

CHAPTER –VI

CONCLUSION

It is seen that the nature of mind is the most controversial philosophical problem. This problem is not its existence but of its nature. Man is placed in this world necessarily bodied, conscious of his body which is not conscious of itself. Besides, the mind has many poles. The different questions regarding the 'mind' have been placed. It is observed that the study of the nature of mind and its relation to the body is the most crucial problem discussed in the philosophy of mind. As a result different theories about the nature of mind have been found in philosophy. Among the different theories Descartes' theory is regarded as a notable theory in the philosophy of mind which is known as "Interactionism" or "Dualism." He presented the most systematic dualistic theory for the first time. Though the problem of mind-body relation was a topic of interest in primitive period, Descartes was the first philosopher who brought to the limelight the problem as a separate in distinct field of study. In this regards G T W Patrick writes, 'in the seventieth century this dualistic conception was crystallized into a distinct philosophical system by Descartes'. He further says, "this extreme dualism of Descartes performs the great service of laying a solid foundation for the development of modern physical science and does no violence to the religious prepossessions concerning the soul."¹

From the study of Descartes' philosophy it can be said that Descartes' opinion about the nature of mind and body is that bodies are publicly observable as we can perceive other physical objects. But the operation of mind is wholly private because this is not found in space and this is beyond the control of mechanical laws. The Cartesian theory holds that someone's mind can have the knowledge of the

happenings of his own mind directly. And the knowledge of one's own states and processes are superior to that of the knowledge of external world. If someone tries to acquire the knowledge of the happenings of the external world, he must have a mistake proof apprehension. Thus he says that the self-knowledge attained through this non-sensuous inner perception and constant awareness is supposed to be free from error.

In opposition to Descartes, Wittgenstein maintains that mind is a continuation of language and the world. He states that mind is a part of the world. It is the media of thinking and acting in the world and language. Thus R.C. Pradhan says, "Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* is the turning point to the new revolution that attempted to make a clean break with the Cartesian way of thinking that accorded primacy to thought and the thinking self."² Wittgenstein reduces the Cartesian 'cogito' or self in to a psychological self and says that it is a part of the world, this self cannot represent the world in any way either within the world or from outside. He says that instead of representing the world by the Cartesian cogito it is necessary to represent the Cartesian self itself as a part of the world. He further criticizes the Cartesian conception of self as substance. He says that to be a substance it must be unchangeable and something simple. But Cartesian self being a psychological one cannot be called substance. Thus he says that the question of mind body relation or distinction does not arise because both are parts of the world. Wittgenstein strongly rejects the Cartesian thesis that mind belongs to inner world and its activities are thinking. Cartesian philosophers say that as thought resides in the inner world of mind so it exists prior to an independent of language. They believe that the mind is subjective and invisible as distinct from body. Such view is rejected by Wittgenstein. He says that such an idea arises because of the misunderstanding of

language. According to Wittgenstein, there is nothing in the mind which is called mental states' and so it cannot be described. Hence, for him, mind stands not for mental entities but for mental activities. Wittgenstein firmly says that the way to know other person being in pain is his behavior and his works and the circumstances. So he says "*An inner process stands in need of outward criteria.*"³

It has been found that Wittgenstein nowhere in his theory admits mind as a private entity as Cartesian philosophers believe. Other points of his philosophy are also dissimilar with that of Cartesian ego as the subject of consciousness. Wittgenstein maintains that consciousness is not the essence of mind or self. According to him, "the expression 'in pain' is applied in the case of me and other persons in equal sense because there is not separate meaning of this expression in dictionaries but only in the minds of philosophers." Wittgenstein believes that both of them are free from an obvious touch of solipsism. Even he admits the possibility of knowledge of other minds.

Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind is direct opposite of Descartes philosophy of mind. In Descartes' notion, mind is a substance and its natures are different from the body. The functions of mind are not identical to the functions of body according to Descartes. But Wittgenstein remarks that such concept regarding the nature of mind is completely vague and unscientific. Mind cannot be a substance or separate entity from the body. Mental functions are expressed in outer activities. Mind and body never stand as opposite from each other. The mental state of a person can be seen in his bodily movement. So, it is said that "face is the mirror of mind." Therefore Wittgenstein says that body is the best picture of human mind or soul.

In philosophy of mind, Wittgenstein takes an important role providing a significant concept regarding the mind body problem. According to him, the

epistemic consequences of the Cartesian picture of the mind are nonsensical. Descartes was a dominant figure and his dualistic concept has tremendous role in the philosophy of mind. It is seen that Wittgenstein criticizes the Cartesian theory of dualism. He did not find any scientific or logical possibility in Descartes' concept of mind-body problem. From the analyses it is seen that Descartes as a dualist believes in the existence of two separate and independent substances viz mind and body and at the same time he showed the interaction between them. But he emphasized the priority of mind than that of body. From his writings it is seen that he proved the existence of self first by the method of doubt and subsequently he proved the existence of the external world from the veracity of God. Thus Descartes has allowed maximum role of mind. But in Wittgenstein writings it is found that he has given less importance in mind than the function of body.

Wittgenstein says about Descartes that he was very much adhered to the mechanistic notions and thus described the nature of the mind as just the opposite to the body. He says that the description which can be applied to bodies cannot be applied to the mind. Bodies are found in space, they are subject to motion and modification of matter. They can be observed by others. But mind cannot be described in such way. It is something occult and beyond public observation. But Wittgenstein strongly criticized that mind is not an entity or substance. He does not believe any private entity. Mind is realized in different activities and he confined the sphere of mind to abilities and behavior. Mental concepts are not private phenomena; it is expressed in behavior or publicly observable situations. In Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind, it is found that by the concept of mind he clearly maintains that mind means the abilities of person. According to him, it is the way in which a person

behaves. This view of Wittgenstein regarding the concept of mind may be compared with the view of behaviorism.

There is another objection by Wittgenstein to Descartes' philosophy of mind. The method of Descartes' philosophy is the method of doubt. His "cogito-ergo-sum" is the famous dictum which is followed from the method of doubt. But according to Wittgenstein, doubt cannot be a genuine method in philosophy for establishing the existence of mind/self. According to Descartes, knowledge of mind is incorrigible and the indubitable. Therefore Wittgenstein's view is exactly opposite to that of Descartes.

It is observed that according to Descartes the nature of mind is mysterious. We cannot catch the mind like other physical objects or substance. The nature of mind is not only mysterious but also very complicated. From the religious standpoint Descartes tries to explain the mind or self than the epistemological perspective. But Wittgenstein very clearly tries to analyze the concept of mind from epistemological standpoint. He never accepts the mind as a substance or entity. He rejects Descartes' notion and proposes that mind is not mysterious and it is not a religious issue. Mind is found in day to day life through different activities. Mind/self doesn't depend in religious feelings. It is common and obvious and not a private entity. Therefore we may draw the conclusion that Descartes' philosophy of mind is rejected by Wittgenstein.

From Descartes' concept of mind, it can be said that private language is possible. He accepts inner sensations and private states of mind. For him, mind is essentially private. A man can privately know all states and processes of his own mind. He has a privileged access to his mind. From Descartes' view point, private

language is possible. He accepts private language because it gives us knowledge of immediate private experience.

Though, Wittgenstein ponders the possibility of a language that talks about those things that are known only to the user, whose content is inherently private, he rejects private language as meaningless. The usual example is that of a language in which one names one's sensations and other subjective experiences, such that the meaning of the term is decided by the individual alone. For example, the individual names a particular sensation, on some occasion, 'S', and intends to use that word to refer to that sensation. Such a language Wittgenstein calls a *private language*.

Wittgenstein presents several perspectives on the concept of mind. One point he makes is that it is incoherent to talk of knowing that one is in some particular mental state, whereas others can learn of my pain, for example, I simply have my own pain; it follows that one does not know of one's own pain, one simply has a pain. For Wittgenstein, this is a grammatical point, part of the way in which the language-game involving the word 'pain' is played.

Although Wittgenstein certainly argues that the notion of private language is incoherent, because of the way in which the text is presented the exact nature of the argument is disputed. First, he argues that a private language is not really a language at all. This point is intimately connected with a variety of other themes in his later works, especially his investigations of "meaning". For Wittgenstein, there is no single, coherent "sample" or "object" that we can call "meaning". Rather, the supposition that there are such things is the source of much philosophical confusion. Meaning is a complicated phenomenon that is woven into the fabric of our lives. A good first approximation of Wittgenstein's point is that meaning is a social event; meaning happens between language users. As a consequence, it makes no sense to

talk about a private language, with words that mean something in the absence of other users of the language. Cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor has noted that use theories (of Wittgenstein kind) seem to be committed to the motion that language is a public phenomenon –that there is no such thing as a “private language.” Fodor opposes such claims because he thinks it is create or describe the languages of thought, which would seemingly require the existence of a “private language.”

Wittgenstein also argues that one couldn't possibly use the words of a private language. He invites the reader to consider a case in which someone decides that each time one has a particular sensation he will place a sign **S** in a diary. Wittgenstein points out that in such a case one could have no criteria for the correctness of one's use of **S**. Again, several examples are considered. One is that perhaps using **S** involves mentally consulting a table of sensations, to check that one has associated **S** correctly; but in this case, how could the mental table be checked for its correctness? It is “[a]s if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true”, as Wittgenstein puts it. One common interpretation of the argument is that while one may have direct or privileged access to one's current mental states, there is no such infallible access to identifying previous mental states that one had in the past. That is, the only way to check to see if one has applied the symbol **S** correctly to a certain mental state is to introspect and determine whether the current sensation is identical to the sensation previously associated with **S**. And while identifying one's current mental state of remembering may be infallible, whether one remembered correctly is not infallible. Thus, for a language to be used at all it must have some public criterion of identity.

To sum up, Wittgenstein asserts that, if something is a language, it cannot be (logically) private; and if something is private, it is not (and cannot be) a language. Thus we have found that it is a great attack to private language by Wittgenstein.

It is observed that Wittgenstein as a supporter of ordinary language analysis opines the interesting point that private language is impossible. An idealist speaks in private language. In case of private language he views that it is confined to speaker only. But the function of language cannot be confined to one speaker only. Again his significant point is that private language cannot be checked or justified. That is why 'Private Language' as a means of communication cannot be entertained. Discarding the private type of language Wittgenstein wants to establish that his later philosophy encompasses the circle of ordinary language. Though Wittgenstein rejects private language in real sense, it is observed that, people have some private experiences and they use individual language. In this sense, one cannot avoid the privacy. Therefore it can be said that Wittgenstein's arguments against the possibility of private language are not appropriate. In this context, A. C. Grayling remarks, "Wittgenstein's rejection of privacy always produces another problem in linguistic philosophy."⁴

It is observed that as a linguistic philosopher, Wittgenstein gives importance in proper use of language. Philosophical problems relating to mind/soul, consciousness/sensation and others arise due to misuse of language. In order to understand Wittgenstein's concept of mind, it is necessary to know what Wittgenstein has got to say so far as consciousness is concerned. Wittgenstein tries to dissolve the problem of mind and body and attempted to show that these problems arise out of conceptual confusions, and that proper attention to the way in which we use mental and physical terms in ordinary language will relief us from the vexations problem. According to Wittgenstein, mind is a part of the world where language-games take

place. It is observed that the question of consciousness arises only in the case of human beings who speak language. According to Wittgenstein, it is because of this, that, mind, thought and other mental states are ascribed to the human beings. It is the human beings who have the capacity to relate themselves to the world by virtue of their cognitive and other interest in the world. It is suggested by Wittgenstein that human mind cannot rest without speculation by simply dissolving the philosophical problems. A philosopher has to enquire the mental concepts until the mystery of the mind is disclosed. Wittgenstein maintains that language serves as the best medium of relating our mind to the world and mind does not stand apart as a transcendent entity but directly enters the world as a function of the linguistic activities. According to Wittgenstein, thinking and representing the world are same and the activity of representing the world means we have already thought about the world. Thus Wittgenstein's concept of mind represents the universe with language which represents rational mental activity and consciousness.

When Wittgenstein denies Descartes' concept of consciousness, he gives some important points about consciousness in his writings. He very carefully observes the use of mental words to express mental phenomena. It is found that according to him, there is nothing in common underlying mental phenomena. In this connection his concept of family resemblance can be applied to it. In a family, members have some common features in their nose, eyes, height etc due to which one can identify them as they have come from the same family. Though there is nothing common in the members of that family but they have some similarities. This concept can be applied in language or mental consciousness. There are different kinds of languages which have no any common essence but they have similarities. In that sense, like family resemblance, all conscious processes resemble to one another but nothing in common

which is to be called consciousness. The concept of family resemblance, according to Bambrough, is the solution of the problems of universals in philosophy.⁵ Therefore it can be said that in concept of consciousness, the notion of family resemblance is a significant one.

Wittgenstein criticizes the Cartesian theory of consciousness, which regards conscious to be a private inner essence. He says that a fundamental mistake is being made by Descartes and others to the philosophical tradition namely, that first person ascription, of psychological states are reports or descriptions of essentially private inner going on.⁶ Wittgenstein states that the all sensations of 1st persons are nothing but behavioral expressions. The key concept here is that of expression or behavior. This notion makes Wittgenstein as a behaviorist.

Wittgenstein states that “consciousness” does not refer to a phenomenon inside us and the alleged ontological gap between the physical world and the world of consciousness is merely a categorical difference between non-sentient and sentient beings that we commonly make apply. In *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein tries to show that there is no such thing as a “metaphysical” mystery of consciousness. This is Wittgenstein’s treatment of the Cartesian picture of consciousness is a part of his more general criticism of the inner/outer distinction. This is also closely connected to the problem of other minds. It is believed that “the mental states of others are hidden to me as well as my mental states are hidden for others.” But Wittgenstein criticized by saying that “Nothing is hidden.” Therefore ‘private’ is not allowed by Wittgenstein.

Another point that Wittgenstein makes against the possibility of a private language involves the beetle-in-a-box thought experiment. He asks the reader to imagine that each person has a box, inside of which is something that everyone

intends to refer to with the word “beetle”. Further, suppose that no one can look inside another's box, and each claims to know what a “beetle” is only by examining their own box. Wittgenstein suggests that, in such a situation, the word “beetle” could not be the name of a thing, because supposing that each person has something completely different in their boxes (or nothing at all) does not change the meaning of the word; the beetle as a private object “drops out of consideration as irrelevant.” Thus, Wittgenstein argues, if we can talk about something, then it is not private, in the sense considered. And, contra positively, if we consider something to be indeed private, it follows that we cannot talk about it.

Wittgenstein's investigations of language lead to several issues concerning the mind. His key target of criticism is any form of extreme mentalism that posits mental states that are entirely unconnected to the subject's environment. For Wittgenstein, thought is inevitably tied to language, which is inherently social; therefore, there is no 'inner' space in which thoughts can occur. Part of Wittgenstein's credo is captured in the following proclamation: “An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria.” This follows primarily from his conclusions about private languages: similarly, a private mental state (a sensation of pain, for example) cannot be adequately discussed without public criteria for identifying it.

It may be said that Wittgenstein rejects the view that consciousness is the essence of the mind. Before Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell also rejects the view that consciousness is the essence of mind. In the book ‘The analysis of mind, Bertrand Russell refutes the idealist view that mind is the reality and matter is the creation of the imagination of our mind, as well as the materialist view that matter is the reality and mind is the property of matter. In his course of analysis he considers the different

ways of being conscious. He says that perception, memory, belief are the examples of states of consciousness. Russell also criticized Descartes dualism.⁷

David Hume is another philosopher who rejects mind as a substance. Hume advocates that there is no such thing like mind, but we have different impressions which can be regarded as mind. Like Hume Russell writes, “when we try to look into ourselves, we also seen the ways to come upon some particular thought or feeling and not upon the ‘I’ which has the thought or feeling.”⁸ In ‘An outlines of Philosophy’ Russell defines mind as the group of mental events which is part of the history of a certain living body. From such concepts of mind of Russell, it is clear that there is much similarity between his own views and that of Wittgenstein.

In Wittgenstein notion, someone says that there must be special mental entity called a mind that makes our experiences private, is wrong. Part of the reason Wittgenstein thinks this way because he considers language to have meaning through public usage. In other words, when we talk of having a mind (or a beetle) we are using a term that we have learnt through conversation and public discourse. Furthermore, the word we have learnt can only ever meant “whatever is in your box” - i.e. your mind –and should not therefore the used to refer to some entity or special mental substance since no one can know that such a think exist. (we can’t see into other people’s boxes). From this example Wittgenstein wants to show that there is no certainty in private thinks, and words of private language don’t present in language game.

From the above analysis it is found that Wittgenstein nowhere in his theory admits mind as a private entity as Cartesian philosophers believe. Other points of his philosophy are also dissimilar with that of Cartesian ego as the subject of consciousness. Wittgenstein maintains that consciousness is not the essence of mind

or self. According to him, “the expression ‘in pain’ is applied in the case of me and other persons in equal sense because there is not separate meaning of this expression in dictionaries but only in the minds of philosophers”. Wittgenstein believes that both of them are free from an obvious touch of solipsism. Even he admits the possibility of knowing of other minds.

In analytical philosophy of twentieth century, Wittgenstein may be regarded as a man of genius. His two major works viz. *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* and *philosophical Investigations* are the stepping stones of analytical movement from where Wittgenstein’s concept of mind can be interpreted. Regarding the *Tractatus* Bertrand Russell remarks as “Mr. Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus*, whether or not it proved to give the ultimate truth on the matters with which it deals, certainly deserves, by its breadth and scope and profundity, to be considered an important event in the philosophical world.”⁹ Really it is a great remark about this book. Wittgenstein’s concept of the relation between language and mind has focused in this book. His *Philosophical Investigations* is also a famous book where Wittgenstein opines about mental states in different sections in it. Regarding this book Meredith Williams remarks as follows –

“Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* is one of the works of twentieth-century philosophy, destined to join the philosophical canon. Like all great works of philosophy it poses new problems while creating new forms of argument and persuasion. Unlike most contemporary philosophy texts, Wittgenstein’s work is not structured by chapter and section headings, but rather by numbered passages – evidence of Wittgenstein’s distinctive style and profound originality.”¹⁰

Wittgenstein’s analysis of thought, language and mind are absolutely remarkable in analytical philosophy. It is observed that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of

mind is anti Cartesian and there is no room for inherent privacy in the life of any individual. In spite of rejecting privacy, it is found that there are some statements in his *Philosophical Investigations* to support the inner life theory. Wittgenstein does not deny the essential privacy in some respect. But these inner are meaningful for own self only.

Wittgenstein in the form of linguistic analysis tries to emphasize a concept of mind. In various points it seems to be quite different from the ordinary view of the nature of mind. Wittgenstein asserts that whatever one can say about mind or the mental, one can ultimately say in term of the actually observed and observable behavior. Analytical behaviorism is an attempt to explain mind in terms of activity.

It states that the man would act and he reflects on his acts. And even if he reflects he can know that he does so. For admitting self reflection of some of our mental conditions would mean admitting more that what could be permitted by Wittgenstein's open hypothetical statement *regarding* behavior. In this respect C. A. Mace Ginn points out that analytical behaviorism gives an extended meaning of the term 'behavior' in such a way as include mental epithets which otherwise would embraces him. It seems that the analytical behaviorists while maintaining the reality of mental experiences denies causal explanation accorded to them by Descartes mind body dualism.

It is examined in Wittgenstein's philosophy that understanding and learning the meaning of a word is not mental act, but consists of understanding a pattern of behavior. And Wittgenstein interpreted in behavioral terms not only the concept of meaning but even mental concept like 'pain'. Within the framework of behaviorism, he argued that our mental concepts do not refer to the conscious, subjective status. Therefore all mental concepts, with our residue are reducible to a collection of

behavioral patterns. Thus a mental concept is not a 'name' of an inner phenomenon but refers to 'publicly' observable situation, Wittgenstein used his arguments the possibility of a 'private language' to prove that mental concepts are equivalent to a collection of behavioral situations.

From the observation, it can be said that as a contemporary thinker Wittgenstein's theory of mind is almost uniformly dismissive of pre-twentieth century accounts of mind and soul. (Except from them, perhaps). He often makes appeals to our ordinary intuition about the absurdity of substance dualist claims for an autonomous, usually immortal entity.

Wittgenstein's remarks in the *Philosophical Investigations* and in his writings on the philosophy of psychology undermine the picture of the mind as hidden from view. He does not provide an alternative scientific theory of psychology, but he reminds us of the forms of expression we use in our ordinary lives when we talk about wishes, hopes and expectations. In this manner, by giving us descriptions, he hopes we may come to see things differently. Wittgenstein attempts to develop a different picture of mental life. In his opinion, soul is not an entity or a property of the human body. It is best understood by reference to a whole range of abilities, many of which are exercised in the course of any human life. For Wittgenstein, to be human being, to have a human soul, is to have the life of a human being. This idea about mind is really remarkable in Wittgenstein's thought.

Wittgenstein's later philosophy involves a sustained struggle with a very common picture of the human mind or soul. It is the picture that the inner is essentially or logically hidden. He points out, the view that pain and other sensations are not logically hidden. There is no reason to believe that the pain is a private object which is located inside the person who experiences it, the difference between being in

pain and pretending to be in pain can be accounted for in terms of properties which one person has and the other does not. According to A. C. Grayling, Wittgenstein's denial of the mental element in the meaning of abstract terms and propositions and his denial of the mental aspect of an abstract thinking could be traced to a wrong introspectional analysis. ¹¹

It is seen that the most revolutionary view of Wittgenstein is that the old type of philosophy is nonsense and that the nonsensical character of the old type philosophy is rooted in the misuse of language. He says that the so called philosophical questions are pseudo-questions as such; they do not need to be answered. The philosopher should be brought out from the state of puzzlement, which could be done by persuading the philosopher to realize for himself how he has misused the words taken by him from common speech. That is what he means by saying that philosophical puzzles must be dissolved and not resolved. According to G. N. Mathrani, 'Wittgenstein says that philosophical puzzle about God (it being a philosophical puzzle) results from mental uneasiness. But in many cases, mental uneasiness is caused by the puzzle about God.' Wittgenstein's method of analysis is a poor therapy for those who are indeed puzzled about fundamental questions in philosophy. His therapy is meant for those whose philosophical puzzles are surface puzzles and not depth puzzles. According to Mathrani, "Wittgenstein was a thinker and not a scholar in the sense of being a great reader, he did not read much." ¹²

Though Wittgenstein criticizes Descartes' dualistic concept of mind body problem, both of them acknowledge that mind is a central feature of the world because the human language and actions are enormously important for our understanding of the world which we concerned. While Descartes posits the mind as the metaphysical centre of the world Wittgenstein takes it as an epistemological truth

about the human being. Descartes shows that mind is completely independent of the world and body is required for the manifestation of the mind. On the other hand, Wittgenstein makes it clear that though mind is irreducible, yet mind is co-partner of the body.

According to Wittgenstein, there is a self defeating character of the Cartesian position. For him the 'Paradox' of Cartesian theory of consciousness is that by giving prominence to the private sensations, the theory eliminates sensations.¹³ The beetle in the box passage displays this self-defeating character of the Cartesian position. He denies the truth of a private inner account of consciousness. It is better to mention here that, in absolute sense, Wittgenstein does not reject private inner account of consciousness. He does not want to deny the obvious truths that have a private mental life. People may have thoughts and pains but they do not utter and they do not show it. Wittgenstein does not deny to analyze this truth in a neo-behaviorist fashion. He wants to deny the possibility of giving a private sense, e.g. of giving sense to the word 'pain' by just attending to one's own pain experiences, a performance that would be private and unshakable. From the behavioral expressions one can assume the internal or mental feelings. The word 'pain' is always related with pain behavior. From such views, Wittgenstein may be regarded as a behaviorist. In this context Anthony Kenny remarks as follows, 'Few people are immediately convinced by Wittgenstein's suggestion that it is only the expression of pain that the word 'pain' can mean pain. Surely, we want to say, we can have a pain without ever saying or showing that we do and on the other hand we can say that we have a pain without really having one, the only connection between pain and the expression of pain is that they sometimes coincide. Pain and its expression seem no more essentially connected than redness and sweetness, sometimes what is red is sweet and sometimes not.'¹⁴

In this objection Wittgenstein immediately agrees that in our language we use the word 'being in pain' in such a way that we can say 'A is in pain but he does not show it.' But he insists that we should have no use for the expression of its application was severed from behavioral criteria. So the relation of pain to pain behavior is not the same as the relation of redness to sweetness. It is essential to the language game with the word 'pain' that the people who play it both behave in the particular way we call expressing pain, and sometimes more or less entirely conceal their pains. In this view, according to Kenny, Wittgenstein's position is different from behaviorism. If pain is identified with pain behavior, then 'A is in pain' means 'A is behaving in such and such a way'. But Wittgenstein rejects this interpretation of his theory that pain language is connected with pain-behavior. 'Pain' does not mean crying; the verbal expression of pain does not describe the natural expression of pain, but takes its place.

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Descartes said that there could be no third-person knowledge about another's mental states. "I know my mental ideas directly; I can only infer you from your behavior and other outward signs, which are only contingently related to inner events and states". This Cartesian view is rejected by Wittgenstein. He must provide a fresh look at the grammar of mental expressions. The dictum most closely associated with this fresh look of Wittgenstein's remark that 'an inner process' stands in need of outward criteria.¹⁶ The relation between inner processes and their outward signs must be no contingent if we are to speak intelligibly about the inner life of other people. Early interpretations of the *Investigations* took Wittgenstein to be denying mental states as truly inner. Wittgenstein's concept of consciousness and mental process makes him a logical behaviorist. He seems to say that mental processes are of the sensory kind like sense impressions, sensation of pain etc. Wittgenstein denies the

non-sensory intellectual kind of mental process. For Wittgenstein many psychological statements assert not only the occurrence of mental processes but also something about overt behavior. In this regard Wittgenstein maintains that there must be observable, behaviouristic criteria for the application of psychological concept. Mental phenomena are nothing but outward expression. If we remove the physical behavior from our action we find that nothing remains to be called mental or intentional. Wittgenstein does not find any difference between a physical movement and mental intention. He seeks to make clear in the place of the inner in the outer.

After discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind, a question arises in everyone's mind that "can we call Wittgenstein as a behaviorist?." According to some readers, Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist. It is seen that, in the different sections of *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein uses some mental predicates which implies that Wittgenstein believes "mind" as an entity. For example, he writes – Human body is the best picture of human soul.¹⁷ Here Wittgenstein accepts the human mind as an entity like the human body. He asserts that mind or soul is located in the human body. Body is visible but mind is invisible. The above statement implies that we have mind and our body is just a picture of that. According to Wittgenstein, both mind and body exist. This notion of Wittgenstein regarding the concept of mind is opposite from the behaviorist's assumption that there is no such entity which is called mind. Therefore it can be said that Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist from psychological perspective. In psychology, there is no such entity which called "mind." Psychologists accept only behavior not the mind.

A critical analyzer of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind Anthony Kenny also tries to say that Wittgenstein is differ from the position of behaviorism.¹⁸ He states that, "according to Wittgenstein in our language we use the word being in pain" in

such a way that we can say “A is in pain, but he doesn’t show it.” But he insists that we should have no use for the expression of its application was severed from behavioral criteria. So the relation of pain to pain behavior is not the same as the relation of redness to sweetness. It is essential to the language game with the word ‘pain’ that the people who play it both behave in the particular way we call expressing pain, and some time more or less and entirely conceal their pains.¹⁹ In this point Wittgenstein’s position is not similar with behaviorism. If pain is identified with pain behavior, then “A is in pain” means “A is behaving in such –and such a way”. But Wittgenstein rejects this interpretation of his theory that ‘pain language’ is connected with ‘pain behavior.’ “Pain doesn’t mean crying: the verbal expression of pain doesn’t describe the natural expression of pain, but takes its place”²⁰

From such views we can’t say that Wittgenstein is a behaviorist. According to Paul Horwich, “Wittgenstein wants to make it absolutely clear that he is not behaviorist that he is certain not denying that pains and other experiences exist over and above behavior.”²¹

Though, according some critics, Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist but it has been seen that from the writings of Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*, one can say that Wittgenstein is a behaviorist. He writes the following versions which make him as a behaviorist. In *Philosophical Investigations* he writes as follows-

(1) Inner stands in need of outward criteria.²²

The above statement written in the *Philosophical Investigations* implies that there is a close connection between the inner and outer. From the outer expression or behavior it can be determined that there must be inner because without inner state outer expressions are impossible. Thus the co-relation between inner and outer is recognized by Wittgenstein. Therefore it can be said that body is outer expression of

the inner states of mind. Without the existence of body the concept of mind is meaningless. Mind and mental world are reflected in one's outward expression and behaviour. Thus to exhibit the inner the outer world is necessary.

(2) A sensation is not a something private.²³

Sensation or feelings are not private because one's emotional turmoil finds expressions in his/her outward behaviour. Wittgenstein points out that "I would never have learned the meaning of the word 'pain' without the aid of other people, not of whom have access to the supposed private sensation of pain that I feel. For the word pain to have any meaning at all presupposes some sort of external verification, as set of criteria for its correct application, and they must be accessible to others as well as to myself." Thus the traditional way of pain needs to be abandoned altogether. Therefore the feeling of pain is related to the pain behavior or external behavior.

(3) "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain for example, without *pain-behavior*?" – It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) living human beings can one say: it has sensation: it sees, is blind, hears is deaf is conscious or unconscious.²⁴

Thus it can be said that pain cannot be hidden in reality. Through the physical gesture, pain or pleasure gets its identity. In case human beings only pain or pleasure can be understood because of their consciousness. On the other hand irrational beings are not capable of showing their behavior or "mind" as they don't have conscious activity.

(4) Human body is the best picture of the human soul.²⁵

From this statement which is mentioned in *Philosophical Investigations* it can be said that human body is like the mirror of human soul. If the soul or mind is happy then the body behaves calm, but if restlessness prevails in the soul or mind then that

beings a unhappy reflection in the body. Thus body may be considered as outward expression and mind is the inner state of the body.

(5) Only of what behaves like a human being can one say that it has pain etc.²⁶

According to Wittgenstein, mental states are intimately connected to a subject environment, especially their linguistic environment and conceivability or imaginability arguments that claim otherwise are misguided. Pain occupies a distinct and vital place in the philosophy of mind for several reason. One is that pain seems to collapse the appearance/reality distinction. If an object appears to us to be red it might not be so in reality, but if we seen to our self to be in pain I must be so: there can be no case of seeing at all. At the same time one can feel another person's pain, but only infer it from their behaviour and their reports of it.

It is seen that in the above versions, Wittgenstein gives importance in outer world than the inner. Physical activities are sources for determination of mental existence. For example, "pain" can be understood from behavioral expressions. When someone feels toothache or other pain, naturally he shows some physical behaviors which are not same with a normal one. Therefore outer expressions are the general criteria for realizing the actual events. For such types of notions, Wittgenstein may be regarded as a behaviorist. But his behaviorism is logical or analytical behaviorism, since according to Wittgenstein, mental states may be translated without lost of meaning into attribution of behavior and behavioral disposition. We may called Wittgenstein as an analytical behaviorist, because according to him, the statement about mental states can be translated into possible circumstances. Therefore we have come to the conclusion that Wittgenstein may be regarded as an analytical behaviorist.

From his remarks on the importance of public, observable behavior (as opposed to private experiences), it may seem that Wittgenstein is simply a behaviorist—one who thinks that mental states are nothing over and above certain behavior. However, Wittgenstein resists such a characterization; he writes (considering what an objector might say):

“Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” — If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.

Clearly, Wittgenstein did not want to be a behaviorist, nor did he want to be a cognitivist or a phenomenologist. He is, of course, primarily concerned with facts of linguistic usage. However, some argue that Wittgenstein is basically a behaviorist because he considers facts about language use as all there is. Such a claim is controversial, since it is not explicitly endorsed in the *Investigations*.

From philosophical perspective Wittgenstein has put forward his intense study on mind in above manner. He analysis/introspection of mind, body, language, thought, reality etc. puts him on a platform of a behaviorist. Thus it can be concluded at the end of my study in this thesis that Wittgenstein may be called a behaviorist. But his behaviorism is logical or analytical behaviorism.

Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind has a tremendous impact in the movement of analytic philosophy. Modern analytic philosopher like Gilbert Ryle, P. F. Strawson, J. L. Austin etc. take their inspiration from Wittgenstein. Though Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind is criticized on some specific points still Wittgenstein's trend does not come to an end. Rather it has been flourishing over the modern philosophical world since the beginning of the last century. This trend has brought to the limelight the importance using the analysis of language philosophically. The analysis of mind

in terms of ordinary language is the significant thought of Wittgenstein. So, his philosophy is still relevant. P.M.S. Hacker points out that with the collapse of Wittgenstein's early philosophy; he joined the repudiators of metaphysics rejecting traditional metaphysics, the Kantian project and the ineffable metaphysics of the *Tractatus* alike. The line he pursued however was idiosyncratic and unparalleled in history of philosophy.²⁸ P. F. Strawson remarks that "right or wrong Wittgenstein's particular doctrines like Family resemblance, Language-games, Form of life, Use theory of meaning etc. are the greatest interest and important concept. But the value of the '*Philosophical Investigations*' as a model of philosophical method is greater still. It will consolidate the philosophical revolution."²⁹

Lastly it can be said that Wittgenstein is one of the very few western philosophers who have brought to the forefront the connection between philosophy and language. His contribution to the contemporary western philosophy is so highly rated that G.W. Von Wrie said, the unraveling and evaluation of various famous which Wittgenstein's influences has assumed will constitute a major chapter in the history get to be written of twentieth century philosophy and ideas.³⁰ Gorge Pitcher supporting this view and writes, "Wittgenstein is one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. He may be the greatest."³¹

Really Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* is a great contribution to the philosophy of mind. Wittgenstein offered a new dimension to the 'problem of mind' by relating mind with language.

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