical form of fact, are identical, because, there is a one to one correspondence between the element of a proposition and the specific situation that is described by the proposition. So, Wittgenstein emphasized on the fact that language pictures reality.

Edna Daliz's observation, "Picture theory is a form of the correspondence theory of meaning."⁶ revels that picturing is the only activity of language. In this connection Wittgenstein opines, *The proposition is a picture of reality*. ⁷ A picture and linguistic expression perform the same function either in a picture or in a proposition one name stands for one thing and another for another thing and they are connected together. According to picture theory, the meaning of a proposition is that particular situation is pictured by the proposition. But the relationship between the proposition and the situation pictured is not so simple. A proposition is composed of words and the meanings of the individual words in the expression are parts of that whole situation.

Wittgenstein insists on an isomorphism between language and reality. The word isomorphism is derived from mathematics. It means structural similarity. Because of this structural similarity, language can represent a picture of reality, but this picturing itself cannot be pictured in language. So this point carries us over to the limitation of language. In *Tractatus*, the world thought and language are co-extensive. Language pictures reality, with equal force it can be said that thought pictures reality. Wittgenstein gives the following definition of thought, *The logical picture of the facts is the thought.*⁸ He writes that in a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.

Wittgenstein explains a very affecting view according to which a sentence is a picture. He said that it is literally a picture, not merely like a picture in certain

respects. His general conception is that when we put a sentence together we construct a model of reality. In a proposition a situation is as it were put together experimentally.

The famous idea of Wittgenstein is that thoughts and propositions are pictures. He writes- *The picture is a model of reality* ⁹ these are made up of elements that together constitute the picture. Each element represents an object and the combination of objects in the picture represents an object and the combination of objects in the picture represents the combination of objects in the state of affairs. The logical structure of the picture, whether in thought or in language is isomorphic with the logical structure of the state of affairs which it pictures. *That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.* ¹⁰ The aim of picture theory of language is to set out an account of what sentences mean and gives us a way of distinguishing sense from non sense when necessity arises. The picture theory of language is an attempt to discover the essence of language. In its simplest form the theory says that the function of language is to allow us to pasteurize things.

In the view of Wittgenstein a picture is a model of reality and to the objects in the reality correspond the elements of the picture. The picture itself is a fact. The fact that things have a certain relation to each other is represented by the fact that in the picture its elements have a certain relation to one another. "In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be picture of the other at all. What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner rightly or falsely is its form of representation.

In this connection Wittgenstein writes- A proposition is a picture of reality for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me.¹¹ A picture has just the same features which a proposition has. It represents some statements beyond itself. A picture shows us what it represents. Likewise a proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. But a proposition does not at once appear to be a picture of a situation. Ordinary pictures look like what they represent and a proposition certainly does not look like a situation. But Wittgenstein does not say that a proposition is an ordinary i.e. special picture it is a 'logical picture' of it. The concept of logical picture is an extremely important concept of the *Tractatus*. Something becomes a logical picture solely on the basis of structural or formal consideration. If a proposition understood as a logical picture agrees with reality then it is false. The division between agreement and disagreement is absolute. In Wittgenstein's Philosophy, there is no intermediate relation between agreement and disagreement.

According to George Pitcher, in order for one thing, "A to be a logical picture of another B, three conditions must be fulfilled –

- 1. There must be a one to one correspondence between the components of A and those of B.
- 2. To every feature of the structure or form of A there must correspond a feature of the structure or form of B. and
- There must be rules of projection connecting the components of A and those of B. Rules of projection are rules whereby given A (or B), B (or A) Can be reconstructed from it."¹²

At first sight proposition doesnot appear to be picture, for example 'John is standing in the road' does not appear to be the picture of a man standing in a room. So propositions are not picture in the ordinary sense. There is a link between language and reality by virtue of which language turns out to employ a musical analogy to explain his point. The following stand to one another by some internal relation –

- 1. A gramophone record
- 2. The musical idea
- 3. The written musical notes
- 4. The sound waves.

All these are internally connected. Therefore, for example, the sound waves can represent existence between language and reality. Because of this internal link language can represent reality or picture reality. Wittgenstein states, because a proposition is a picture of reality, therefore if I understand of a proposition then I understand the situation that is represented by the proposition. Wittgenstein writes- *A proposition communicates a situation to us and so it must be essentially connected with the situation. And the connection precisely that it is its logical picture.*¹³

According to *Tractatus*, in any picture there has to be one to one correspondence between the elements of a picture and those of thing pictured. Hence there must be exactly as many components of the picture as there are of the thing pictured. Let us take an example, if one element of a picture stands for man and another for a cow, then the relationship between the picture elements might show that the man is milking the cow. A picture is a fact, namely the fact that the picture elements are related to one another in a definite way. A picture fact shows that the things picture elements stand are related in the same way as are the picture elements.

It is difficult to see how a list of names can be pictured. Wittgenstein answers this question by saying that, *what constitutes a picture is that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way.* ¹⁴ The view of Wittgenstein that, a

picture is a fact seems to be in conflict with the commonsensical view, according to which the things in a picture which do the representing are the biotech's of paint or link or whatever, and that what they represent are the several objects of the scene depicted. Wittgenstein disagrees to this way of describing the matter. According to Wittgenstein, what represent the scene are certain facts.

> The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.¹⁵

Therefore a picture is a fact and it represents certain features of the reality depicted only, because it is a fact.

From various studies it is seen that a picture must have something in common with what it pictured. This common thing is the picture's form of representation. There are different kinds of pictures, different pictorial notations, and different methods of projection. But all pictures must have in common with reality. This logical form is called the form of reality. It is defined as the possibility that things in the world are related as the elements are pictures, they have the same form as the reality they depict. Wittgenstein's picture theory can be summarized as follows:

Language consists of propositions. These propositions can be analyzed into elementary proposition. The elementary propositions themselves are combination of names, which refer directly to object. Further, elementary propositions are logical picture of states of affairs, which are combination of objects. State of affairs combines to form facts of whatever completing which constitute the world. Therefore language is truth functionally structured and its essential function is to describe the world. The totality of thoughts, he believed is a picture of the world.

b. Some Reflections of Picture Theory:

The picture theory of Wittgenstein is objected on many grounds. This theory states that language has only one function namely the function of picturing. But critics including Wittgenstein himself point out that picture is not the only function of language. The picture theory brings us to paradoxical situation. In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein says that language pictures reality. But this picturing itself cannot be pictured. In later life Wittgenstein himself discovered it as wrong since meaning depends on its use.

Thus the paradoxical view of Wittgenstein is seen in both the books. According to Wittgenstein, propositions and primarily elementary propositions are pictures of reality. He never speaks of propositional signs as being pictures of reality. But this view of Wittgenstein seems to be incorrect. Generally we think of a picture as consisting of marks or patches of point arranged in some way on paper or canvas. Likewise a propositional sign also consists of marks arranged in a certain way on paper. A propositional sign ought to be called a picture rather than a proposition. In the book, "The philosophy of Wittgenstein", George Pitcher clearly reveals his objection against Wittgenstein's view,

"A proposition cannot be a picture, because it includes a reference to a perfectly definite situation (viz. the situation describes) where as a picture does not. It must be propositional sign that is a picture of reality and not the proposition."¹⁶

Studying the observation of George Pitcher it can be communicated that Wittgenstein has shown some lapses regarding his analysis of the picture theory, Because Wittgenstein does not stick to his earlier notions. Wittgenstein comes to realize that in the *Tractatus* he confused meaning with reference. It is wrong to say that the meaning of a name correspond with thing. It is based on our misunderstanding of the grammar of the word name. In the investigations we find Wittgenstein criticizing his earlier thesis. He starts out by quoting and important passage from Augustine's confession. This passage, according to Wittgenstein, gives us a particular picture of the essence of human language, a picture which leads us to believe that every word has a meaning; this meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

According to Wittgenstein, Augustine's theory of language is applicable to names like, table, chair, and people names. In Augustine's theory language has only one function, namely to describe facts. Wittgenstein demolishes this picture by asserting that our language has innumerable kinds of sentences e.g. assertion, quotation and command. There are countless different kinds of use of what are called symbols, words, sentences etc.

The picture theory of language violates the conventions of the language we use. The sentences of the language we use are of linear structure. They are not maps of the facts they describe. Thus, the picture theory is inconsistent with the characteristic feature of language. Maps are no doubt perspicuous representations. We find in a map or a diagram an ideal case of a one to one correspondence between a picture and the situation depicted. But the essential difference between a map and a proposition is that while the former is two dimensional, the latter is one – dimensional. Wittgenstein describes propositions as picture. But a proposition may be a picture of a situation without being a two dimensional structure. So, there is a dilemma – if the propositions are one dimensional structure, they cannot express all the possible modes of configuration of a given number of objects, on the other hand,

if they are two – dimensional structures, then they cease to be linguistic propositions and become maps. If we accept the first, it makes language proper, and if we accept the second, it makes the picture theory inconsistent with general nature of language.¹⁷

The picture theory of language cannot give us a proper reply in case of understanding in a sense of proposition. But Wittgenstein writes that, *A proposition should be able to communicate a new sense to us.*¹⁸ This may imply that we can understand the sense of a proposition without any early acquaintance with it, without its sense being explained to us. But this is possible only when we know the names of a proposition, because the propositions are the pictures of the states of affairs. The states of affairs denote the configuration of objects stated by the proposition. George Pitcher remarks that this view is not entertaining in the context of picture theory of language. So he views –

"The assumption is that, in all possible states of affairs, objects are configured only specially, i.e., that all possible states of affairs are purely spatial arrangements of objects. In that case, the special arrangement of the names in the proposition might conceivably be a picture of the spatial arrangement of the objects in the state of affairs."¹⁹

Wittgenstein's concept of picture theory in *Tractatus* can be compared with Plato's concept of language. Plato had also distinguished language and reality. His form of this difference is known as Being and Becoming. Plato argues that language or words are copies of reality. It is seen that Plato's theory of ideas are mystical because he could not make a bridge between language and reality. In the Book, "Appearance and reality" Bradley too accepted the distinction between language and Reality in the form of thought and Reality. Bradley says that thoughts are appearances of Reality. His concept is that Reality is one, comprehensive, and all inclusive harmonious whole. Because of its very nature thought cannot apprehend reality. Bradley also accepted the logical analysis of language. Of course he had not given much importance on language or thought. Then it can be said that Bradley also accepted the mystical language in philosophy.

D. N. Dwivedi points out that Wittgenstein's picture theory is indispensable. This follows not only from the linguistic considerations, but also from the ontological considerations. If we grant the view that elementary propositions are representational pictures of states of affairs, we cannot compare a proposition with the fact it picture. There is no doubt that the *Tractatus* account of proposition is wrong. In *Tractatus* he underestimated the conventional character of language, and wrongly assumed that propositions have some fixed form which they share with reality, and which can be revealed only by analysis.

Thus the philosophers evaluated the picture theory of meaning. It is observed that, though the picture theory has some drawbacks, it is significant in linguistic philosophy in the analytical movement. In this context Donald Hutson says-"Wittgenstein's picture theory was an exercise in arm chair logic. He analyzed the concept of a picture and then deduced from this what reality must be like in order to be a picturable entity and what language must be like in order to be a picturing entity. It did not upset him at all that his conclusions were not empirically testable. His starting point was presupposition that a proposition is a picture of reality."²⁰

2.3 Language found in Philosophical Investigations:

In his later life, Wittgenstein realized that in the *Tractatus* he has confused to express the proper concept of language. He thought that logical and formal language is not useful. So he wanted to provide a new concept of language in his *Philosophical Investigations*, which is written in his later life. In his masterpiece Wittgenstein

provides a wholly different concept of language from the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein holds that the meaning of a word is not the object for which the word stands. The meaning of a word lies in its use. Instead of picture theory of *Tractatus*, use theory of meaning takes place in *Philosophical Investigations*. According to Wittgenstein, language is like a game. Language can be compared to our form of life. For analyze language, Wittgenstein introduces the different concepts of language such as Language-game, Use theory of meaning, Form of life, Family resemblance and so on. These different concepts of language are interrelated.

a. The Concept of Language Games:

According to Wittgenstein, language consists of multiplicity of language games. Wittgenstein's conception of meaning as use cannot be understood without his concept of 'language game'. In his later work i.e., in *Philosophical Investigations* he gives us completely different conception of language from *Tractatus*. Language is the multiplicity of language games. The meaning of a word can be known only through the context in which it is used. Meaning cannot be separated from use and to know the use of a word is to see the context in which it occurs. The context or contexts in which the different word or words occur are language games of word or words. Language-games, in simple language means the games that are played with language or words.

Wittgenstein holds that the speaking and understanding of a language is a part of an activity. There are certain similarities between language and games.

- 1. Both language and games are activity.
- 2. Both are rule governed.
- 3. Both are public.

Therefore, language is like a game. Wittgenstein does not say that language is a game, but he uses the expression 'language-game' which means that to speak a language is to play a game. Wittgenstein writes that, language-game is a whole consisting of language and action into which it is oven.

As a form of communication 'language-games' signify diverse use of human language. Wittgenstein writes – *I will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game*.²¹ From the use of the term we may say that language is dynamic and changing. Therefore it is not fixed at a time. Language is a growing phenomenon. Language is going more develop through various stages from the primitive stage to the present or modern age. Language is the most developed form of human communication. Wittgenstein states that his concept of language-games may appear to critics as simple, naive, and perhaps even dull or uninteresting. He opines that, *what we say will be easy, but to know why we say it will be very difficult*.²² He also remarks *the difficulty of these methods of exhibiting language-games is that you think it is perfectly trivial. You do not see its importance*.²³ Language games explore the different meanings of language embedded in language games.

Wittgenstein's notion of language games is the fundamental concept of semantics. His earlier concept of picture theory is replaced by language games in his later philosophy. The central point in his *Philosophical Investigations* is to dissolve the mystical meaning rooted in *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein opines–

*Of course, what confuse us it's the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us so clearly. Especially not, when we are doing philosophy!*²⁴

The picture theory of meaning claims that there is a hidden structure or essence in every form of propositions or sentences because grammatical similarity of

(48)

sentences occupies an important position in his earlier philosophy. But in his later life he discovers language as language games. Therefore, *he expresses that language is instrument and its concepts are instruments*. ²⁵ Wittgenstein opines –

> A is building with his building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words, "block", "pillar", "and slab", "beam". A calls them out, B brings the stone which he has learnt (at such a call) to bring at such and such a call. ²⁶

Here Wittgenstein shows the language-game played between A and B. When A calls "beam" instead of "Give me a beam", B gives a beam to A, because here the word "beam" is used in the sense of "bring me a beam." In our day today life we use several types of languages which are related to mind. For example when one calls "rickshaw" the driver of the rickshaw comes to the person with his rickshaw because he understands what the person means by saying "rickshaw". His mind can adjust the remaining part of the sentence that "bring the rickshaw." Therefore in language games mind occupies the central position. As the language is a function that can be played in between two persons or among more, there is no need for elaborate dialogues. The mind can accommodate the need of the language and convey it with limited words.

Wittgenstein tries to bring out a process under this symbolic form of communication between A and B, which is embedded in the form of linguistic activity, i.e., training process. That is why, the training process is the essential factor in language games. When A calls out B, then B knows what A needs, so, in such a way B is trained that he immediately grasps the situation and responds accordingly. So, communication becomes easy or viable when we become expert in using language. There, Wittgenstein writes –

And the process of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language-games.²⁷

According to Wittgenstein, this practice is also an essential factor in case of communication. In his opinion it is found that without practice we cannot acquire the rule behind the language-games. For example, a child follows whatever one does in front of him and the child goes on until he or she reached the result. It proves that the child wants to acquire the technique or rule which is blanketed in our language-games. Wittgenstein writes –

Those games by means of which children learn their native language I will call these games language-game.²⁸

There are countless forms of human communication. These are known as symbols, words, and sentences; our form of life consists in 'playing' with these forms of communication. Wittgenstein means this form as 'language games'. In *Philosophical Investigations* he writes –

Giving orders, and obeying them-

Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements-

Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)-

Reporting an event -

Speculating about an event -

Forming and testing a hypothesis –

Presenting the results of an experiment in table and diagrams –

Making up a story; and reading it – Play-acting – Singing catches – Guessing riddles – Making a joke; telling it – Solving a problem in practical arithmetic – Translating from one language into another – Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying.²⁹

From this version Wittgenstein proves the multiplicity of language games. In our day to day life, people use various types of language according to their needs. These different types of language found in different places and times are nothing but language games. They are always interlinked with our activities. Through different kinds of activities we can express our language style or forms of life. Our activities are marked through our language. Therefore it is obvious that language is intimately connected with our life. When our activities are stopped our life becomes stagnant and finally all round development of a man will come to a halt when language does not develop and progress. Hence it is proved that there is a inter connection between human life, activities and language. Languages have a prime role in human life. So Wittgenstein writes –

> I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game." ³⁰

Language games include the concrete entities of language; actually occur in the life of language. Not abstract entities have been taken out from the totality of definite linguistic use like a tiny wheel from a watch. It is said that the individual language games are actually found in communication, i.e. in a concrete situation of an actual use of language, they are not some abstractions or subsequently inferred structures. So Wittgenstein views –

We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm. ³¹

Wittgenstein's concept of language games is also known as instrumentalist theory of language. By the tool theory of language he replaces the atomic model of language. He states that language is instrument. Wittgenstein compares the words to the tools in a tool box. Just as tools have diverse use so also the functions of words are diverse. In 'Notes For Lectures', Wittgenstein says that, *we call something a language game if it plays a particular role in our human life.*³² To understand a word or concept, it must be set in its linguistic context, and it must always be remembered that every word may figure in many different contexts. Words only have meaning within language game is the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven. Word or a concept, in short, is not a picture of anything. It has no fixed meaning.

In *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein remarks how a child learn language and directed against the views of Augustine and others who believe that a child learns his native language when it has learned to repeat a sound after us as we point. Here the problem is not how a child learns, for instance, a word like 'red' but how it learns to know what 'colour is, that is, how to master a language-game. The child learns, Wittgenstein argues, not by explanation, but by training. Rules and grammar is also discussed by Wittgenstein in his later work. One general similarity between language and games is that both involve that use of rules. This is not to say, however that all aspects of either games or languages are bounded by rules.

Wittgenstein, through his account of language games seeks to bring out a language from ordinary language. Language is ever-changing. This dynamism is characterized by the appearance of new perspectives, new ideas of thinking and speaking. Human beings try to achieve the better. Therefore language as an invariably related with human life cannot remain static or uniform. There cannot be a fixed essence of language, the multiplicity of games – none can be regarded as the best, or none can count as the ideal game that reveals the 'essence' of all games. It is not because of the limitations of the particular games but because of the fact that there is no essence to be found among different games. Wittgenstein says that language and language games lack any common essence. He writes –

Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.³³

From the above concept of language it can be said that language has a glorious past and bright future. The main intention is to show how we can remove our puzzles or confusions due to misunderstanding of language. So, Wittgenstein's philosophy is known as language therapy. He writes – *The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities but also of dissimilarities.* ³⁴ For him, philosophical

problems arise when language goes on holiday. Philosophical puzzles are isolated from practical situations. Therefore he says that philosophical puzzles are not solved, but dissolved. According to Wittgenstein, only ordinary language can help to understand the philosophical puzzles.

Language games are the basic semantical links between language and reality and it is the central topic in later work of Wittgenstein. This concept of language games are not perfect notion according to critics. The concept of language games are criticized as follows –

A.C. Grayling remarks that Wittgenstein's concept of language games have some drawbacks which cannot be ignored. He writes – "One thing that immediately strikes a critical reader of the later works is that the chief concepts occurring in them are either vague or metaphorical or both. The idea of games is a metaphoric." ³⁵ In this regards he says that Wittgenstein avoids the systematic theorizing. His account is highly general and in the critical respects therefore too vague. There is no practical utility of some concepts of Wittgenstein. In this context Christopher Geftwert also mentions that "though language resembles with game, but it is also different from a game in certain respect."³⁶ An important difference is that whereas the rules of the game can be subjected to arbitrary changes, this cannot be done in case of the rules of language. Language is very closely related to what Wittgenstein called form of life that language and its rules must reflect the relationship between language and life. In this respect we can say that game is one kind of activity which is far from language. Therefore the comparison between language and game is not appropriate. There are various reasons against any significant analogies between language and games. Games are not comparable with instruments, whereas language is an essential

instrument in social life. Here we may say that language and games cannot be same. Therefore the comparison between language and game is not appropriate.

Another critic of Wittgenstein, Harold R. Smart opines that Wittgenstein's concept of language games have some drawbacks. Smart does not find any significant analogy between language and games. Language is invariably related with our life. But games are not form of life. We can survive without playing game but cannot avoid language. Again games are not way an instrument, whereas language is essentially instrument in human life. From the following opinion we can assume Smart's concept about language games. "Thus one can hardly imagine a more inappropriate linking of terms than the one incorporated in the phrase language-game". From it we may say that the comparison of game and language, Wittgenstein cannot provide his concept of language properly.

Though, Smart criticizes the comparison between language and game, Garhinger regards that language and games are similar to each other in that they are activities based on definite and to some extent arbitrary, rules, contradictory or inadequate rules put on end to both language and games. Finally, language and games are form of communication between partners.³⁷ In this regard, we may say that Wittgenstein's concept of language, relating with the mind, has a great influence in the philosophy of mind.

b. Use Theory of Meaning:

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein's position was that language has a unique discoverable essence, a single underlying logic. The relation between world and language is picturing here. The picturing relation itself rests, at bottom, on a denotative link between names and objects, names 'mean' objects. In *Philosophical Investigations* he rejects this view. Here Wittgenstein says that these various logics of

language, that means it has no one logic. Language has no single essence, but it is a vast collection of different practices each with its own logic. Meaning does not consist in the devoting relation between words and things. The meaning of an expression is its use in the multiplicity of practices which go to make up language. Moreover, language is not something complete and autonomous which can be investigated independently of other consideration. Language is related with all human activities and behavior. In short language is a part of our life.

The most important issue in Wittgenstein's later philosophy is the connection between meaning and use in language-games. Wittgenstein compares the notion of use with language games. He said, *the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life.*³⁸ Wittgenstein does not support the notion that the meaning of a word is something unique and mysterious. Wittgenstein views that the meaning of a word is in its use in the language. In this context he gives the examples of five red apples, He opines –

> I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked 'five red apples'. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked 'apples'; then he looks up the words 'red' in a table and finds a color sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers- I assume that he knows then by heart- up to the word 'five' and for each number he takes an apple of the same color as the sample out of the drawer. -It is in this similar ways that one operates with words. –But how does he know here and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'? - Well, I assume that he acts as I have described.

Explanations come to as end somewhere. –But what is the meaning of the word 'five'? No such thing was in question here, only how the word 'five' is used. ³⁹

Again Wittgenstein writes -

"The meaning of a word is what is explained by the explanation of the meaning." I.e., if you want to understand the use of the word 'meaning' look for what are called "explanations of meaning." ⁴⁰

The explanation of meaning exactly shows what the meaning is all about. In this sense meaning is a physiognomy. ⁴¹ A physiognomy is a meaning found in phenomena. It is a subject which remains in the background of *Philosophical Investigations*, but is of great importance in connection with Wittgenstein's view on art and religion.⁴² In the context of language games to determine the meaning of an expression, Wittgenstein criticizes the verbal definition or primer theory of meaning and Ostensive definition. To Wittgenstein, *naming is something like attaching a labels to a things.*⁴³ Here, labeling does not imply the intended meaning in language. In this regard Bruce Goldberg writes as follows –

Suppose that I label my desk 'a' and write in a book 'a object worth more than five dollars." I then show someone else that I have labeled the desk and ask him to find other objects in the house to which 'a' applies. Of course, I do not show him the book. There are obviously hundreds of different ways he might proceed. He might say it applies to the chair, the cat, the record player, the light shining through the window, and so on. What is clear is that he cannot tell, simply by knowing that the desk is labeled 'a' what the meaning of 'a' is. He has the object right in front of him and still he does not know whether it is right or wrong to apply 'a' to any other objects. I might have written in the book. 'a=my desk'. Carrying this conclusion further, he cannot even know whether he would be right in applying 'a' to the desk. I might have defined 'a' as 'object bought by the person using the term 'a'.⁴⁴

From these expressions, it can be said that Wittgenstein is not satisfied with the naming theory of meaning and as a result he tries to solve the problems through the ostensive definition. When the meaning of a thing is explained by pointing to an object then it is known as ostensive definition. But Wittgenstein shows that there are some difficulties in ostensive definition. For instance, if a person utters the sentence, "This is black" by pointing at a thing, there is the possibility that one may misunderstand him and take the word black to stand for a 'black board' if one does not know that black is the name of a particular color. Therefore, Wittgenstein emphatically asserts that pointing to an object is not sufficient if we do not know the actual uses of language in language games. In this context he explains this point by an analogy with the game of chess –

When one shews someone the king in chess and says: "This is the king", this does not tell him the use of this piece – unless he already knows the rules of the game up to this last point: the shape of the king. You could imagine his having learnt the rules of the game without ever having been shewn and actual piece. The shape of the chessman corresponds here to the sound or shape of a word. ⁴⁵

Reporting on Wittgenstein Anthony Kenny says – "if ostensive definition is to be successful then – learner must not only be acquainted with the bearer, but also grasp the role in language of the word to be defined – the ostensive definition will not suffice by itself, because it can always be variously interpreted so, in the acquisition of the understanding of a word acquaintance with the word's bearer is not so important as mastery of the word's general use."⁴⁶

Wittgenstein's notion of language games insists on following a rule. The rule following is an important issue in language game and Wittgenstein gives interest on it. Following the rules is depend on 'practice' as playing the game. It can be said that 'language games are linguistic practices, governed by certain rules and conventions.⁴⁷ Therefore Wittgenstein makes a distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar. By the surface grammar he means the uniform appearance of sentences or propositions like he goes to school and he wants to swim. But by the depth grammar, Wittgenstein means the multifarious uses of a sentence or a proposition. In his later work he puts much emphasis on depth grammar. It removes the picture theory of meaning. In this context Wittgenstein views–

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything – since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. ⁴⁸

According to Wittgenstein, depth grammar indicates that there is not one occasion or content or situation or circumstance in which we fixed rules. It is seen that language game is based on depth grammar, because it asserts the multifarious uses of language. The function of language is not uniform or unique, it is multidimensional. In this context Wittgenstein writes –

Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life? – This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression "to obey a rule."

(59)

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. – To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions).

To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique. ⁴⁹

In this version, Wittgenstein indicates that rules are not enough if we are not able to use language in actual cases. So, he asserts on the practice of rule following. Wittgenstein writes –

> And hence also, 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': Otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it. ⁵⁰

Wittgenstein points out that grammar are not accountable to reality. To determine meaning and reference grammatical rules are sufficient. It can be said that the rules constitute meaning and the rules make the use of language possible.

In language games meaning is embedded. So, meaning is connected with both linguistic and non-linguistic behavior uses bearing the meaning from non-linguistic to linguistic behavior. That is way; language game also includes linguistic and nonlinguistic behavior. Both are important to language games, because linguistic activities are embedded in non-linguistic behavior or impure language-games. Wittgenstein believes that words derive their meaning from language-games. In his later work, Wittgenstein holds that, there is a connection between meaning and use. In this regard some interlocutors try to deviate him from his own position in the following way – we may use sometime a word without knowing its meaning, again we may know meaning of a word without knowing its use". For example, a non-Indian person may know that 'Namaskar' is an Indian culture but he may not know when and how to use the word 'Namaskar' properly. Again most people know how to use the letters P Q R S T without knowing its meaning. Likewise many people sing a song without knowing the meaning of the words of the song.

As a linguist, Lazzlo Antal defines the meaning of a word as the rule for the use of a word in a context. To Antal, the meaning of a word must be prior to its use. Antal Argues –"From this it obviously follows that, if we use the word according to their meaning, then the meaning proceeds the use of the word, just as the use of a language pre-supposes knowledge of that language." ⁵¹

In this respect Wittgenstein asserts that there are some cases in which meaning and use do not proceed together, still it cannot be held that there is no connection between meaning and use. According to Wittgenstein, words get their meaning not from the ostention definition but from their uses. Words are not used in exact and fixed ways. Rather they are used as instrument. Therefore, Wittgenstein emphatically asserts that language-game is concerned with the use of words. Wittgenstein writes –

For a large class of cases though not for all –in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.⁵²

Wittgenstein states that meaning is determined by use. Wittgenstein's concept of language-games discards his earlier view that meaning and understanding are mental activities. In this context he views – Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? – In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? – Or is the use its life? 53

As for instance, the word 'elliptical' derives its meaning from the language games in which it is used. Again he denies any kind of image as the necessary element in the meaning of a word. To remove the misunderstanding Wittgenstein gives the explanation that meaning and understanding are mental activities. Suppose –

A writers series of numbers down; B watch him and tries to find a law for the sequence of numbers. If he succeeds he exclaims: "Now I can go on"! ⁵⁴

Wittgenstein in this version shows that 'knows how to go on' means the different things in the different situations. So, he tries to show that mental content or process can not be the factor for understanding the diverse functions of language. So Wittgenstein writes –

In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristics of understanding, understanding is not a mental process. (A pain's growing more and less; the hearing of a tune or a sentence: these are mental processes) ⁵⁵

In this Wittgenstein's view, meaning and understanding cannot be any private entity, because if there was any inner process in our mind then we would have been able to trace out anything like that. He maintains that there is no mental content out of which the words get its meaning. In this way Wittgenstein explains –

> Consider these examples, Think before you speak? He speaks without thinking." "What I said did not quite express my

thought". "He says one thing and thinks just the opposite." "I did not mean a word of what I said, The France language uses its words in that order in which we think them."⁵⁶

Though, Wittgenstein's notion of use theory of meaning is considered as very important theory of linguistic philosophy, but it is not able to escape from criticisms. A.J. Ayer remarks that the statement of Wittgenstein that is 'meaning is use' is not true because if meaning and use are same, then it can be said that one can know the meaning of word without knowing its use and one can know its use without knowing its meaning. For example one can know that the Latin word 'Jejunus' means 'hungry' without knowing how to use it in a sentence.⁵⁷ Moreover without meaning like personal names, propositions, conjunction are cases in points.

The basic problem of use theory is not finding a sense of the word 'use' in terms of which meaning can be explicated. There are many types of linguistic use which are not relevant to questions about meaning. As Paul Ziff remarks, 'it is wrong to say, the meaning of a word is its use in language, for the use of a word depends upon many factors which have nothing to do with questions of meaning. ⁵⁸

c. Concept of Form of Life :

In his later philosophy Wittgenstein's concept of forms of life has occupied a dominant place. In the *Blue and Brown Book*, he mentions it as 'convention'. Speaking of a language is a form of life – it is the main theme of this notion. There is an invariable relation between speaking and understanding of language and our form of life. Our life cannot proceed without language. In this respect Wittgenstein admits that -

Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments. Now perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which concepts we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet and inches as well as in metres and centimetres; the difference is merely one of convenience. But even this is not true if, for instance, calculations in some system of measurement demand more time and trouble than it is possible for us to give them.⁵⁹

Wittgenstein compares the words to the tools. In this context, his significant example of *Philosophical Investigations* may be considered. Here he shows a language games between a builder and a worker. To lead a life we have to know how to lead the form of life or how to play with language. So, Wittgenstein puts much emphasis on forms of life in his later philosophy.

In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein thought that language had a hidden meaning or structure. The words were pictures of a hidden structure. Therefore, words were passive or dead signs in the sense that they represented or pictured things which were actual. In the book "Study of Wittgenstein's philosophy", D. N. Dwivedi mentions that words themselves are lifeless, i.e., they are either vibrations in the air or marks on paper. Wittgenstein's earlier picture theory of language is the language of reality. So, his language in *Tractatus* was logical. Wittgenstein used the technique of logical analysis of language for focusing on the correspondence between language and reality.

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein mentioned about forms of life in the following ways-

- (i) It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in a battle..... And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.⁶⁰
- (ii) Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or form of life. ⁶¹
- (iii) So, you are saying that human argument decides what is true and what is false it is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree to the language they use. That is not agreement in opinion but in form of life.⁶²
- (iv) Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of language? That is to say, the phenomena of hope is modes of this complicated form of life.⁶³
- (v) What has to be accepted, the given, is so one could say forms of life.⁶⁴

These different views on forms of life can be interpreted, but sometimes it is difficult to understand because he has not clearly expressed what is meant by different forms of life. J. F. M. Hunter in his article *Forms of Life in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations* observes that the expression form of life, is used of five serving important junctures in Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, but it was not very helpful as to what he meant by it.

By the first view on forms of life Wittgenstein indicates that language consists of various functions. As for instance he has mentioned the comprehensive example of a builder A and a worker B. By this example he opines that language is not unique. It can be used in multipurpose ways. Language has no limitation. Therefore, Wittgenstein writes – *Look at the sentence as an instrument, and its sense as its employment*, ⁶⁵ there are different functions of language. As he writes –

But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question and command? – There are countless kinds, countless different kinds of use of what we call symbols, 'words', 'sentences.' And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)⁶⁶

Wittgenstein through this view mentions that language is connected with different forms of life. The words that one use in language don't have one unique function. There are multifarious uses of language. These words of language are not fixed. There uses are such that they come into existence and there are uses replaced by others and in this way some words are replaced by some new words and earlier ones become absolate. Thus new types of language games come into existence. According to Wittgenstein, private language cannot be shared by others. Through his concept of form of life Wittgenstein put utmost importance on sharing function of language.

In the second view of forms of life Wittgenstein means that language is embedded in our forms of life. All human activities are performed through the medium of language. Therefore, it is obvious that there is an interrelation between our language and activities. Activities are techniques which are used in our every step of life. Without activities our life would be static or fixed. Through different kinds of activities, human life is pursued. Whatever we do or act is nothing but linguistic out. Language is the medium of communication and through this medium life is regulated. Can we think of a human life without this medium? The answer is that nothing remains if we left out linguistic medium from human life. Through different types of language human life can be systematized or standardized. In the second view Wittgenstein talks about the activities which are related with language as a form of life. He mentions in the section 23 of *Philosophical Investigations* that giving orders and obeying them, describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurement speculative about an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, play-acting, singing catches etc are nothing but different forms of life. Therefore, it can be said that Wittgenstein by the second view of forms of life means that language is related with the activities of human life.

Wittgenstein by the third view means that language is a way of life or manner of living, language is a model of life or fashion of life. Language always helps us to find out the standard or measurement of the form of life. It is undoubtedly accepted that language is correlated with our life. Although there is not a unique form of life, still there are resemblances among different forms of life. Through his concept of form of life Wittgenstein has pointed out a value determination policy. That is why Wittgenstein announced that use determines meaning. By the third view, therefore Wittgenstein pointed out two. Important issues - firstly language is a model of life; secondly, value determination policy is an act.

Through the fourth view of form of life, Wittgenstein insisted upon the understanding of language. According to him, philosophical problems arise when words are isolated from practical situation. This is the case what Wittgenstein describes as language going on holiday. He means by this metaphysical sentence that when we use words in isolation from actual practical situation then philosophical problems arise. So, Wittgenstein holds that philosophical problems are not solved, but

dissolved. In philosophical discourse there is a chance of misunderstanding. For instance, for giving the answer of the question what is the name of capital of India is very easy because it is not the isolated from practical situation. But if someone asks what capital is? Then the reply goes on holiday. It implies that when a question goes astray from practical situation, we merge in puzzlement and paradoxes. This is the reason that Wittgenstein amends his earlier linguistic technique in philosophy. The idealistic analysis of language does not show the way out of linguistic confusions. In this context he tries to show the fly way out of the fly-bottle. The space of the bottle is limited. The fly in the bottle is confined to the provided space. But, according to Wittgenstein, the business of philosophy is not confined as the scope of the fly in the bottle. The business of philosophy is to deal with the actual use of words which can help us to remove puzzlement, misunderstanding and paradoxes from linguistic confusions. Therefore he writes, Philosophy does not result in philosophical proposition, but rather in the clarification of proposition.⁶⁷ Wittgenstein, therefore, gives interest in clarification of language, not in exploration of the essence of language. In this context, he holds that essence is expressed on grammar. And Wittgenstein puts emphasis on grammatical investigation to remove misunderstanding of language. In this context, the distinction between surface grammar and depth grammar may be mentioned which is also an important issue. The surface grammar points to the grammatical similarity but it does not indicate the multipurpose functions of words, while the depth grammar mentions the functions of words. So, Wittgenstein puts emphasis on depth grammar in his later philosophy. His grammatical enquiry is regarded as a milestone in philosophy.

Wittgenstein opines that the duty of a philosopher is to show that the philosophical puzzlement arise through some questions such as what is knowledge, what is truth, what is a being, what is mind etc. According to Wittgenstein, these types of questions are meaningless and unanswerable. Wittgenstein beautifully writes

Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either It leaves everything as it is.⁶⁸

So, Wittgenstein defines *philosophy as a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.*⁶⁹ The problems arising through a misunderstanding of our forms of language have the character of depth. Wittgenstein deeply asserts that when philosophers use words like, 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'T', 'proposition', 'name' etc. and try to grasp the essence of the thing one must always asks is the word ever actually used in this way in the language game? What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.⁷⁰ Philosophical discussion are concerned with multifarious uses of words, not with language and reality. In a metaphysical sense, Wittgenstein asserts that philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. So, Wittgenstein is interested in ordinary language or colloquial language. Ordinary language is free from the limitations of an ideal language or artificial language.

It can be said that Wittgenstein thought about the importance of diverse function of language. Language is dynamic or natural in the sense that it is not derivative. His view is that language is related with activity. Through his concept of form of life he discovered the necessity of public language in the history of philosophy. In this context, Malinowski's dictum seemed to be supported. As Wittgenstein's thought – *Speech is the necessary means of communication, it is one*

(69)

*indispensible instrument for creating the ties of the moment without which unified social action is impossible.*⁷¹ Wittgenstein mentions it as conventions in Blue and Brown Books. His view is that language is a form of life. There is an inseparable relation between language and the way or form of life. So, Wittgenstein in this respect admits that, *Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments.*⁷² He compares the words to the tools. Emphasizing the importance of language Wittgenstein holds that thought are expressed in language. Language governs us from the beginning to the end of our life. Wittgenstein writes, *to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.*⁷³ There are several types of language games in our life. Wittgenstein observes:

> Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life. ⁷⁴

Wittgenstein's concept of form of life is related to the human society i.e. social behaviour. Wittgenstein writes that *if a lion could talk we could not be able to understand him*, because he does not share the same form of life with us. To speak language is to take part in form of life because there is a relation between language and behavior. Even if a lion utters, grammatically correct sentence, his behavior would be too radically different from ours. We cannot understand what a lion says because his moods of behavior into which his words are woven are too radically different from our own. Thus for Wittgenstein language and behavior or form of life are connected in such a way that the understanding of a particular language is not possible without associating it with a particular pieces of behavior.

According to Wittgenstein, if a person says "goodness, it is three o' clock I must hurry to make the appointment" then it is expected that the person would

definitely make some movement from which one can make out that he is in a hurry to make the appointment. Only a minded being can utter this sentence because to utter this sentence is to take part in a language game involving mind. If a lion says "goodness, it is three o' clock I must hurry to make that appointment" but continues to lie there without making any effort to move as lions won't do. Here we cannot say that the lion has asserted or stated that he is in a hurry since it is three o' clock though he has uttered the suitable words. To be able to utter this sentence does not imply that one is minded being because to utter this sentence is to make an assertion is to take part in a language game involving these words. One who utters this sentence and thereby takes part in the language game associated with it is to possess mind. To posses mind is to take part in language game involving the word mind. Since a lion's general behavior is exactly like that of an ordinary lion to save his ability to utter English sentences we cannot say that he has asserted what he uttered because the lion does not take part in that language game which he is expected to do. When the lion utters this sentence only the lion cannot be said to be a minded being. Thus Wittgenstein wants to say that there is an inseparable relation among form of life, language-game and mind.

d. Concept of Family Resemblance:

The concept of family resemblance in language is significant concept in his later work. Wittgenstein proceeds through an example i.e. we have different kinds of games such as card games, board games, Olympic Games and so on. But the fact is that there is nothing common among these different types of games. Of course they have similarities and relationships among these games. When we look at board games, we find the relationship with other kind of games in the cases of winning and losing, concentration on playing importance of the technique used by the players etc. Secondly if we pass to the card games then we find the many similarities with the first groups. When we compare the two games; we find that there are no common features latent in the two games. Because there are some important features which are present in the first game but not present in the second one. As for example, card games can be played by more than four players but in board game we find that it can be played two three or four players but not by more than four players. Again while playing the card games intuitive power is necessary but in the board games this character is not seen. And again when we pass to the ball games, we find the characteristics like competition (winning & losing) spirit, skill team etc. We also see similar characteristics of chess in some cases. But these two games (ball games and chess game) are not completely same. For example ball game can be played even by a child alone. In this game that is played by one child only, there is no competition. The child throws the ball to wall and catches again. Again when we look at the game of tennis and chess playing then we find that there are some similarities in case of artistic technique (like manipulation of racket in case of tennis and manipulation of pony, bishop, queen etc. in case of chess game) played by two players. But the dissimilarity between the two is that tennis can be played by more than two players, while in chess game there can be only two players. If we pass to the game of ring, a ring a rose then we see the feature like amusement. But the other important features found in other games like skill, competition, skill, technique used by players, concentration and team spirit are absent. In this context Wittgenstein writes -

> Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games." I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic Games, and so on. What is common to them all? – Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'"

- but look and see whether there is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! - Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. – Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.⁷⁵

From the above explanation, Wittgenstein comes to the conclusion that language can be compared to family. He maintains that just as in a family different member have similarities or resemblances amongst themselves likewise games also have resemblances with one another. The members in a family are not identical with each other, so also games are not identical with each other. In this context, therefore Wittgenstein introduces the concept of "family resemblance". He writes –

> I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances", for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, color of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. – And I shall say: 'games' form a family.

> And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a "number"? Well, perhaps because it been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fiber on fiber. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that someone fiber runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibers. ⁷⁶

It is significant that Wittgenstein's notion of 'family resemblance' has importance in language as he wanted to find a cure for our craving for generality against the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case. The concept of family resemblances provided a solution to the problem of universals. Through this concept of family resemblance Wittgenstein tries to hold that just as in case of game we do not find any one feature that is common to all games likewise, there is no one common element that occurs in different language. Different languages have only similarities but they do not share a common essence. From this view, Wittgenstein therefore advocates that games form a family. As a result Wittgenstein puts forward a resemblance theory i.e. family resemblance in order to discard the prevalent and age old concept of generality which is popularly present in Plato's idea of good, Spinoza's concept of substance and Leibnitz's concept of pre-established harmony. According to George Pitcher, – "Wittgenstein sets out to show that the belief in essences, although widespread and entirely natural is mistaken. Whereas philosophers traditionally looked for difference and multiplicity, indeed he once remarked to a friend that he had considered using as a motto for the Investigation a line from the King Lear "I will teach your differences." ⁷⁷

Wittgenstein compares the resemblance among games to resemblance among members of a family. Just as the members of a family are not identical with other members in respect of height, color, intellect, structure of the body etc, so also the different types of games are not identical with other games. So, Wittgenstein holds that games form a family.

Thus, Wittgenstein argued that language has only family resemblance where there is a large collection of similarities, only a few of them will obtain between any two of the practices that we call games. But there is no single feature – say, skill, competition, entertainment – which is common to all games. A language game is a simplified model of some particular aspect of our language, considered more or less in isolation by being conceived of as the total language of some group of people. Thus we can speak broadly of the language-game of science as distinguished from the language game of religion. And within the language game of science, for some purposes we can speak of the language games of physics, biology and so on. Because the uses of language overlap even more than most games do, there are artificial abstractions. The pieces – that is to say, the words we use in any one language-game might be used in many other language-games as well.

In Wittgenstein opinion games form a family, just as there is no common feature among games. So, in a family we do not find a common feature among the members. This view of Wittgenstein is a concept of analogy. But Craig Fox remarks that this analogy is not significant. In the article, *Wittgenstein on family resemblance*, he mentions that although we find different feature among games, they have some commonality which shows that these are games, like wise they belong to the one family. But there are some technical difficulties in this analogy. The feature of game and the feature of human being are not same. So, Wittgenstein's reasoning of family resemblance, Rudolf Haller remarks that "family resemblance discussion can be seen as a model for many of Wittgenstein's other discussion in the *Philosophical Investigations*". Really, the notion of family resemblance makes Wittgenstein's concept of language as a significant issue in linguistic philosophy.

The word language is not the name of a single phenomenon (as it is said to be in the *Tractatus*, where indeed the assertion is a crucial one). It is the name of the class of an indefinite number of language-games. To talk about language as a single and unambiguous phenomenon would be like talking about the game, as if there only one game. Different language-games show a family-resemblance and the number of different language-game is indefinite.

2.4 Conclusion:

Wittgenstein's concept of language has a tremendous impact in philosophy of language as well as in the philosophy of mind. In philosophy of language Wittgenstein plays a great role by providing the new concepts such as 'Languagegame', 'Use theory of meaning', 'Form of life', 'Family resemblance' etc. These concepts are the way to clarify the philosophical problems that arise in analytic philosophy. It can be concluded that Wittgenstein is mainly concerned with the basic question how language as interpersonal communication are possible. By introducing the notion of language-games, Wittgenstein tries to show language is nothing but multiplicity of language where mind has take an important place. From the study of Wittgenstein's concept of language it can be said that the social dimension of language is made the sole dimension of linguistic activities. In this context Craig Fox remarks that Wittgenstein's concept of language discussion can be seen as model for many of Wittgenstein's others discussion in the *Investigations*. Thought as a function of mind can be expressed in language therefore it is clear that language and behavior are interconnected. Speaking and understanding of a language is not possible without relating them to behavior. This is true of language which one uses to speak of one's mind.

References:

- 1. Grayling A. C., "Wittgenstein, A Very Short Introduction", P-19.
- 2. Ibid, P -19.
- 3. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus", Sec 1.
- 4. Ibid, Sec -1.1
- 5. Ibid, Sec -2.12
- Daliz Edna, "The Picture Theory of Meaning", "Mind" Vol. LX1, April 1953, P-184.
- 7. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus", Sec 4.01.
- 8. Ibid, Sec -3.
- 9. Ibid, Sec 2.12.
- 10. Ibid, Sec -2.1511.
- 11. Ibid, Sec 2.161.
- 12. Pitcher George, "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein", P-78.
- 13. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus", Sec -4.03.
- 14. Ibid, Sec -2.14.
- 15. Ibid, Sec -2.15.
- 16. Pitcher George, "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein", P-60.
- 17. Dwivedi D. N. "A Study of Wittgenstein Philosophy", P-97.
- 18. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus", Sec.-4.07.
- 19. Pitcher George, "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein", P-129.
- 20. Hudson Donald, "Wittgenstein and Religious Belief", P-18.

- 21. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Philosophical Investigations", Sec.-7.
- 22. Ambrose, Alice (ed.), "Wittgenstein's Lectures Cambridge 1932 to 1935", P-77.
- 23. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Philosophical Investigations", Sec- 105.
- 24. Ibid, Sec 11.
- 25. Ibid, Sec-421.
- 26. Ibid, Sec.-2.
- 27. Ibid, Sec.-7.
- 28. Ibid, Sec.-7.
- 29. Ibid, Sec.-23.
- 30. Ibid, Sec.-7.
- 31. Ibid, Sec -108.
- 32. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Notes For Lectures", P- 45.
- 33. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Philosophical Investigations", Sec.-18.,
- 34. Ibid, Sec.-130.
- 35. Grayling A. C. Wittgenstein, "A Very Short Introduction", P-111.
- Greftwert Christopher, "Wittgenstein on Thought, Language And Philosophy", P-66.
- 37. Smart H. R., "Language Games in the Philosophical Quarterly" ed. by A. D. Woozley, Vol. 7, P-233.
- 38. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Philosophical Investigations", Sec -23.
- 39. Ibid, Sec -1.

40. Ibid, Sec - 560.

- 41. Ibid, Sec. 568.
- 42. Frince Henly, "Wittgenstein An Exposition of The Philosophical Investigations P- 34.
- 43. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Philosophical Investigations", Sec -26.
- 44. William, F., "Wittgenstein on Naming and Ostensive Definition", in "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein (ed.)", J.V. Canfield Vol. 8, P-156.
- 45. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Philosophical Investigations", Sec -31.
- 46. William F: "Wittgenstein on Naming and Ostensive Definition", in "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein (ed.)", J.V. Canfield Vol. 8, P-157.
- 47. Mauthner, T (ed.), "The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy", P-306.
- 48. Wittgen stein Ludwig, "Philosophical Investigations", Sec.-126.
- 49. Ibid, Sec -199.
- 50. Ibid, Sec -202.
- 51. Antal Lazzlo, "Questions Of Meaning", PP: 51-52.
- 52. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Philosophical Investigations", Sec.-43.
- 53. Ibid, Sec. 432.
- 54. Ibid, Sec. 151.
- 55. Ibid, Sec 154.
- 56. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Wittgenstein Blue and Brown Book", P- 148.
- 57. Grayling A.C., "Wittgenstein", A Very Short Introduction, PP: 112-119.
- 58. Ziff P, "Semantic Analysis", P- 138.

59. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Philosophical Investigations", Sec.-569.

- 60. Ibid, Sec -19.
- 61. Ibid, Sec -23.
- 62. Ibid, Sec -241.
- 63. Ibid, Sec -174.
- 64. Ibid, Sec -226.
- 65. Ibid, Sec 421.
- 66. Ibid, Sec. -23.
- 67. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Tractatus Logico Philosophicus", Sec -4.112.
- 68. Wittgenstein Ludwig, "Philosophical Investigations", Sec -123.
- 69. Ibid, Sec -109.
- 70. Ibid, Sec 116
- 71. Malinowski B., "Problem of Meaning in Primitive Language" P- 310.
- 72. Wittgenstein Ludwig, ", "Philosophical Investigations", P-569.
- 73. Ibid, Sec -19.
- 74. Ibid, Sec -23.
- 75. Ibid, Sec -66.
- 76. Ibid, Sec, P- 67.
- 77. Drury M (O.C.) "Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Symposium", The Listener, P-164.
